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3. Supporting savers to make the right choice at retirement for them and 
their family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment 
'But what am I to do?' said Alice. 'Anything you like’, said the Footman, 
and began whistling.  
Lewis Carroll (1865), Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
 
We will investigate whether it is possible to design a set of good decumulation defaults and 
default pathways at retirement which will be suitable for most savers, in the same way that 
a good default investment strategy in the accumulation phase can be designed. Even if this 
is possible, we accept that it is likely that more people might opt for a different retirement 
income plan than the estimated 10% of people who reject the default accumulation fund. 
For example, some retirees might be in poor health and so might choose to access their 
funds in full at the date of retirement – or over as short a period as possible (staggered to 
avoid paying unnecessary income tax). Given the complexities of retirement expenditure 
decision making, we will examine the support in terms of guidance, help and advice that 
savers need in order to make the right choices for them and their family.  Building on the 
lessons of auto-enrolment, we will examine what nudges would be useful to move people 
towards making decisions that are in their best long-term interests. We will also consider 
the barriers, especially the regulatory barriers, to implementing a default. The overriding 
question that we seek to answer in this Chapter is this: Is it possible to design safe harbour 
retirement income plans which combine safe harbour products with financial help or 
guidance (that confirms the suitability of the product for the client) in order to provide 
retirement income journeys that are good enough for most of Middle Britain? 
3.1 Introduction 
The optimal drawing down of retirement assets is a considerably more complex activity than 
the initial task of accumulating those assets. The two main reasons for this are, firstly, that 
most savers will not have a good understanding of many of the risks outlined in Table 1.2 
and, secondly, the impact of those risks will differ for different people depending on their 
circumstances. People, for example, differ in terms of the size of their pension pot, the 
availability of alternative sources of income and wealth, their liabilities, their health status, 
their family circumstances, their tax position, and their risk appetite and risk capacity. The 
new flexibilities announced by the 2014 Budget will introduce additional complexity and 
uncertainty both to the final phase of the of the accumulation stage of DC pension schemes 
and to the retirement income market itself (i.e., the decumulation stage).  
In this Chapter, we examine different ways of segmenting the retirement income market. 
We look at different spending types, different behavioural types, and the different 
resources and needs of the different market segments. We propose a retirement 
expenditure and investment plan that helps to overcome the behavioural barriers that many 
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people face that prevents them making decisions that are in their best long-term interests. 
Next, we consider a range of defaults and default pathways that have been proposed to 
nudge people onto an optimal decumulation strategy. We then turn to the information, 
guidance and advice that are available for consumers and examine the suitability of each. 
We examine the role of advisers in the new pensions environment and the impact of 
technology on advice. Despite Government efforts to provide information to pension savers, 
we ask whether there is an advice gap for certain segments of the market. The different 
charging models used by advisers are investigated. The implications of this for a default 
pathway are considered. This is followed by an investigation of potential consumer 
vulnerability and the proposed regulatory responses to this. Access and exit charges became 
prominent issues in the months following the introduction of ‘freedom and choice’ and we 
consider media and Government reactions to these. We also discuss pension fraud and the 
questions of customer engagement and customer responsibility. Monitoring of the pension 
reforms will be important and we consider proposals about how to do this. The self-
employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment are also examined. We end the 
Chapter by briefly examining the experience of other countries. 
3.2 Understanding the retirement savings market 
We begin with some recent surveys of savers covering their attitudes and plans for 
retirement income.  
In November 2014, the Pensions Policy Institute published an analysis, commissioned by 
Fidelity Worldwide Investment, of the decisions people will need to make, following the 
introduction of the new pension regime, when they are approaching, at the point of, and 
during retirement.356 The report found that ‘many of those reaching retirement with a DC 
[defined contribution] pension pot will have a greater number of options to choose from 
about how they access their savings. This could make their decisions far more complicated, 
pushing the burden of managing these risks further onto pension savers, and, in some cases, 
extending the need for ongoing decision making during retirement’. The report also found 
that ‘decisions about accessing DC pensions are considered the most challenging of pension 
and retirement decisions and other major financial decisions from across the life course’. 
This is because people will have to understand ‘complex and uncertain’ factors such as 
inflation, investment and longevity risks (and the other risks in Table 1.2) and many people 
do not have the financial capability or numeracy skills to do this adequately. The report 
concludes that: ‘those with low levels of numeracy will find decisions about accessing 
pension savings particularly challenging, but will be at greater risk if they also do not have 
                                                     
356
 Pensions Policy Institute (2014) Transition to Retirement - How Complex are the Decisions that Pension 
Savers Need to Make at Retirement?, November; http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/press/press-
releases/t2r-how-complex-are-the-decisions-that-pension-savers-need-to-make-at-retirement 
201 
 
the security of being able to fall back on a secure source of private pension income in the 
form of an indexed DB [defined benefit] pension’. 
Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA),357 the PPI found that 
people reaching state pension age (SPA) over the next ten to fifteen years vary considerably 
in their pension and non-pension savings. It identified the groups at greatest risk of making 
poor decisions when they reach SPA ‘if they are not offered adequate support, either 
through guidance and advice or through the provision of suitable defaults’. It predicted that 
700,000 people reaching SPA over the next 10-15 years (12% of the total) will be at ‘high 
risk’ of making poor decisions when they retire; this group has significant DC savings 
(between £19,400 and £51,300), but no additional DB pension. A further 1.6 million (29% of 
the total) will be at ‘medium risk’; this group has £6,300 or less in DC savings and little or no 
additional DB pension.  
In March 2015, the International Longevity Centre – UK (ILC-UK) also published a report 
based on an analysis of ELSA data.358 The study analysed the outcomes of four different 
approaches to using DC pension wealth: (a) annuitising, (b) blowing the pot on big ticket 
items, (c) putting everything into a savings account, and (d) leaving the fund invested and 
using drawdown.   
The report found that: 
 Even if all those approaching retirement were to annuitise, over half of them (1.1 
million people) will not be able to secure an adequate income (defined as 70% of 
final salary), unless they use non-pension assets or receive additional benefits on top 
of the state pension 
 In a scenario where the DC pot is used to buy big ticket items, an additional 350,000 
people (1.4 million people in total) will not be able to secure an adequate income in 
retirement 
 Putting everything in a savings account also risks people running out of money 
before they die. The report predicted that average replacement rates could fall from 
66% to 49%. Given that people typically underestimate their life expectancy by 
upwards of four years, spending savings too early is a real possibility 
 Leaving the fund invested also risks people running out of money before death as 
well as exposing individuals to substantial income volatility. Within a balanced fund 
of 60% bonds and 40% equities, the report estimated that average annual income in 
retirement could vary between £18,000 and £12,000, depending on the fund’s 
                                                     
357
 ELSA is the largest survey of people living in England aged between 55 and 74. In total, there are 6 million 
people in this age range and 2 million of them have DC pension pots and are yet to retire. 
358
 Here Today, Gone Tomorrow. How Today’s Retirement Choices Could Affect Financial Resilience Over the 
Long Term, 16 March 2015;  
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/images/uploads/publication-pdfs/Here_today,_gone_tomorrow_1.pdf 
202 
 
performance.  If individuals are unprepared for such volatility, it would be akin to 
significant year-on-year income shocks (e.g., incomes being lower by 30% one year 
compared with the previous year) which could adversely impact living standards. 
The prospects are even worse for the 850,000 individuals who will rely mainly on a DC 
pension but have low levels of financial capability. In all the four scenarios above, they will 
end up with replacement ratios below 40%.  
The report warned that ‘such income falls coming at the end of life could have disastrous 
implications resulting in individuals cutting back on expenditure just at a time when they 
may need it most, i.e., to maintain basic living standards as well as paying for long-term 
care’. 
In January 2015, the Pensions Policy Institute published the results of a set of in-depth 
interviews with 55 DC pension savers aged 55 to 70.359 The interviews were conducted by 
Ignition House and sponsored by State Street Global Advisors. The purpose of the interviews 
was to determine the preferences for how these savers would draw a retirement income, 
the financial trade-offs that they are willing to make, and the default products and 
strategies that could best support them. The new flexibilities are popular with DC savers. 
However ‘once they begin to understand the full scale of choices and trade-offs involved in 
deciding how to access their DC pension pots at retirement, they can quickly become 
daunted. This suggests that disengagement and inertia amongst consumers from April 2015 
is a key risk without the provision of effective default strategies and appropriate guidance 
and advice. The idea of their pension scheme or existing provider offering a default 
investment or drawdown option into retirement resonated with DC savers, with some 
believing that providers even had a “duty” to offer this – though they recognised the 
importance of wider individual and household circumstances and the need for there to be 
some element of choice for those who want it’. 
The PPI identified a number of specific risks facing savers: 
 Reluctance or inability to plan beyond the next few years, which means locking into a 
specific course of action either before or at retirement is generally unpopular 
 Perceptions that there are ‘safer’ or ‘better’ investments they can use outside of 
pensions, which, when probed, are based on misguided beliefs or have not been 
properly thought through 
 Poor understanding of both spending needs throughout retirement and likely life 
expectancy and, in particular, the probability of living beyond age 85, which means 
DC savers are likely to underestimate the importance of longevity insurance 
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 Pensions Policy Institute (2015) Transition to Retirement - Supporting DC members with Defaults and 
Choices Up To, Into, and Through Retirement: Qualitative Research with Those Approaching Retirement, 
January; http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/publications/reports/transition-to-retirement-defaults 
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 Lack of engagement (even very close to retirement) – leading to the potential for 
consumer detriment if the defaults available are not suitable and designed in the 
best interest of savers. 
Digging deeper into investment issues, the study found that the participants are not 
currently well-equipped to make investment choices. In particular, they are not confident 
about investing in equity-based products. The implication is that ‘left to their own devices, 
participants would probably put their fund in “safe” investments [i.e., investments with 
capital protection] or leave it rolling in their pension’.  Participants are generally reluctant to 
make up-front commitments about when they might be willing to lock their money in to a 
particular strategy. They are also reluctant to hand over significant sums of capital in the 
early years of retirement to another party. However, after some prompting, most 
participants would be willing to trade off more risk and indeed some flexibility for the 
possibility of higher returns. With further prompting, many participants would typically 
choose a low or medium risk portfolio.360 
In terms of drawing from the pension pot, participants place a high value on ‘ease of access 
and flexibility to change the amount of income’: they would ‘prefer to access their pension 
pots on an ad hoc basis or take money out of these tax efficiently, but there was confusion 
about how to do this’. It was likely that they would draw a level income or take more 
income early on.  
Participants had a poor understanding of longevity risk and hence a low awareness of how 
long the pension pot needed to last. The concept of longevity insurance ‘was understood 
and resonated, but a key barrier will be the cost of this’. Participants ‘could see the merits of 
securing an income at some point in the future when they were no longer willing or able to 
make decisions on the pot any more. However, they were very unwilling to precommit to 
purchasing an annuity to do this. In addition, they would want to retain as much flexibility as 
possible, so were not warm to the idea of automatic conversion or rollover to a guaranteed 
income in later life, especially if this meant locking into an annuity. They would prefer to 
leave their options open for as long as possible, and are unlikely to want to commit to the 
option of securing an income until they are in their 70’s or beyond’. Nevertheless, many 
participants ‘were warm to the concept of a gradual payment for a longevity insurance 
product, with participants being able see how this could help them to build up a “safety net” 
against the risk that they live too long or take out too much income. The biggest barrier 
mentioned would be the cost, with the majority feeling that ongoing premiums of between 
                                                     
360
 The low-risk portfolio consisted mainly of bonds with some shares and had an expected return of 4%, just 
enough to beat inflation, but in a bad year could lose 10% of its value. The medium-risk portfolio consisted of 
60% shares and 40% less risky assets and had an expected return of  5-6%, more than enough to beat inflation, 
but in a bad year could fall by 15-20%. With prompting, participants could be persuaded to move away from 
an all-cash portfolio, which while not falling in value in nominal terms, would generate returns of only 1-2% 
which would not be sufficient to keep up with inflation. However, there was a reluctance to move to a high-
risk portfolio (with 80% in shares) where the expected return was 6-7%, but in a bad year could fall by 25-30%. 
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£500 and £1,000 per annum, starting at age 65, were not seen as an unreasonable amount 
to secure a lifetime income, e.g. £5,000 per annum, from age 85 onwards’.361 But, ‘after 
considering these costs, some still then felt that it would be too much of a “gamble” and 
they would prefer to take their chance on running out of money’. Death benefits are viewed 
as a ‘nice to have’, with individuals more willing to take more investment risk for their 
partner than their children. 
The PPI believes that defaults are a good way of dealing with these problems. The two main 
justifications are that: (a) most participants did not know and were not interested in how 
their pensions were currently invested in the accumulation phase and (b) they can also be 
overwhelmed by the number and complexity of choices around drawing down income. They 
were also currently in a default through auto-enrolment. So the reason for having a default 
in the accumulation phase would also appear to hold for the decumulation phase: it is 
unlikely that people will develop the necessary skills and knowledge to manage investment 
choices in the decumulation phase. But despite support for the idea of defaults, participants 
also wanted some alternatives in recognition of the differing circumstances people face in 
retirement. Nevertheless it was clear that people needed support to make the trade-offs 
that the new world of ‘freedom and choice’ will bring: ‘given the existing lack of 
understanding around the underlying investments in default funds, and what the funds are 
seeking to achieve, it will be important that any defaults and alternatives offered are clearly 
branded and communicated in terms of their objectives and risk-level’. 
The PPI proposes that policy makers, regulators and the pensions industry should work 
together to address these issues. Alistair Byrne, senior DC strategist at State Street Global 
Advisors, added: ‘We need to begin putting in place arrangements to implement the 
‘freedom and choice’ reforms now, and the PPI's research provides strong evidence to build 
on. It's clear that default investment strategies in DC plans need to cope with uncertainty 
around when people will retire and how they will access their retirement savings. The 
industry needs to put in place well-governed retirement income defaults that provide 
members with value for money and flexible access to their assets, without overwhelming 
them with complex choices’. 
The uncertainty over how retirement income will be taken is confirmed by a poll conducted 
by True Potential, the results of which were published in February 2015.362 The poll of 2,000 
pension savers found that 76% of those aged 55-64 did not yet know how they will take an 
income from their pension, rising to 82% for those over 65. Only 5% planned to buy an 
annuity, although 40% of respondents believed a consistent income was the most important 
factor in retirement. Of those of working age, 20% said they had not thought about a 
                                                     
361 
These premiums were generated by discussions that took place in the participant meetings, rather than 
being based on calculations around realistic premiums for this type of longevity insurance. 
362
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Most over-55s undecided on retirement route – poll, Professional 
Adviser, 23 February. 
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pension, with higher percentages amongst the young: 29% of those aged 18-24 and 24% of 
those aged 25-34. 
A survey conducted by Fidelity Worldwide Investment for its Class of 2015 report published 
in March 2015 found that only 14% of 525 people interviewed in January 2015 who will be 
retiring in the next year had done any significant research about their options.363  A further 
10% were waiting to be contacted by their product provider. While most respondents (65%) 
felt confident about managing their finances, many had not yet considered the basic 
elements of a retirement income plan. One in ten thought they could make withdrawals 
from their scheme without needing to contact their provider to establish terms of access. A 
further 7% reported that they had not even thought about this. In addition, many people did 
not understand the tax implications of the new pensions regime, with 42% not knowing the 
threshold at which pension lump sums are taxed and 10% believing they can access their 
whole pot tax-free. While 56% of those polled said they would access their pension as a cash 
lump sum, with 18% planning to access more than the tax-free amount, only 4% said they 
would withdraw the entire pot in one go. Annuities were being considered by 22% of those 
not wishing to withdraw all of their pot, 25% said they would transfer to a drawdown 
product, 17% will leave their pension invested and defer taking it, and 13% will use a 
combination of a drawdown pension and an annuity. Another 20% were still undecided. 
Alan Higham, then Fidelity retirement director, said: ‘These decisions are complex and we 
would urge people to seek the appropriate expert help and advice in order to ensure they 
get the most from their retirement savings; be it through careful research or through an 
adviser…..if they are less confident. It is alarming that there is a certain hard core of people 
taking an approach to retirement that they would not take to their everyday life. With 
neither a rainy day fund, nor idea of a budget nor, indeed, an intention of establishing the 
best deal or checking the small print on their funds, this group is vulnerable to making a 
poor choice that could cost them dearly in retirement….[Further], the tax implications of 
accessing your pension could be the biggest issue for this set of retirees’.364 
In September 2015, Retirement Advantage released the results of a survey, conducted by 
YouGov, where the over 50s were asked what they would like from their retirement income 
product. The findings indicate that ‘the need for flexibility and the desire for certainty are 
valued equally by consumers, though when pressed, certainty is considered more important 
                                                     
363
 Reported in: Michael Klimes (2015) Just one in seven retiring this year have researched options, 
Professional Pensions, 23 March; Jack Jones (2015) One in ten retiring this year expect whole pot to be tax-
free, Professional Pensions, 10 March; Carmen Reichman (2015) Fifth of near-retirees still clueless about tax 
on pension withdrawals, research, Professional Adviser, 10 March. 
364
 Vince Smith-Hughes, head of business development at Prudential, has also warned that the majority of 
people accessing their pensions for the first time will be overpaying tax, particularly if they withdraw large 
sums of cash. This is because HMRC requires providers to apply an emergency tax code on sums withdrawn if 
they do not have the customer’s normal income tax code. Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Prudential 
sounds emergency tax warning on pension pot withdrawals, Professional Adviser, 1 April.  
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than flexibility’. Around a quarter wanted absolute certainty and were reluctant to take any 
risk whatsoever with their pension savings, but most were happy to take some investment 
risk. The implication of the findings, according to Andrew Tully, pensions technical director 
at Retirement Advantage, is that ‘consumers want it all, and as we know, neither an annuity 
nor a drawdown product on their own meet the need for certainty and flexibility. But a 
combination of both products can…. Combining annuities and drawdown into one product, 
offered under drawdown rules, opens up a whole new way of thinking about flexibility of 
income in retirement’.365  
In March 2015, Franklin Templeton released the results of its Retirement Income Strategies 
and Expectations (RISE) survey of 2,000 adults.366 It found that only 25% of respondents 
(mainly from the highest income groups) planned to leave some of their pension pot 
invested on the stock market after they retire, while 42% thought the stock market was 'too 
risky' as a retirement strategy, and 33% felt they did not have the knowledge to choose the 
right investments. The main concern was the possible decline in the value of the pension 
pot: 80% of respondents stated that they would be worried about a 20% decline in their 
pension savings, while 44% would be concerned about a 5% fall. There was a clear 
preference for low-risk investments: 73% said they were leaning towards a low-risk 
approach to their retirement investments, while 88% said stock market investing had no, or 
only a limited, role to play in retirement saving due to the perceived risks. The key preferred 
alternatives were tax-efficient vehicles, such as independent savings accounts (ISAs), 
favoured by 40% of respondents, while 26% thought property would be a part of their 
retirement portfolios.  
A survey by J.P. Morgan Asset Management reported in February 2015 revealed poor 
investor understanding of how investments generate the income that will be needed to pay 
for goods and services in retirement. According to Jasper Berens, head of UK funds at JP 
MAM: ‘Given the relentless media attention that record low interest rates have received 
over the past couple of years, I was genuinely flabbergasted to learn that less than half of 
UK investors (44%) could correctly explain the term “income investing”,…It seems to be the 
case that, while many investors acknowledge the importance attached to generating income 
for their portfolios, too few actually know how to achieve this outcome’.367 A ‘worrying’ 38% 
of respondents plan to rely on savings accounts as their 'preferred' source of income, 
despite the below-inflation returns that these generate.  
                                                     
365 
Andrew Tully (2015) The whole package: Annuities and drawdown side by side, Retirement Planner, 22 
September. 
366
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Most retirees have 'no intention' to stay invested – poll, Professional 
Adviser, 31 March. 
367
 Jasper Berens (2015) Alarm bells: The growing income investor knowledge gap, Professional Adviser, 27 
February. 
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A survey of 1,000 relatively well-off people aged over 55 conducted in March 2015 found 
the average pension pot was £87,500 and the average amount people expected to take in 
income each year was £9,000. Even with a growth rate of 5% per annum, this means that 
the average pot will only last 10 years. Half of those nearing retirement (i.e., aged 55-64) 
were unable to predict how long their pension income would last. Not everyone surveyed 
had a pension pot: almost 20% would have to rely solely on a state pension. Around one 
third would need to continue working to support their retirement expenditure, while 50% 
could rely on property and other savings.368 
A survey held in April 2015 by website RetireEasy of 1,572 well-off pre-retirees – who are 
aged 58 on average, plan to retire partially at 61 and have average private pension assets of 
£146,000 – found that most felt well prepared for the new pensions regime, despite the fact 
that only 34% had been contacted by their pension provider about the changes. Despite 
this, 68% said they were aware of the changes and potential charges. The survey found that 
28% plan to withdraw funds before they reach 65. Of those, 90% are only going to withdraw 
the 25% tax-free maximum lump sum. The same percentage said that they do not have 
plans to buy an annuity with the remainder of their fund. A similar proportion (91%) of 
those surveyed plan to supplement their income by working part-time in retirement. Three-
quarters (78%) are either fully or partly aware of the difference between capped and flexi-
access drawdown. More than one in eight (84%) think that ‘freedom and choice’ is a ‘good 
idea', although 72% do not plan to take advantage of the freedoms.369 
The above surveys covered the national population as a whole.  Collectively, they reveal that 
people welcome the new pension flexibilities, but many – especially in the middle market 
group lying between those who will rely mainly on the state for their retirement income and 
the well off – will find themselves poorly equipped to make best use of them, not least 
because they hold beliefs and preferences which are mutually inconsistent, a condition that 
psychologists call ‘cognitive polyphasia’.  
Does the picture become clearer if  we segment the market more finely?  
3.3 Segmenting the retirement income market 
When segmenting the retirement income market, we need to recognise that people differ 
both in their types and in their resources. 
3.3.1 People differ in their types  
We consider two ways of segmenting the market according to type of customer. 
                                                     
368
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Retirees banking on 10% withdrawal rate 'will drain pots in a decade’, 
Professional Adviser, 8 April.  
369
 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Well-off retirees on top of freedoms despite 'poor provider contact', 
Professional Adviser, 15 April. 
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3.3.1.1  Segmentation by type of spender 
The first way is to segment DC savers according to their spending objectives. This is the 
approach taken in the Aon DC Member Survey. In December 2014, the results of a 
nationwide survey of over 2,000 occupational DC scheme members by YouGov was 
published. The survey was conducted between September and October 2014 and sponsored 
by Aon Hewitt and Cass Business School.370 It identified five types of spender as shown in 
Table 3.1.  
‘Certainty seekers’, who account for 35% of the total, want an annuity so that they can have 
a secure stable guaranteed income for life. ‘Steady spenders’, accounting for another 35%, 
want the same outcomes as certainty seekers. They want an annuity in all but name, but 
they intend to continue investing their money in retirement to generate a stable income: 
‘While there are recognised downsides to conventional annuities, with price, compulsion, 
lack of flexibility and no terminal value all cited as negatives in the current system, there is 
clearly also a continued appetite for an ‘annuity-like’ approach’ according to the survey. 
Fifteen percent are classified as ‘flexibility foremost’. This group will be relying on the state 
pension and other sources of income to meet their core expenditure needs and will draw 
from their DC pot as and when needed. ‘Early spenders’, accounting for 10% of the total, 
want either to draw down as soon as possible to spend or invest in assets such as property, 
or continue to invest their pot to generate income, while enjoying higher spending in the 
earlier years of retirement. The fifth group, called ‘residual required’, comprising 5% of the 
total can be subdivided into either ‘care conscious’ or ‘bequest driven’. Both groups plan to 
continue investing during retirement to generate a stable income either to provide for 
possible care costs or to make bequests to the family.  
The proportions of the population comprising these different spending types appear to be 
broadly confirmed by other recent surveys. For example, Aegon’s Second UK Readiness 
Report,371 published in November 2014, found that 40% of retirees want a guaranteed 
retirement income for life, while 30% said that they would like some combination of a 
guaranteed income and a cash lump sum. Just 16% said they would take their pension as a 
cash lump sum. Similarly, a study by ILC-UK called Making the System Fit for Purpose,372 
published in January 2015, found that 70% of those approaching retirement wished to use 
their pension pot to provide a guaranteed life-long and inflation-protected income. Just 7% 
reported that they would use their pot to buy a car or pay for a holiday, while 5% said they 
would prefer to pay off their debts.  
                                                     
370
 http://www.aon.com/unitedkingdom/defined-contribution/dc-member-survey.jsp. Also reported in Sophia 
Singleton (2014) What do DC scheme members really want?,  Pensions Age, December. 
371  
https://www.aegon.co.uk/news/media-centre/pressreleases/just-6-percent-are-on-track-for-the-retirement-
they-want.html 
372 
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/publications/publication_details/making_the_system_fit_for_purpose 
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Table 3.1: Types of DC saver according to their spending objectives 
Type Definition % of total 
Certainty-seeker Want an annuity so that they can have a secure, 
stable, guaranteed income for life 
35 
Steady spender Want the same outcomes as certainty seekers. But, 
they plan to continue investing their money in 
retirement to generate this stable income. 
Essentially, they want an annuity in all but name 
35 
Flexibility foremost Anticipate continuing to invest and will dip into 
these savings as and when needed. They are likely to 
be planning to rely on state pension and other 
sources of income to support their retirement 
15 
Early spender Want to take their retirement savings in one 
(partially taxable) lump sum, or in a series of 
payments soon after retirement (perhaps to reduce 
the tax impact) 
10 
Residual required  Want to ensure a significant element of pension 
savings towards the end of their lifetimes for long-
term care or bequest to family 
5 
Source: Aon DC Member Survey, December 2014 
 
The Aon DC Member Survey also provides insights into how people plan to take money from 
their pot. Fifty percent of those surveyed said they would use drawdown either in whole or 
in part. Of this sub-sample, 20% said they would like the drawdown and investments 
managed within their current scheme, 17% said they would like them managed by another 
pension provider such as an insurance company, 25% said they would manage the process 
themselves with the aid of an adviser, and another 25% said they would ‘go it alone’. 
The survey also asked about drawdown concerns and elicited the following responses to the 
question ‘which of the following would worry you the most with regard to your drawdown 
pot?’: 
 29% – running out of money before I die 
 26% – my money not growing as fast as I need it to in order to meet my income 
needs 
 25% – seeing the value of my pension fund fall in value, even temporarily, due to 
poor investment returns 
 11% – not being able to access my pension fund when I need to 
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 7% – none of the above would worry me 
 1% – don’t know. 
What is concerning about these findings is that most people do not appear to be worried 
about running out of money before they die – even when they are explicitly asked –  and 
this after all is the main protection a properly designed pension plan provides. The key 
explanation for this appears to be that death is an event too distant for many people to be 
concerned about. This is a behavioural problem which needs a behavioural solution. 
 
3.3.1.2  Segmentation by behavioural type 
The second way of segmenting the market is by behavioural type.373   
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their best selling 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions 
about Health, Wealth and Happiness define two very different types of consumers – ‘econs’ 
and ‘humans’. In a retirement expenditure context, ‘econs’ are fully rational life-cycle 
financial planners. ‘Humans’, by contrast, try to make the best decisions for themselves, but 
are subject to behavioural traits that limit their ability to implement their plans. Thaler and 
Sunstein believe that very few people are ‘econs’ and their book provides examples of how 
to nudge ‘humans’ into making optimal choices. 
If people were ‘econs’ capable of behaving rationally and were sufficiently well informed, 
they could calculate the risk-return tradeoff between an annuity and drawdown and choose 
which was initially better for them and, more importantly, when it was optimal to switch 
from drawdown to an annuity to guarantee they will not outlive their resources. Econs will 
be very concerned about this. But most people are ‘humans’ who neither behave rationally, 
nor have the technical skills to evaluate the risk-return tradeoff, nor, indeed, many of the 
other risks listed in Table 1.2. Humans have behavioural biases which prevent them 
behaving rationally. One particular example is what economists call the ‘annuity puzzle’, the 
reluctance of many humans to buy annuities.374 
                                                     
373 This Section draws on David Blake and Tom Boardman (2013) Spend More Today Safely: Using Behavioral 
Economics To Improve Retirement Expenditure Decisions With Speedometer Plans, Risk Management and 
Insurance Review, 17(1), 83-112. 
374 
In most countries, annuitisation is voluntary as it now is the the UK. The very small number of countries 
with mandatory annuitisation are: Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Mauritius, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland  and Sweden. 
(See European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2014) EIOPA’s Fact Finding Report on 
Decumulation Phase Practices, EIOPA-BoS-14/193, October,  
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/EIOPA-BoS-14-
193_EIOPA_s_Fact_Finding_Report_on_Decumulation_Phase_Practices.pdf;  
and Dariusz Stańko and Nina Paklina (2014) Supervising the Distribution of Annuities and other Forms of 
Pension Pay-Out, IOPS Working Papers on Effective Pensions Supervision, No.21, December,  
http://www.iopsweb.org/WP_21_Supervising-Distribution-Annuities-Pension%20Pay-out%20.pdf ) 
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There are a range of behavioural reasons why retirees do not tend to voluntarily annuitise a 
sufficient proportion of their retirement wealth:375  
 Aversion to planning – particularly in respect of large infrequent transactions  
 Related to this is aversion to paying for advice 
 Inertia and procrastination: people have to make the active decision to start a 
retirement expenditure plan or purchase an annuity and the default position is to do 
nothing 
 Poor financial literacy: many, if not most, people do not recognise the importance of 
securing a basic understanding of retirement income provision and planning and, as 
a consequence, are not sufficiently competent to manage the conversion of their 
investments to income in old age or are unwilling to make the effort to understand 
unfamiliar products376 
 This is compounded by poor estimates of life expectancy and poor understanding of 
the variability of actual lifetimes: in short, a poor understanding of the nature of 
longevity risk377  
 Aversion to dealing with complex problems involving a sequence of choices 
 Related to this is the issue of choice overload – having so many choices that you end 
up making no choice at all378  
 Illusion of control: people like to feel in control of their capital, but annuitisation 
leads to an apparent a ‘loss of control’ 
 Unwillingness to contemplate unpleasant events, e.g., dying and leaving behind 
dependants 
 Overconfidence: many people underestimate how much they need to live on after 
retirement379  
 Related to this is lack of self-control. A particular advantage of an annuity is that it 
acts as a valuable pre-commitment device (i.e., is a very valuable behavioural tool). 
An annuity helps control spending in retirement. Many people are unable to control 
their spending. A survey by Aviva in April 2014 reveals that 61% will find it difficult to 
                                                     
375
 A similar list of behavioural traits is given in: ideas42 (2015) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: A Behavioural 
Perspective, Association of British Insurers, February, http://www.ideas42.org/publication/view/freedom-and-
choice-in-pensions-a-behavioral-perspective/; and Barclays Wealth (2015) Humanising Pensions: 
Understanding the Behavioural Effects of Freedom in Pension Choice. 
376
 The Government has encouraged improvements in financial education for years now. See, e.g., HM 
Treasury (2008) Thoresen Review of Generic Financial Advice: Final Report, March. 
377
 These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
378
 Sheena Iyengar and Emir Kamenica (2010) Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 
Journal of Public Economics, 94, 530-539; ideas42 (2015) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: A Behavioural 
Perspective, Association of British Insurers, February. 
379 
Overconfidence is very common in human decision making. It is particularly common in investment decision 
making by both retail and institutional investors. Over-confidence can be explained by biased self-attribution, 
whereby individuals update their beliefs about their own ability as being attributable to skill following good 
outcomes, but due to bad luck after bad outcomes. They become more overconfident after good past 
performance, but not less confident after bad past performance. 
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resist spending the pension pot. They could spend their money too quickly in 
retirement and be reduced to living on the single tier state pension of £155.65 per 
week from April 2016.380 This could involve a massive reduction in their standard of 
living and they will not even have a rainy day fund to fall back on. A more extreme 
example is people who are desperate for money at any price as the recent pay day 
loan and pension liberation cases show 
 Too much self-control. There will also be people with the opposite set of behavioural 
traits, those who take excessive precautions and put everything into a rainy day fund 
and hence spend their money too slowly. Such people could have enjoyed a higher 
standard of living in their retirement had they had an annuity, taking comfort from 
the fact that next month another annuity payment will come in should they live that 
long 
 Hyberbolic discounting:381 this leads to a poor understanding of the distant future 
and a poor understanding of the effects of inflation in reducing purchasing power 
over time: economists call this latter phenomenon ‘money illusion’382 
 Mental accounting. Individuals tend to assign assets to different mental accounts 
such as ‘assets available for current expenditure’ and ‘assets available for future 
expenditure’. In terms of the decumulation of pension assets, the pension pot at 
retirement is likely to be assigned by individuals using mental accounting to the first 
of the above mental accounts if it can be taken as a lump sum and to the second if it 
has to be taken as an annuity. Individuals who employ mental accounting are likely 
to value the annuity less than they value the lump sum 
 Framing effects: retirees can be unduly influenced by the way things are 
communicated to them. If an annuity is explained in an investment frame (‘an 
annuity is like a bond, but you will lose your entire investment if you die’), then 
people are likely to view an annuity as a highly risky investment, but if an annuity is 
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 This is the maximum: many people will not get this. It has been estimated that more than a million people 
will not get the full single tier pension when it is introduced on 6 April 2016. Only 45% of people retiring before 
2020 will receive the full amount (Reported in Sarah O’Grady (2015) ‘Nasty shock’ as a MILLION people miss 
out on full pension, Daily Express, 13 January).   
381 
Most people tend to discount (i.e., reduce the value of) future outcomes because they are impatient: one 
apple today is valued more than one apple tomorrow. Some people might even prefer one apple today over 
two apples tomorrow. At the same time, the very same people might appear to be willing to display much 
more patience when choices have to be made at some distance in the future. Given the choice between one 
apple in 100 days and two apples in 101 days, such people would choose to wait 101 days and receive the two 
apples.  This behaviour is consistent with hyperbolic discounting: people have a high short-term discount rate 
and a lower long-term discount rate. Hyperbolic discounting leads to behaviour that is inconsistent over time. 
The apparent long-term patience disappears when the long term becomes the short term. After 100 days, 
people choose the one apple rather than wait one more day to get two apples. Hyperbolic discounters prefer, 
for example, a nominal annuity over an index linked annuity since it gives them more money up front and they 
discount future inflation risk. 
382
 Money illusion is the tendency of people to think in nominal or money terms rather than in real terms that 
takes inflation into account. Many people would prefer to have a nominal rate on their bank account of 5% 
when inflation is 6% to a return of 2% when inflation is 1%. 
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explained in a consumption frame (‘an annuity allows you to maintain your standard 
of living in retirement for however long you live’), then people are likely to have a 
much more favourable view of an annuity. Similarly, choices can be framed in a way 
that causes people to overvalue the ‘large’ lump sum in their pension fund at 
retirement and undervalue the ‘small’ annuity. The emphasis on the pension pot size 
rather than the income in retirement is very bad from a behavioural perspective. To 
many people, a pot size of £28,000 sounds like a lot of money, but it is not when it 
has to possibly last for the next 30 years or more 
 Susceptibility to negative norming, e.g., concerning annuities. Annuities have a bad 
press in most countries. It is interesting to contrast this with the positive view of DB 
pension schemes which effectively auto-enrol all pensioners into an annuity. More 
importantly, studies show that annuities that are bought on the open market by 
people in good health – rather than the internal or rollover annuities bought by the 
existing customers of an insurance company’s accumulation fund when they retire – 
represent good value of money.383  Recent research by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) has shown that the ‘money’s worth’384 of annuities between 2006 
and 2014 to be very high at 94% for a 65-year old, confirming previous UK studies.385 
Further, the chance of running out of money with an annuity before you die is zero. 
This is not true with drawdown.  The FCA study shows that a drawdown scheme that 
takes the same amount of money at age 65 as an annuity and has a 1% charge has an 
11% chance of running out of money before age 85. But as we saw from some of the 
above surveys, many people heavily discount this possibility 
 Related to framing and negative norming is herding or peer effects: if dominant 
members of a peer group, such as employees near retirement at a company, trash 
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 It is important to recognise that standard annuities do not represent good value for people in poor health. 
Indeed, there is evidence that as many as 600,000 people in poor health have been mis-sold an annuity. They 
should have been sold an enhanced annuity which took account of their health status. As a result of 
campaigns, such as the Daily Telegraph’s Justice for Annuity Victims campaign, the Financial Ombudsman 
Service is considering whether insurance companies should be made to compensate victims without recourse 
to the courts. Compensation could vary between 20 and 50% of the original price of the annuity (Reported in 
Katie Morley (2015) Pension redress owed to 600,000, Daily Telegraph (Your Money), 14 March). 
384
 The ‘money’s worth’ of an annuity equals the ratio of the expected present value of the future annuity 
payments to the purchase price. It takes into account the life expectancy of the annuitant as well as the 
interest rate on assets – typically Government bonds – used to make the annuity payments. The money’s 
worth will always be less than 100% due to administrative costs and the costs of the capital that the insurer 
incurs. Increasing life expectancy and falling interest rates in recent years have reduced the money’s worth. 
The FCA shows that the increase in life expectancy between 2006 and 2014 has reduced the annuity amount 
by 7%, while the fall in interest rates has reduced the annuity amount by 11%. 
385 
Matteo Aquilina, Robert Baker and Tommaso Majer (2014) The Value for Money of Annuities and Other 
Retirement Income Strategies in the UK, Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No. 5, December; 
Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks (2008) Annuity Markets, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Edmund Cannon and 
Ian Tonks (2009) Money’s Worth of Pension Annuities, Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report 
No. 563; Amy Finkelstein and James Poterba (2002) Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Annuities Market, 
Economic Journal, 112, 28-50.  
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annuities, then this could lead to a herd effect whereby no members of the group 
choose to buy annuities 
 Loss aversion: many individuals wish to avoid making losses and so try not to put 
themselves into a position where losses might occur, even if this means foregoing 
large gains with a high probability. A common view is that ‘annuities are a gamble’. 
The probability of dying very soon after purchasing an annuity is very low, but this 
probability is likely to be overestimated, so the ‘loss’ is perceived to be high: ‘what 
dying and losing all my capital too!’. Conversely, the significant probability of 
outliving one’s resources if one does not annuitise is underestimated, so the ‘gain’ is 
perceived to be low. Hence the ‘gain’ from annuitising will give only a small welfare 
benefit, while the ‘loss’ from dying early will have a large welfare loss. Loss aversion 
is not by itself a sign of irrational behaviour. However, the tendency to overestimate 
the probability of low-probability events and underestimate the probability of high-
probability events is certainly irrational 
 Finally, there is regret or disappointment aversion: individuals might choose to avoid 
making a decision because they might regret or be disappointed by the 
consequences of that decision. Again the decision not to buy an annuity might be the 
result of this type of aversion.386 
3.3.2 People differ in their resources and needs  
The other important way of segmenting consumers is by resources and needs.  This is one of 
the ways in which the FCA classifies consumers into 10 types. The FCA's Consumer Spotlight 
identifies two types of consumer who are retired:387 
                                                     
386 
Loss aversion differs in a subtle way from regret aversion. With loss aversion, individuals are risk-seeking in 
the domain of losses and risk averse in the domain of gains, relative to an exogenous reference point. Regret 
aversion implies individuals anticipate ex-ante the regret they will feel ex-post if they made a suboptimal 
decision; in this case, the reference point is the best decision that could have been made and this reference 
point is endogenous in the decision process.   
387
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) FCA reveals ten types of consumer in bid to drive product design, 
Professional Adviser, 19 January. The remaining 8 types are: Affluent and ambitious - mostly aged between 35 
and 60, they have high incomes, own their homes and work full-time. They are highly educated and financially 
confident, Mature and savvy - confident and well informed about financial services, has higher incomes and 
savings than average, and is in full-time work; Living for now - people on low incomes, most working or 
studying, are internet-savvy but less confident about financial matters - although they will take more risks than 
average consumers; Striving and supporting - mostly in work and with low incomes, more than half of this 
group have dependent children, risk averse but can struggle with bills or fall behind with payments; Starting 
out - slightly below average income, but technologically advanced with a high level of education, this group 
consists mostly of under 45s who are single and without children, almost all are renting; Hard pressed - on low 
incomes, many struggling with everyday expenses, Many also have no savings or investments, and are not 
confident with financial decisions; Stretched but resourceful - likely to own their home, and many have 
savings, investments and pensions, half have children at home and are generally confident about financial 
matters, but time-poor;  Busy achievers - those on high household incomes, with mortgages, pensions and 
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 Retired with resources 
o These are mostly retired homeowners who are risk averse and rarely in debt, 
with high savings and a range of financial products and typically well 
informed on financial matters. They comprise two groups known as ‘mass 
affluent’ and ‘high net worth’ 
 Retired on a budget 
o These are mostly over 65 with low incomes, who are careful with their money 
and stay loyal to providers. They have limited access to services and 
information. They are also known as the ‘mass market’. 
Many of the people surveyed in the above studies belong to this second category.  
We can divide income needs into three broad categories: 
 ‘essential’ income: the income required to cover the retiree’s minimum basic 
expenditure needs or ‘heating and eating’ as it was described to us 
 ‘adequate’ income: the income required to achieve a minimum lifestyle that is 
acceptable in retirement 
 ‘desired’ income: the income required to achieve the full lifestyle to which the 
retiree aspires. 
Table 3.2 shows household expenditure by gross income quintile group for those aged 65-
74. We could, for example, interpret the income needs of the bottom quintile as essential. 
This amounts to £198 per week per household (or £167 per week per individual). This is 
approximately equal to the state pension and other benefits received by a recently retired 
couple (£191).388 We could interpret the middle quintile as having an adequate income of 
£484 per week per household (or £249 per week per individual) and the top quintile as 
having a desired income of £920 per week per household (or £350 per week per individual).  
A survey from Which? Consumer Insight Tracker released in March 2015 found that 66% of 
those aged 50-64 are concerned about how much money they will need in retirement. 
Further, only 41% of retired people say they are living comfortably on their pension.389 The 
survey, conducted by Populus, interviewed a representative sample of 2,251 UK adults 
online between 17th - 18th September 2014 and 2,088 UK adults online between 16th - 
18th January 2015. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
some savings, they are in work, albeit largely part-time, with children at home, they can access information 
and services easily but for them time is very limited.  
388 
DWP Pensioners’ Income Series, July 2014. 
389 
http://www.which.co.uk/news/2015/03/which-calls-for-additional-pension-reforms-397246/ 
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Table 3.2: Household expenditure by gross income quintile group where the household reference person is aged 65 to 74, 
2011-2013 (£ per week, United Kingdom) 
  
  
  
  
Lowest 
twenty 
per 
cent 
 
Second 
quintile 
group 
Third 
quintile 
group 
Fourth 
quintile 
group 
Highest 
twenty 
per 
cent 
All 
House-
holds 
Lower boundary of group (£ per week)a   
 
265 462 696 1,078 
 
Weighted average number of persons per household  1.2 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.6 1.8 
Commodity or service  Average weekly household expenditure (£) 
1 Food & non-alcoholic drinks  35.10 49.70 61.90 70.70 93.20 55.60 
2 Alcoholic drinks, tobacco & narcotics  6.90 9.30 12.80 14.50 19.00 11.10 
3 Clothing & footwear  7.50 11.90 21.40 24.80 41.00 17.30 
4 Housing(net)b, fuel & power  40.20 49.70 52.90 66.10 86.10 53.60 
5 Household goods & services  10.60 23.60 33.30 39.00 60.10 27.90 
6 Health  3.10 5.80 8.60 13.10 12.60 7.50 
7 Transport  15.50 40.40 66.40 86.40 143.00 55.50 
8 Communication  6.80 9.70 11.20 14.10 17.80 10.70 
9 Recreation & culture  28.30 48.10 87.50 93.00 140.90 66.50 
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10 Education  - [0.30] [0.30] [3.00] 11.90 1.60 
11 Restaurants & hotels  11.70 23.90 38.60 49.20 80.40 32.80 
12 Miscellaneous goods & services  15.60 23.00 33.90 45.30 100.60 33.10 
1-12 All expenditure groups  181.20 295.30 428.70 519.20 806.80 372.90 
13 Other expenditure items  16.50 33.20 55.10 62.10 113.10 45.30 
Total expenditure (£) 197.70 328.50 483.80 581.30 920.00 418.20 
Average weekly expenditure per person (£)  167.10 194.20 249.00 256.90 350.30 234.60 
Notes: This table is based on a three year average. 
a
 Lower boundary of 2013 gross income quintile groups (£ per week). 
b
 Excluding mortgage interest payments, council tax and Northern Ireland rates. 
Source: ONS, Family Spending 2013 
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The Aon DC Member Survey discussed earlier appears to suggest that attitudes to both the 
standard of living in retirement and the age at which retirement takes place are changing. 
The great retirement deal that the babyboomers could get, namely a pension of two-thirds 
of final salary from age 65, is no longer regarded as realistic. The survey suggests there is ‘a 
welcome sense of realism among employees about their retirement prospects’. Nearly 50% 
of respondents expect a pension of between 21% and 50% of their final salary. Similarly, 
50% expect to retire between 66 and 70, while 10% anticipate working until their 70s. While 
50% still expect to fully retire from all paid work when they leave full time employment, 
around 40% anticipate easing into retirement by do some part-time work; however, 5% 
expect they will not be able to ever retire.   
3.3.3 Implications of the market segmentation analysis 
Together these surveys build up a very interesting picture about savers at retirement. The 
mass affluent and high net worth segments of the market appear to have the confidence 
and ability to manage the drawdown of its retirement assets effectively. One of their main 
concerns will be inheritance planning. Those at the other end of the wealth distribution will 
have small DC pension pots that would buy very low annuities.390  Much of their retirement 
income will be provided by the state and the freedom to choose how to spend these small 
pension pots will probably be more valuable than a small addition to the state pension that 
an annuity would buy. Their main concern will be to act in a way that does not increase their 
income tax or reduce their welfare benefits. However, it is those in between – the mass 
market that is Middle Britain – who face the biggest challenges from pension ‘freedom and 
choice’. The surveys show that this group:  
 are uncertain about when they will retire 
 have a poor understanding of their spending needs throughout retirement, but value 
ease of access and the flexibility to change the amount of income they draw 
 lack engagement (even very close to retirement)  
 are reluctant or unable to plan ahead 
 are reluctant to do research, e.g., on the tax implications of withdrawing cash 
 have a poor understanding of life expectancy and, in particular, the probability of 
living beyond age 85, which means DC savers are likely to underestimate the 
importance of longevity insurance 
 are unwilling to give up their lump sum at retirement in exchange for an annuity 
 are unwilling to pre-commit to the purchase of an annuity even at high ages 
 are warm to the concept of a gradual payment for a longevity insurance product, 
with participants being able see how this could help them to build up a ‘safety net’ 
against the risk that they live too long or take out too much income 
                                                     
390
 They might also have some DB pension as well, although, in due course, this source of retirement income 
will disappear as private-sector DB pension provision comes to an end. 
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 although some are confident about managing their finances, many appear to be very 
poorly equipped to make investment choices  
 prefer low-risk investments 
 are likely to be confused by the range of new products and delivery options for 
receiving retirement income 
 at high risk of making poor decisions 
 welcome guidance and advice, but are not prepared to pay much for it 
 need support to make trade offs 
 feel their employer or pension scheme provider has a ‘duty’ to offer a default 
drawdown option in retirement, but it must be well designed and they also want 
alternatives to a default. 
We also need to be aware that there is a difference between what people say they will do 
and what they actually do. The above surveys suggest that many DC savers plan to act quite 
rationally. They imply that life time annuities ought to remain an important feature of 
retirement incomes. However, the survey conducted by ILC-UK also found that people had a 
poor understanding of their retirement income options. Only 50% of those with a DC 
pension said they understood what an annuity is, only 20% understood what an enhanced 
annuity is, and only 35% said they understood what income drawdown is.391  
In addition, financial advisers did not expect annuity sales to be high in future. An Aegon 
adviser survey392 of 200 financial advisers found that only 2% of advisers expected annuities 
to be the market leading product by 2025. One in three believed that risk-managed funds 
would become the leading product, while 28% thought that guaranteed investment 
strategies would lead the product list. So there also appears to be a big disconnect between 
what savers say they will do and what advisers believe that savers will do. Nick Dixon, Aegon 
investment director, said: ‘It’s now clear that most [advisers] now think some form of 
income drawdown or phased retirement will overtake traditional annuities before long. 
Flexible guarantees, risk-managed funds, and income funds are all becoming central to 
advisers’ toolkits as their clients look to take advantage of the new flexibilities’. An 
implication of this is that many people will not see the need for longevity insurance, because 
they cannot imagine the consequences of running out of money before they die.  Yet, if they 
did run out of money before they died, it is equally likely that they would regret this and 
accept that the strategy that led to this unfortunate circumstance was sub-optimal in the 
long run.  
One of the most important facts to recognise is that the alternatives to annuitisation – 
principally income drawdown – involve more risk, often much more. People can only get a 
higher return than an annuity by taking on more risk and the extra return is not guaranteed. 
                                                     
391 
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/publications/publication_details/making_the_system_fit_for_purpose 
392
 Reported in Professional Adviser, 7 January 2015. 
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Almost immediately after the Budget, scheme members were being encouraged to take on 
more risk.393 Drawdown also has higher charges, in particular, fund management charges.394 
In addition, there are drawdown products that guarantee a minimum income, but long-term 
guarantees of this kind can be very expensive.  
So we are confronted with the following potentially toxic combination: people who do not 
fully understand the risks that they face, being offered a wide range of retirement income 
products and solutions, but with a poor understanding of how these products and solutions 
can help them manage those risks and also their costs. How do we deal with this? First, we 
should recognise that most people should not be expected to manage the risks in Table 1.2 
themselves. This means that the provider must design products and solutions that 
effectively manage these risks.395  Second, we need to recall that one of the important 
lessons from behavioural economics is that too much choice is a bad thing. This means that 
we should consider introducing defaults with a small number of default pathways (using 
decision trees) that will lead to good retirement income solutions for people given their 
circumstances. This will help to overcome the problems of choice overload and poor value 
for money. 
The use of defaults in decumulation builds on the lessons of auto-enrolment in the 
accumulation phase of DC schemes introduced in October 2012. However, there are 
important differences arising from the greater complexity of decumulation decision making.  
First, in the accumulation stage, a single default investment strategy could be designed that 
would be adequate for most people. Because people’s circumstances differ, it is unlikely 
that we will be able to design a single (‘one size fits all’) default decumulation strategy that 
would suit most people.  
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 Chris Torney (2014) Savers should consider taking more risk with their pensions in light of new Government 
rules, express.co.uk, 23 April.  
394
 Fund management charges are included in the total expense ratio (TER). But what is included in the TER are 
only the visible costs in fund management. There are also a significant number of hidden costs as reported in 
David Blake (2014) On the Disclosure of the Costs of Investment Management, Pensions Institute Discussion 
Paper PI-1407, May. The investment management industry is now beginning to acknowledge that these hidden 
costs exist. Daniel Godfrey, then chief executive of the Investment Association wrote on a blog: ‘We think [a 
full list of charges] will avert a continuation of the trap we’ve all fallen into over the last twenty years with 
disclosure [of charges] that nobody understands at best and which can be misleading at worst, with spurious 
assumptions of accuracy being made that could lead to real consumer detriment’ (reported in Dan Hyde (2015) 
We misled savers for 20 years over hidden fees, says fund boss, Daily Telegraph, 11 February). In February 
2015, the Investment Association issued a position paper Meaningful Disclosure of Costs and Charges; 
http://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/assets/files/consultations/2015/20150210-
iacostsandchargesreport.pdf 
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 At the very minimal, the products and solutions need to have (a) accessibility, (b) investment returns in 
excess of inflation and (c) longevity insurance (see Chapter 2). 
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Second, in the accumulation stage, people could be auto-enrolled onto the DC scheme 
default investment strategy without the need for very much information, guidance or 
advice. This is clearly not the case with decumulation. The Government has introduced the 
‘guidance guarantee’, a new service called Pension Wise that is free, impartial and aims to 
help individuals consider their options and make informed choices.396  However, we need to 
assess whether ‘guidance’ – which is a non-regulated activity in the UK – is adequate for the 
purpose, in which case the customer can avoid the expense of taking ‘advice’ – which, 
depending on the type of advice, can be a regulated activity in the UK – from a qualified 
financial adviser.397 
Third, in the accumulation stage, people are auto-enrolled at a natural point in their career, 
i.e., when they have made the decision to start a new job and expect to be filling in forms, 
etc. There is no a similar clear-cut point in decumulation, especially if people have 
accumulated a number of pension pots over their career. Any default would, in general, 
need to be triggered by the member.  
We also need to overcome the behavioural barriers that people face which prevent them 
making decisions that are in their best long-run interests, that is, decisions that their older 
selves will appreciate that their younger selves made, rather than decisions they will 
subsequently regret. Further, in a world of ‘freedom and choice’ and no compulsion, we 
need to find ways of nudging people towards the best default for their circumstances. 
Finally, we need to determine whether there are any regulatory barriers that impede the 
effectiveness of the default, the guidance/advice or the nudging and, if there are, then they 
need to be identified and removed. 
Before doing all this, we briefly consider initial customer reaction when ‘freedom and 
choice’ first started. 
 
3.3.4 Initial customer reaction to the introduction of ‘freedom and choice’ 
There was a great of interest from customers when the new pension regime was introduced 
on Flexiday, 6 April 2015. There were around 60,000 phone calls and 10,000 emails and 
letters per day to providers, more than double the usual number providers typically receive. 
Most callers just wanted information, but a number of people exercised their new freedoms 
and cashed in at least part of their pension pot.  The money was spent on a wide range of 
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 https://www.gov.uk/Government/news/millions-guaranteed-the-right-to-free-and-impartial-guidance-on-
their-new-pensions-choices. Pension Wise is discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.3. 
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 For those who choose not to use the default, advice would still be highly desirable, although cost is an 
important consideration, especially if the pension pot is fairly small. These issues are discussed later in the 
Chapter. 
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consumer items, most notably, a speedboat, a cruise on the Queen Mary, a Bentley, a 
holiday home in France and a child’s wedding; some paid off debt.398   
Tom McPhail, head of pensions research at Hargreaves Lansdown, said: ‘It will take some 
time for a clear pattern to emerge in terms of how investors are looking to use the new 
freedoms. Initial demand has been focused on an investment income rather than buying an 
annuity, though we do expect this balance to swing back to some extent in the weeks to 
come. Relatively few people are asking to take all their money out; we'll be tracking the 
sums involved, however, in the main, we expect it to be at the smaller end of pension pot 
sizes’.399 
Table 3.3: What customers telephoned Hargreaves Lansdown about on 6 April 2015 
 Topping up/opening a SIPP 8.2% 
 Taxation (of drawing a pension) 8.7% 
 Ad-hoc lump sum withdrawals 16.9% 
 Drawdown 42.1% 
 Annuities 9.8% 
 Taking tax-free cash only 6.6% 
 Taking all their pension pot in one go 7.7% 
  
A breakdown of the calls Hargreaves Lansdown received on 6 April is shown in Table 3.3. 
Only 7.7% of calls concerned accessing the entire pot. Its customer preferences for products 
in the first two weeks following  Flexiday  were as follows: over 85% were about drawdown, 
around 6% about uncrystallised funds pension lump sums (UFPLS) and only around 7.5% 
were about annuity purchase.400 
An analysis of client calls to Fidelity Worldwide Investment concerning the new pensions 
freedoms revealed the following:401 
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Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) Providers pick up 60,000 calls a day after flexibilities take effect, 
Professional Pensions, 16 April; Lisa Bachelor (2015) Speedboats, cruises and holiday homes on pensioners' 
shopping lists, Guardian, 9 April; Ruth Lythe  (2015) A sports car, a hot tub, a cruise on the Queen Mary: Two 
days into pensions revolution we ask savers what they plan to do with their nest eggs, Daily Mail, 8 April. 
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 Reported in Professional Adviser (2015)  Just 8pc eye taking pension 'in one go' - drawdown dominates – 
research, 7 April. 
400
 Email communication from Tom McPhail, 22 April 2015. 
401
 Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Advice rule irritates DB savers as pension freedom trends emerge, 
19 May. 
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 Dominant drawdown: 61% of calls to telephony teams were from customers wanting 
to enter drawdown and take tax-free cash 
 Drawdown deferrers: Half of drawdown customers were deferring income, with 
many taking the tax free cash element 
 Allowance impact: More customers were seeking information around the lifetime 
allowance 
 Overstated cash claims: Just 6% wanted to cash out, of which small pots made up 
half this statistic 
 Annuities agenda: 'In' proved as popular as 'out', with 3% of customers enquiring 
about cashing in their annuity and a further 3% wanting to purchase one. 
Only 1% of the clients of retirement adviser My Pension Expert chose to cash in their 
pensions completely. Once the tax and longevity risk implications were explained, the 
majority of its clients avoided the lump sum option in favour of drawdown and annuities.402 
Within two months of Flexiday, the proportion of Scottish Widows’ customers looking to 
take their pensions as cash had fallen from 70% to 50%. Around 85% of requests were for 
pots of less than £30,000, with an average withdrawal of £20,000. Robert Cochran from the 
company said: ‘It's still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the longer term 
impact of pension freedoms due to the pent up demand of those who deferred until April 
6th to access their money….However, our site activity data also tells us that customers are 
still looking for more help in making the right decisions, given the wide range of options now 
available to them’.403 Blackrock reported that 1,152 over-55s had accessed their BlackRock 
workplace pension pots (valued at £13.4m) over the same period and 83% took all their 
pension saving in cash. One client withdrew £300,000, and while 25% of this was tax-free, 
the rest would be taxed at a marginal rate of 45%.404 
In June 2015, the chancellor George Osborne announced that 60,000 pension savers had 
withdrawn more than £1 billion from their pension pots in the first month of ‘freedom and 
choice’, an average of £17,000 each. He said: 'These unprecedented freedoms have been 
widely welcomed…It is a sign that this is a real success, but we have to make sure that 
people get the best advice, that the market responds and that companies up their game in 
helping customers make use of these freedoms. We will be watching these things very 
carefully’.405  
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 Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Tax hit dissuading savers from taking pensions as cash, 19 May. 
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 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) Cash requests tail off as pension freedoms bed down, Professional 
Pensions, 2 June. 
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 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) BlackRock client takes tax hit after £300k pension withdrawal, Retirement 
Planner, 10 August. 
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 Reported in Daniel Grote (2015) Pension Freedom - savers withdraw £1 billion, Citywire, 16 June. 
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The amount withdrawn in the first two months was £1.8bn according to data released by 
the Association of British Insurers (ABI).  The details are as follows: 
 Savers took out more than £1bn in 65,000 cash withdrawals from their pension pots. 
The average pot taken was £15,500. Most were uncrystallised funds pension lump 
sum (UFPLS) withdrawals 
 Savers took out £800m from income drawdown policies in 170,000 withdrawals 
 Savers put in £630m to buy 11,300 annuities and a further £720m to buy 10,300 
income drawdown policies 
 The average annuity was purchased with £55,750 and the average fund put into 
drawdown was £69,900. 
So 52% of the total sales were annuities and 48% drawdown. This compares with 2012, the 
peak year for annuity sales in the UK when monthly sales were £1.2bn (90% of the total) and 
only £0.1m per month was put into income drawdown products (10% of the total).406   
The amount withdrawn in the first three months was £2.5bn according to the ABI, 
equivalent of £27m a day.407  The details are as follows: 
 Savers took out more than £1.3bn in 65,000 cash withdrawals from their pension 
pots. The average pot taken was £15,000. Most were UFPLS withdrawals.  
 Savers took out £1.1bn from income drawdown policies in 264,000 withdrawals, 
with an average payment size of nearly £4,200. 
 Savers put in £990m to buy 17,800 annuities and a further £1.3bn to buy 19,600 
income drawdown policies.  
 The average annuity was purchased with £55,600 and the average fund put into 
drawdown was £68,000 
 55% of annuities were bought from the existing provider, compared with 45% of 
drawdown products. 
The amount withdrawn in the first six months was £4.7bn according to the ABI.408  The 
details are as follows: 
 Cash withdrawals: 
o £2.5bn was paid out in 166,700 cash lump sum payments, with an average 
payment of just under £15,000 
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Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Savers extract £1.8bn in first two months of pensions freedom, 
Investment Week, 15 July. 
407
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Providers paying out £27m a day since pensions freedom, says ABI, 
Professional Adviser, 3 September. 
408 
Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Pension freedoms: £4.7bn paid out in first six months, says ABI, 3 
November.  
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o £2.2bn was paid out via 606,000 income drawdown payments, with an 
average payment of £3,600 
o In 95% of cases where savers accessed a cash lump sum, they withdrew the 
entire fund. Four in five cash lump sums were paid to those under 65, with 
three in five under 60 
 For funds being invested: 
o £2.85bn was invested in 43,800 income drawdown products, an average fund 
of almost £65,000; 60% of people changed provider when buying an income 
drawdown policy 
o £2.17bn was invested in around 40,600 annuities, making the average fund 
invested nearly £53,300; 40% of customers who bought an annuity changed 
provider. 
So 60% of sales were drawdown and 40% were annuities. ABI director for long term savings 
policy, Dr Yvonne Braun, said: ‘Despite some ringing the death knell for annuities, this seems 
to have been premature. An increasing number of people are recognising the value of a 
guaranteed income, with annuity sales rising this quarter. There are also initial signs that the 
number of people accessing their pension pot as cash is beginning to settle down, with 
larger pots continuing to be used to buy retirement income products’. 
In August 2015, Royal London discovered from a survey it conducted that 69% of people 
making use of the pension freedoms took their pension pot as a cash lump sum. Of these, 
16% said they would use the cash to clear their mortgage or other debts, while 23% 
intended to put the money into a bank, building society or cash ISA account which was likely 
to pay a lower rate of return than their pension pot was earning. The remainder planned to 
use an alternative savings or investment vehicle.  The company called on the FCA to increase 
awareness of the tax implications of cashing out a pension pot at retirement. Fiona Tait 
from the company said she was worried the results reflected a wider industry trend: ‘Royal 
London does want the pension freedoms to work, but not at the financial detriment of 
customers. Where customers are looking to pay off debts or spend the money on a vital 
purchase, the tax charge may well be a price worth paying. However, if the intention is for 
the cash to just stay in a savings account, consumers are potentially paying a tax charge for 
no additional financial benefit. Having extra focus in the retirement risk warnings framework 
would help to ensure that customers appreciate all the options they have within their 
existing pension. This is particularly important for those customers who are not willing or 
able to access financial advice’.409  On the other hand, a survey of Zurich’s clients, also 
published in August 2015, found that only 9% of over-55s had accessed their pension pots. 
The rest were either not ready to make a decision, were keeping their pensions invested 
and spending other assets like cash savings first, or were worried that they could run out of 
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Reported in Natasha Browne (2015)FCA pressed to highlight tax hit as savers cash out to put money in the 
bank, Professional Pensions, 20 August. 
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money.410  According to calculations made by Hargreaves Lansdown for for BBC News, the 
Treasury will net an extra £700m in tax in 2015-2016 as a result of the cash withdrawals.411  
Paul Green from Saga said: ‘It's great to see so many people taking advantage of the new 
pension freedoms and that people are being savvy with savings and shopping around for the 
best deal. David Cameron and George Osborne were right to trust people with their own 
money. Treating adults like adults leads to better outcomes for society and individuals – we 
have happy citizens and a welcome boost for the economy’.412 
However, others have warned warned against using amounts withdrawn as a 'measure of 
success' of pension freedom. For example, Adrian Walker, retirement planning manager at 
Old Mutual Wealth, said: ‘The UK has a problem with saving, not spending, so care needs to 
be taken when deciding how to measure the success of the pension freedoms. I would 
suggest that a more appropriate measure of success will not come for many years, when 
those people who have withdrawn money from their pensions are still enjoying the 
retirement they planned and saved many years for’.  Tom McPhail also pointed out that ‘less 
than one in ten of people [are] currently choosing to buy an annuity, compared to eight or 
nine in 10 only a couple of years ago’, implying that most people exercising their pension 
freedoms are not protected from outliving their resources.413 
The Retirement Planner Inquiry for August 2015 invited advisers to provide feedback on how 
their clients were using drawdown products. Only 3% of advisers reported that their clients 
were choosing to take income from natural yield414 only, 15% said clients were drawing 
from capital, and the remainder (82%) said it was a combination of income and capital. 
Long-established drawdown clients tended to restrict income drawn down to no more than 
natural yield, while high-net worth individuals ‘tend not to require a monthly income 
drawdown and as such the majority strip out gains from capital growth when appropriate’.  
The inquiry also found that ‘the popularity of multi-asset funds is set to increase as more 
people remain invested throughout their retirement. Many fund managers have launched 
or repurposed multi-asset funds to capitalise on pensions freedom’. Around 40% of advisers 
had increased allocations to multi-asset funds since April 2015 or were planning to do so. 
The main reason was to increase diversification and reduce the volatility of the fund value. 
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Reported in Tim Wallace (2015) Savers reject the high life despite pension freedoms, Daily Telegraph, 31 
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Investment Week, 15 July. 
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 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Chancellor reveals £1bn cashed in since pensions freedom, 
Professional Adviser, 16 June.  
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That is, the pay-out of dividends, coupons, and rent etc from income-generating investments – see Chapter 
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Around 17% of advisers were also recommending enhanced income funds where yield could 
be as high as 7%, while another 50% said they were considering doing so.415  
3.3.5 Initial scheme reaction to the introduction of ‘freedom and choice’ 
A survey of 70 trustees and advisers by Linklaters in May 2015 found that nearly 20% of 
company DC pension schemes will offer flexible drawdown as a result of the ‘freedom and 
choice’ reforms, while 46% will offer some degree of access to the UFPLS option, though the 
majority preferred a one-off withdrawal. A survey from Sackers of more than 50 UK 
schemes also in May 2015 found that two-thirds of DC schemes were offering members 
some form of pension flexibility. Of these, 94% were allowing members to cash out their 
pots through the UFPLS, while only 14% were providing flexi access drawdown. Of the one-
third of schemes not currently offering any flexibility, 54% said they were considering it, 
while 38% said they had no plans to do so.416  
However, trust-based DC schemes appeared to be more conservative in their approach than 
contract-based schemes and were still in a ‘wait-and-see mode’ concerning at-retirement 
options, according to Nils Johnson, director of retirement at Spence Johnson. He anticipated 
that over the next three years, ‘cash and drawdown’ would become the two main options 
being offered.417  
Others agreed that ‘now is not the right time [for trust-based DC schemes] to offer in-house 
drawdown’. According to Richard Butcher, managing director of independent trustee PTL: 
‘They’ve got no commercial imperative to do this… so they were quite happy to wait and see 
what happens. In any event, [schemes not offering drawdown] hasn’t frustrated “freedom 
and choice” because people have always had the right to statutory transfer’. Gregg 
McClymont, head of retirement savings at Aberdeen Asset Management, said: ‘It’s such a 
big change, isn’t it? There are so many questions around the ongoing potential role of 
trustees that I don’t think it’s a surprise that there’s not been a rapid move towards a post-
retirement framework for scheme members….My own view is that it would be unfair to 
point the finger at trustees, because they are trying to manage a situation which has 
changed overnight without consultation, and something that potentially fundamentally 
changes the nature of a pension’. 
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There are five reasons why trust-based DC schemes are not currently offering drawdown to 
their members:418 
1. Sponsor reluctance – enterprise risk 
Providing drawdown means trustees and sponsors will be taking on more enterprise 
risk (organisational risk). According to Richard Butcher: ‘Their concern is for the 
welfare and wellbeing of their staff – not people who retired 30 years ago. I think 
most trustees of single-employer schemes said: “We don’t need to do this, we don’t 
particularly want to do it, there’s a risk to doing it, so why should we bear that risk 
and cost? Let’s just leave it to the commercial market”. It’s going to be the large 
schemes that do it if anybody does it. J.P. Morgan got quite well advanced with their 
plans on it, but then the Americans decided against it because of enterprise risk’. 
Steve Budge, principal DC and savings at Mercer UK, agreed: ‘Clearly there’s a 
nervousness in the market in terms of clients and schemes wanting to offer some 
flexibility but, because of the nature of drawdown, it exposes members to a lot more 
risk in terms of running out of money’. 
 
2. Governance challenges 
In-house drawdown also creates an ongoing governance challenge for trustees. As 
Gregg McClymont explains: ‘Generally speaking, trustees’ jobs stopped at retirement 
and so [in-house drawdown would represent] a big shift towards the trustees having 
a significant role in governing options for retirement income’. 
 
3. Lack of appetite from members 
There is little demand from members for drawdown – most retirees have been 
taking their DC benefits as cash, since they have very small DC pots (although they 
may also have a DB scheme).  
 
4. Lack of product innovation 
Pension scheme members would like both flexibility and security of income, but as 
Gregg McClymont said: ‘That’s not straightforward to achieve, so I’m sympathetic to 
the challenges trustees are facing. In terms of the product side of things, asset 
managers are developing income products and multi-asset products, but that 
product innovation is at a relatively early stage, not least because those at 
retirement at the moment are, according to all the evidence, tending to take cash in 
larger quantities than investing in markets’. Steve Budge agreed: ‘There’s definitely a 
lack of product innovation. I don’t think anyone’s at fault here, there just hasn’t been 
much time to put things together’. 
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5. Lack of scale 
The final issue relates to the inability of many schemes to generate sufficient scale to 
provide true value for money with in-house drawdown. Helen Ball, head of defined 
contribution at Sackers, argues that only the big master trusts or perhaps some of 
the very largest single-employer schemes will ever be able to achieve the necessary 
scale: ‘Over time, it is more likely that they’ll think about some of the new 
flexibilities, because they’ve the scale to provide the funding to do it’. 
A way around this problem in due course would be to work with an established provider of 
drawdown solutions. Mr Butcher explains: ‘The trust could buddy up with a commercial 
provider or perhaps a commercial master trust, so the individual can move across from the 
single-employer trust to a commercial master trust and gain access to drawdown’. 
The slow response of trust-based DC schemes to ‘freedom and choice’ was confirmed by 
Willis Towers Watson’s Pensions Flexibility Study published in January 2016. Of the 222 
trust-based schemes surveyed, 61% did not provide access to any form of flexible 
drawdown, 7% provided flexi-access drawdown within their trust, while the rest (32%) 
allowed members access to a drawdown facility by transferring their assets to one or more 
pre-selected drawdown providers. However, 71% of the schemes allowed members access 
to one lump-sum payment without the member having to transfer their DC assets, while 
19% allowed up to two withdrawals. Further, 62% of the trust-based schemes continued to 
target tax-free cash and annuity purchase as their default option for members. This 
contrasts with the contract-based schemes surveyed, where 80% were offering a blended 
strategy that aims to accommodate a range of member-retirement choices.419 
The May 2015 Linklaters survey cited above found that around 70% of trustees and advisers 
agreed that DB pension scheme members should be allowed to transfer out, with 44% of 
employers having already been contacted by members about moving their pot.420 However, 
there was little sign that DB schemes would offer such flexibilities as drawdown at this 
stage. In September 2015, Aon Hewitt published the results of a survey of more than 200 DB 
schemes. Eight out of ten have taken some action in response to the new regime. One third 
automatically provide retiring members with transfer quotes, and a further 20% intended to 
do so soon; 40% of schemes providing quotes in retirement packs also offered members 
access to financial advice. It was mainly the larger schemes that were doing this. Ben Roe, 
head of liability management at Aon Hewitt, said: ‘Large schemes have generally been at the 
forefront of introducing risk reduction measures, so not surprisingly they have also led on 
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making changes in response to the Budget, as more than a third are planning to quote 
transfers in the retirement pack. This, in turn, can lead to significant savings against funding 
and long-term targets. There is evidence that some companies are also taking advance 
credit for likely liability gains in their profit and loss’. But the survey found less than 10% of 
schemes were making any additional support available to members at retirement. Mr Roe 
said: ‘What is disappointing is the relatively low numbers of schemes which are offering 
meaningful support to members on what is now a more complex decision for them. Not 
only does additional support lead to better member decisions but our statistics show that 
this also leads to more members taking a transfer, which ultimately means more cost and 
risk reduction for companies’.421  
An analysis of requests for information made by Portal Financial between September 2014 
and September 2015 on behalf of its clients to their pension schemes indicated that scheme 
members could wait up to three months to receive the information in the case of DB 
schemes and up to 5 weeks in the case of DC schemes. Managing director Jamie Smith-
Thompson said: ‘Currently, many pension schemes are unable, or unwilling, to support the 
new pension flexibilities and, therefore, members of these schemes need to transfer to a 
provider that can. However, a transfer cannot take place until we are in receipt of the latest 
information and, only at that point, can we provide the necessary advice on a possible 
transfer. It is, therefore, incredibly important that it is provided in a timely manner. Clients 
simply don't understand the delays, as it just doesn't seem possible to them that their 
financial services providers don't have the information at the touch of a button. The delays 
can be very stressful and many scheme providers urgently need to improve their response 
times. We believe that action is necessary and pension transfers should be as simple as 
changing bank accounts with clear service levels and timings that need to be adhered to’.422  
3.4  A retirement expenditure and investment plan that helps to overcome behavioural 
barriers 
To overcome the behavioural barriers which prevent people behaving optimally in 
retirement, we need a plan to help people manage their retirement expenditure. One 
example of such a plan is a SPEEDOMETER (or Spending Optimally Throughout Retirement) 
retirement expenditure plan.423 The term SPEEDOMETER is used to reflect the fact that 
spending optimally is related to the speed with which assets are drawn down and a 
SPEEDOMETER is a useful device both for measuring and influencing speed.   
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Given that most people are ‘humans’ rather than ‘econs’, we should recognise that the 
retirement stage of a pension plan is just too complex for most people to deal with without 
any outside support. We also need to recognise that retirees: have different expenditure 
needs during different phases of their retirement and need to pace their spending 
throughout retirement in order to optimise the use of their lifetime assets and income and 
their ability to make intended bequests. It is important to recognise that a retiree needs to 
work out the desired spending pattern in retirement before deciding on the appropriate 
investment strategy for their pension pot.  
With these considerations in mind, a SPEEDOMETER plan has the following five components 
– and is an example of what is known as a ‘layering’ plan:  
1. First, make a plan. This can be done, either by being auto-enrolled into one as part of 
the retirement planning service offered by the plan member’s company, or by an 
online or telephone-based service providing generic financial information and 
guidance, or, if wealth permits, involving a financial adviser whose role is to assist 
with making and implementing the plan and conducting annual reviews. Key 
components of the plan are budgeting and projecting expenditure. The remaining 
components implement the plan. Ideally, planning should occur throughout the 
accumulation phase. It is very important as retirees approach retirement for 
planning to take place to determine the optimal age for securing a guaranteed life-
long income. 
2. Second, secure ‘essential’ income. The plan needs to take a holistic approach to 
managing all assets and income sources in retirement and not just pension assets 
and income, with the aim of securing, as a very minimum, a core inflation-protected 
income sufficient to allow the retiree to meet ‘essential’ needs for the remainder of 
their life.  
3. Third, have insurance and a ‘rainy day’ fund to cover contingencies. The plan uses 
insurance, when available and cost effective, to cover contingency events, such as 
repairs to white goods, central heating and car. Some expenditures in retirement will 
be lumpy (e.g., holidays and car purchase), so it is important to have a ‘rainy day’ 
fund of liquid assets in order to retain as much flexibility as possible with retirement 
assets. The lower the level of insurance used, the greater the ‘rainy day’ fund needs 
to be. Care costs are potentially the greatest spike to expenditure. There is currently 
a limited insurance market for care costs other than immediate-needs annuities that 
can be purchased when retirees enter care homes. This lack of pre-funded long-term 
care insurance requires the mass affluent to retain a considerable fund against this 
possibility.424 For those with limited means, the state will provide care and this 
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illustrates the need for retirees to be aware of how they can maximise means-tested 
benefits to their advantage. 
4. Fourth, secure ‘adequate’ income.  Many people will, of course, wish to secure a 
higher standard of living in retirement than the essential level if they have sufficient 
resources to meet their needs and wishes throughout retirement, including desired 
bequests.  
5. Fifth, achieve a ‘desired’ standard of living and make bequests. The plan offers a 
simplified choice architecture for managing any residual wealth with the aim of 
achieving a ‘desired’ standard of living in retirement, while allowing part of the 
remaining wealth to be bequested at a time of the retiree’s choosing.  
A SPEEDOMETER plan deals with the behavioural traits that people face: 
 Critically, the plan utilises inertia and procrastination, since, once enrolled, 
individuals do not tend to change their minds 
 The plan accepts individuals suffer from overconfidence and have self-control 
problems and would benefit from using commitment devices 
 If annuities are used in stages 4 and 5 of the plan, they could be  capital-protected or 
money-back annuities, since these deal with the aversion to losing control of and the 
fear of loss of capital on early death. Such annuities have the following advantages: 
o They remove the single biggest consumer objection to annuities:                                                                                 
‘If I die soon after I retire, the annuity provider will keep my fund’ 
o The ‘live or die’ guarantee of getting your money back provides a simple 
underpin  
o They are very easy to explain and for consumers to understand 
o A lump sum repayment rather than the continuation of current income for a 
guaranteed period of 5 or 10 years is easier for people to understand and is 
generally more highly valued 
o The cost of the guarantee is transparent and allows consumers to make an 
informed choice. 
o They automatically phase pension funds into full annuitisation (up to the limit 
specified by the annuitant). 
o They remove a significant barrier to pre-retirement saving: people won’t save 
voluntarily if they don’t believe that it pays to save. 
 The phasing of annuitisation deals with the aversion to making large transactions 
and possible regret about getting the timing wrong 
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 The plan is a universal one, although only the mass affluent will be in a position to 
make use of all five stages. Except for plan members who reveal themselves to be 
extremely risk averse, the annuity will not be the most prominent feature of the plan 
for the mass affluent in their early years of retirement. For most mass affluent plan 
members, what will be discussed first will be the management of retirement assets 
in accordance with the member’s attitude to risk. Annuities will merely be one 
component of the management of retirement assets. This helps to overcome 
framing effects.  
3.5  Defaults and default pathways 
In this Section, we examine some proposals for defaults and default pathways that reflect 
differing individual and household circumstances. In particular, we need to consider how 
nudging and the use of a choice architecture in decision making – ideally also combined with 
guidance or advice – can be used to help ‘humans’ make optimal solutions for themselves. 
3.5.1 Default and default pathways with SPEEDOMETER plans 
It would clearly be better if a retirement expenditure plan like the SPEEDOMETER plan were 
to be adopted by a fully engaged consumer working closely with an adviser. But could 
someone who was not engaged or not willing to seek advice be auto-enrolled or defaulted 
onto the plan?  
The experience of auto-enrolment in accumulation would suggest that the best if not the 
way that a plan like SPEEDOMETER will work for the mass market is if they are automatically 
enrolled into one during a pre-retirement guidance or advice surgery arranged through their 
employer, their pension provider or following a discussion with Pension Wise. There needs 
to be a co-ordinated approach to overcome inertia and procrastination, the two key 
behavioural barriers to effective decision making. Similar strategies can be used to get them 
to start the plan as was used to get employees to start a SAVE MORE TOMORROW (or 
SMART) plan, e.g., sign up now for a plan that starts on the retirement date in six months’ 
time, with the option to drop out at any time beforehand.425 Everyone would have the right 
to opt out until the point at which longevity insurance kicks in. 
For the mass affluent and high net worth segments of the market, the first key nudge of the 
plan is to get pre-retirees to talk to an independent financial adviser. The extent and timing 
of the annuitisation will depend on the initial assessment by the adviser and the subsequent 
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realised investment performance. Couples will need more flexibility than singles. High net 
worth retirees will need more flexibility than the mass affluent.  
For all market segments, the guidance or advice surgery needs to collect information on: 
 Pension pot size 
 Other sources of lifelong income (especially any state and defined benefit  pension) 
 Other sources of wealth (such as housing equity) 
 Liabilities (e.g., mortgage, credit card debts) 
 Health status 
 Family circumstances, including bequest intentions  
 Given other income sources, health status and family circumstances, decide the 
levels of expenditure that are considered essential, adequate and desired 
 Tax position 
 Risk attitude 
 Risk capacity. 
Given this information, the following default pathway can be established:426 
 Given total assets and liabilities, decide whether or not to use part of the pension 
pot to pay off any debts (e.g., mortgage) 
 Decide how to fund essential life-long expenditure if this is above the level that can 
be supported by the state and DB pensions. The only secure way of doing this is via 
an index-linked lifetime annuity or a guaranteed drawdown product offering 
inflation uprating.427 There might well be a temptation to delay the purchase of an 
annuity if the individual retires at an early age and the value of the annuity does not 
look ‘good’ at this age, but it remains a matter of when, not if, part of the pension 
pot is used to provide a secure life-long income to meet essential expenditure – if 
essential really means ‘essential’ – unless the member is single and in extremely 
poor health. If the member is partnered, a joint life annuity should be considered. 
 Decide on the level of insurance to cover contingencies or alternatively the size of 
the ‘rainy day’ fund and in what type of liquid investment this will be held. The 
member should be aware that any cash withdrawn from the pension pot above the 
tax-free amount might have tax consequences 
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 Decide how to fund adequate expenditure needs. There are two possible solutions 
depending on the degree to which the member wishes to guarantee the level of 
adequate expenditure. The first solution, for those wishing to have an absolute 
guarantee, involves annuitising another segment of the pension pot. The annuity 
could be a capital protected, inflation-linked, fixed, investment-backed, variable or 
enhanced, depending on the degree of risk tolerance, level of wealth and health 
status of the member. The second solution, for those who want more flexibility and 
do not believe that annuities represent good value for money or who are prepared 
to reduce their expenditure if investment performance is poor, involves a drawdown 
programme with this segment of the pension pot invested in, for example, an 
‘income fund’ that predominantly generates income, although has some growth 
potential.  A further alternative is guaranteed drawdown428 
 Decide how to fund a desired standard of living and make planned bequests.  
Depending on risk attitudes, the investment is likely to be some kind of ‘diversified 
growth fund’ with drawdown as and when required. However, to ensure that they 
are met on a life-long basis, the residual pension pot devoted to these expenditures 
would need to be annuitised. There are three ways of doing this: use a percentage of 
the pension pot (e.g., 10%) to buy a deferred annuity coming into force at, say, 75 or 
80 if the plan member lives that long, pay for the deferred annuity in monthly 
instalments (this deals with the behavioural problem of giving up a capital sum), or 
hold a reserve fund which is used to buy an annuity at age 75 or 80. The advantage 
of this third method is that there is more flexibility over when the annuity is 
purchased. The disadvantage is that the member will not know what the income 
from the annuity will be until it is purchased. Guaranteed drawdown is again an 
alternative to annuitisation 
 Decide on any further annuitisation (e.g., into a voluntary life annuity or an 
immediate-needs annuity to cover long-term care costs) to reduce the variability 
around the level and timing of any desired inheritance. 
When should the default process begin, given the reality that for many people, retirement 
does not occur on a single date, but instead is a process that is phased in? The default in 
contract-based schemes is that the funds stay with the provider. The same is true in trust-
based schemes, although trustees have the power to force decumulation when a member 
reaches a certain age – in other words, they could inform the member that they will arrange 
the purchase of an annuity for the member unless they hear otherwise. It seems 
appropriate that the member should trigger the default process. This is why some call this a 
‘quasi-default’ rather a true default which requires no action at all by the member.429 
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Ideally, the plan also involves annual reviews with the adviser covering: needs (including 
medical and care needs), state benefits, drawdown strategies for non-pension assets (such 
as housing equity release), inheritance, and tax. A key task of the adviser is to assess the 
initial attitude to risk of the member in order to determine the appropriate investment 
strategy for assets that have not been annuitised and to consider whether this has changed 
since the last annual review.  
It is also important to take actual investment and health experience into account at each 
annual review. Similarly, it is important to recognise that attitudes themselves can be 
flexible. Attitudes to annuitisation can also change. Once a retiree has held an annuity for 
some time, they can appreciate better the value of annuitisation and be less averse to 
further annuity purchases.430   
If the member does not have an adviser, it should still be possible for the member to choose 
from a set of well-designed default pathways using a decision tree. 
 
3.5.2 Other default proposals 
3.5.2.1 Age UK proposal 
In December 2014, Age UK proposed a default plan with the following components:431 
 Maximise state pensions and means-tested benefits 
 Gain a full picture of all pension and other assets 
 Consider merging small pots 
 Be aware of taxation 
 Consider using DC pensions to repay expensive debt 
 Maximise income from other financial assets 
 Decide on which retirement income product:  
o Consumers will need to decide (with or without the help of a financial 
adviser) whether they prefer the lower secure lifetime income from an 
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annuity or take the risk that entering an income drawdown plan could see 
them having to reduce their income or run out of money. For some, they may 
want to choose a mixture of these two options or enter income drawdown 
with a view to buying an annuity at a later date 
 Take difficult decisions about income drawdown:  
o Consumers should try and avoid high-charging income drawdown products 
and understand how their pension should be invested and how much they 
want to withdraw each year to avoid running out of money. They should 
think about what income they would live on if their DC pension ran out. 
These decisions will be difficult for them to undertake on their own 
 Shop around for an annuity and declare medical details to qualify for a higher rate 
 Integrate decisions about small DC pots with decisions about state pensions: It is 
essential that decisions about how to access small DC pension pots are aligned and 
integrated with decisions about when to access state pensions and whether to use 
some or all of their DC pot to buy additional state pension.432 
3.5.2.2 The Strategic Society Centre (SSC) 
In a report published in March 2015, Default Reform: Preventing Low Incomes with an 
Automatic Income Plan, the SSC proposes a default ‘automatic income plan’ that would 
deliver ‘predictable, secure (guaranteed) and good-value income’ in retirement. 433  It 
believes that this is necessary to protect savers who have little experience of investment. 
The SSC’s own research found that only a quarter of 55- to 65-year-olds keeps track of the 
stock market, while only one in three say they are aware of inflation levels. Furthermore, 
only 12% of low-income pensioners have an investment product and 34% do not even have 
a savings account. James Lloyd, SSC director and author of the report, say: ‘The results of 
the Government’s April pensions revolution will ultimately depend on the financial 
capability and decision-making of millions of UK workers. However, this detailed research on 
the financial capability of DC pension savers approaching retirement shows worrying levels 
of financial disengagement, raising questions as to how effective people will be in seeking 
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good-value, appropriate products throughout retirement, that protect them from changes 
in inflation and investment risk….Our research suggests the Government’s pension 
freedoms could repeat the experience of countries like Australia, where ‘freedom and 
choice’ for retirees has ultimately resulted in lower incomes and growing calls for reform’. 
The report warns that there is a ‘significant risk that the April 2015 changes to DC pension 
taxation will result in an increase in pensioner poverty’ with many pensioners running out of 
money before they die. 
 
3.5.2.3 Adrian Boulding’s three step proposal434 
In January 2015, Adrian Boulding, chairman of the Pension Quality Mark, proposed a default 
that uses McKinsey’s 3 x 3 rule: 
 Give people a set of three choices  
 Then another set of three choices (based on the first choice)  
 Followed by no more than a set of three choices. 
In a retirement income context, savers are given the following three choices about their 
pension pot: 
 Take it all at once  
 Leave it all invested and draw a regular income  
 Give it to an insurance company and get an income for life. 
If the saver chooses the second option, the next set of choices relate to the type of 
investment fund they want to use: 
 Low risk, drawing 4% a year  
 Medium risk, drawing 5% a year  
 High risk, drawing 6% a year. 
The third set of choices relate to protecting against the pension pot running out before the 
member dies: 
 Make a single payment of £5000 to an insurance company, which will guarantee 
payments of £200 per month starting at the age of 85  
 Regular payments of £25 a month to an insurance company, which will again 
guarantee payments of £200 per month starting at the age of 85  
 Do nothing and rely on other sources of income 
Mr Boulding also proposes minimum standards for flexible drawdown products: 
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 A simple fund range  
 Low charges  
 A suggested withdrawal rate  
 A slick operation for changing monthly payments or taking one-off lump sums  
 Ongoing reviews  
 Strong governance. 
 
3.5.2.4 Retirement Security Project  proposal: Automatic Trial Income435 
A study from the Retirement Security Project in Washington DC in 2008 proposes that 
‘When they retire, individuals would have a proportion of their DC pot allocated to a two-
year trial annuity unless they opted out. After two years, the annuity would convert to a 
permanent one, unless members dropped out. Employers would choose both the annuity 
provider and negotitate a group annuity rate. They would also choose the type of annuity, 
such as level or index linked’. 
 
3.5.2.5 Michael Johnson’s auto-protection proposal 
Michael Johnson from the Centre for Policy Studies published  Auto-protection at 55 in 
February 2015. The proposal – which could also be called auto-annuitisation – is for a 
default option for people approaching private retirement age whereby their pension pot 
would be automatically enrolled in a not-for-profit national auction house for index-linked 
annuities, the same model that is used in Chile. This would stop them running down their 
savings too quickly. 
Mr Johnson argues that: ‘There are legitimate concerns that some people may fail to 
purchase suitable retirement income products. People approaching retirement need to be 
encouraged to purchase retirement income products that limit downside risks, notably 
longevity, investment and inflation risks that almost all of us are incapable of managing by 
ourselves. People would either opt-out or find themselves with a deferred lifetime annuity, 
which would be a joint-life policy if they are married. That is exactly what goes on in several 
other countries, places like Singapore and Switzerland. All aspiring annuity providers, which 
could include the state, would be required to participate [in the auction]. Initially only a 
limited number of standardised single and joint-life, inflation-protected lifetime and 
deferred annuity contracts would be listed. Pre-auction aggregation of small pots by the 
house would encourage stronger bids’.436 
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There was little industry support for this proposal. A Pensions Buzz poll in Professional 
Pensions showed that only 25% of respondents supported the idea of defaulting people into 
an index-linked annuity.437  
Supporters of the proposal made the following comments: 
 Although they will need to understand what this means for them (and their spouse) 
assuming it’s a single life annuity? 
 As long as the default includes a market listing of the available annuities and the 
default is the best value after they have completed a health assessment 
 But we have seen how politics can override good sense 
 Freedom of choice is important, but a sensible default option that works for most is 
even more important 
 I would also remove the option to take any tax-free cash and the op-out option!  
Maybe this would encourage them to remain in contact with administrators 
 It is surprising this was not introduced in 1997, when limited price indexation (LPI) 
became compulsory for DB Schemes 
 Something is better than nothing even if it is a very small growth 
 There is a need for a great deal of education here 
 Yes there should be a default option. For most ordinary working people, the new 
‘freedoms’ will present a horrifying dilemma about financial matters that they just 
do not understand. 
Opponents of the proposal made the following comments: 
 A thousand times no!  Inflation-linked annuities would be appalling value for money, 
and would lead to more pensioner poverty than just leaving them to use their own 
common-sense (and their computer) 
 And they should be required to make a calculated decision on something as 
important as this. This default option is unlikely to be the best one 
 Annuity rates – especially if inflation linked are very poor value 
 As that is definitely not what most people want or need, it is a daft idea 
 Definitely not. These are apt to be particularly poor value for money 
 Depends on individual circumstances. A default approach would encourage lack of 
involvement in a vital decision 
 Few members are likely to purchase an annuity on reaching retirement age 
 Firstly, index linked annuities are of questionable value. Secondly, there is no need 
for a default at retirement. People will have to make a choice, otherwise they get 
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nothing, and I would favour forcing a choice rather than drifting into an unsuitable 
option. Why have ‘freedom and choice’ if you are going to do otherwise? 
 In a world where the mantra has long been ‘freedom of individual choice’ this is 
possible the most ridiculous and repellent suggestion yet 
 Individuals need time to decide what benefits are right for them – defaulting them 
into an arrangement which may not be appropriate for them, and 
difficult/impossible to get out of 
 Inflation linked annuities are poor value. You have to live for about 15 years to break 
even. What about ill-health, lifestyle, joint? Who chooses the provider? There should 
be no defaults. We need to encourage engagement. If people are ready, or don’t 
want to receive a retirement income, it shouldn’t be forced on them. Would trustees 
take on the liability for making financial decisions for members, which turn out to be 
wrong? They had better increase their liability insurance PDQ. MADNESS 
 It is bad enough that the majority get lumped into a default fund that someone has 
decided is best for them! 
 Make them do something if they want to take money 
 Members have to make a choice at this point, even if their understanding is not 
great 
 Surely the Budget 2014 changes have overtaken this approach? 
 The annuity should be flat rate 
 The bewildering landscape of pensions along with jargon and policies of big pension 
providers will be such that savers are bamboozled into following a route they did not 
wish to. Only by the time they realise it will be too late to reverse 
 The choice should be between capped drawdown and an annuity, with the pot 
remaining invested if the member fails to make a choice 
 There should be no default option; whilst it is just about supportable from an 
investment angle, the retirement choice has to be individual. The decision is too 
important – at some point the individual has to take ownership for their future 
 They must show the options and let the member choose 
 They need to be forced to decide or the pension system will get the blame when 
they feel they have lost out in some way, don’t decide then nothing comes your way 
in retirement, that should get the message through 
 This is a backwards step and unlikely to be the best option for members. Inflation-
linking is a gambol [sic] and the provider is the bookmaker 
 This seems reasonable enough, but great care must be taken to ensure that the 
default is always one of the best value annuities available on the market, otherwise 
there’ll be tears 
 This would be far too prescriptive 
 Why? It is better if they make an active choice with the right advice. 
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In the light of these criticisms, on 6 March 2015, Mr Johnson changed his default from an 
annuity to drawdown, whereby 5% of the pension pot is drawn down each year from the 
age of 55, unless the member instructs otherwise. His justification for the change was that 
he had given insufficient weight to the value of flexibility. The revised proposal could have 
automatic annuitisation later in retirement.438  
Supporters of layering plans, such as the SPEEDOMETER retirement expenditure plan, would 
argue that both of Mr Johnson’s proposals were in fact sensible, but for different segments 
of retirement expenditure. The proposal to default into an index-linked annuity is sensible 
for essential expenditure. As previously mentioned, if ‘essential’ means what it says, then 
there is no real flexibility in how to meet it. Further, if essential expenditure is inflation 
linked, as it will be and is required for as long as the member lives, then there is no real 
alternative to buying an an index-linked annuity, however ‘expensive’ this may be, or a 
guaranteed drawdown product offering inflation uprating. Just because something is 
‘expensive’, does not mean that it is bad value. Flexibility, on the other hand, is valuable 
when it comes to meeting adequate and desirable expenditure and contingent expenditure 
such as a repair bill. However, there would probably be disagreement with one aspect of the 
proposal and that is about the starting time. It would not make sense to begin the 
decumulation process at age 55 regardless of the wishes of the member. It should start 
when the member wants it to start. 
3.5.2.6 Automatic deferred annuitisation 
With this proposal, starting at some age, typically in the 40s, an increasing share of pension 
contributions would go to purchasing units of a deferred annuity that would be received 
when the person retired and started receiving benefits.439   
The idea comes from the US and the first company in the US to introduce it – with the name 
Lifetime Income Strategy – was United Technologies (UT), an aerospace and building 
technology company with around 200,000 employees. 440  UT automatically enrolls 
employees into the strategy, which was designed by AllianceBernstein, unless they choose 
to remain in their existing equity, bond or target-date mutual fund until they retire at an 
assumed age of 65. At age 48, the employee’s savings are gradually moved into variable 
annuities with a guaranteed minimum level of lifetime income for life from age 65. The 
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variable annuities continue to invest in equities and bonds – although in decreasing 
amounts – but also guarantee that employees can withdraw a minimum sum each year, 
even if the market crashes. By the time the employees reach 60, all the investments have 
been switched into a secure income fund. 
The annual income is a fixed percentage of the market value of the secure income fund. For 
example, if the fund was valued at $200,000 and the payout rate was set at 5% – which is 
based on the average rate at which the deferred annuities are acquired by UT over time – a 
65-year old retiree could withdraw $10,000 annually for the remainder of their life, 
irrespective of market conditions, including the case where the account becomes depleted. 
The level of guaranteed income is recalculated annually on the employee’s birthday or when 
new contributions are made. Three insurers – Prudential (US), Lincoln Financial and 
Nationwide (US) – bid every quarter for UT’s annuity business and the annuities are insured 
up to a cap by state guaranty associations.  Employees can choose a joint benefit to cover a 
partner, in exchange for a lower payout rate. Further, any residual fund on death can be 
bequested. 
The fees are lower than for standard variable annuities whose fees have been described as 
‘notorious’. Workers below age 48 pay 0.13% p.a. charges on the underlying index funds. 
The insurance cover provided in the secure income fund costs 1% p.a. So total costs, 
including investment and insurance fees, are 0.21% of the fund value at age 48, rising to 
1.24% at age 60 and above. Fees of this size take a substantial amount out of the value of 
the pension pot when compounded over a 30 year retirement, but it would be worse if the 
retiree took out a large lump sum part of the way through retirement since they would be 
paying for a longevity protection guarantee that they never used.  
Although UT was the first US company to use automatic deferred annuitisation, it is not the 
first to combine target-date funds and annuities. Prudential (US) has offered this 
combination under its IncomeFlex plan since 2008. In this case, the fixed minimum payout is 
5% p.a. irrespective of market conditions. This guarantee costs 1% on top of fund 
management fees. More than 73,000 employees in more than 7,000 pension schemes 
participate in the plan, with some now being auto-enrolled. According to a survey of more 
than 500 large US employers conducted by Aon Hewitt in 2012, 16% offer products within 
their 401(k) plans, such as annuities, that allow retirees to receive a lifelong income stream. 
The survey revealed that more employers would offer such insurance-related options if US 
regulators made it easier for them to do so. Employers are concerned about breaching their 
fiduciary duties to employees, given the much higher probability of insurance company 
insolvency in the US than in the UK. 
The success of automatic deferred annuitisation in the US is very encouraging and suggests 
that, if it can work in the US, it can also work in the UK. 
 
244 
 
3.5.2.7 The Murray Report’s proposal for a comprehensive income product for retirement 
In November 2014, the Australian Government published the Final Report of the Financial 
System Inquiry,441 known as the Murray Report after its Chair, David Murray. The Report 
proposes a default pathway for both the accumulation and decumulation stages – see 
Figure 3.1. 
The Report argues (p.91) that: 
Greater use of risk pooling could significantly increase retirement incomes 
generated from accumulated balances. This could allow individuals to 
allocate consumption throughout their lives better (greater dynamic 
efficiency) by reducing the savings required to achieve a target level of 
income in retirement. This could be achieved by:  
Removing barriers to new product development.  
Using behavioural biases to encourage rather than discourage the use of 
products that provide longevity risk protection.  
This recommendation would involve trustees pre-selecting a 
comprehensive income product for retirement (CIPR) option for their 
members. Pre-selected options have been demonstrated to influence 
behaviour but do not limit personal choice and freedom. They would bring 
the policy philosophy at retirement closer to that of the accumulation 
phase.  
Managing longevity risk through effective pooling in a CIPR could 
significantly increase private incomes for many Australians in retirement 
and provide retirees with the peace of mind that their income will endure 
throughout retirement, while still allowing them to retain some flexibility 
to meet unexpected expenses. An enduring income stream would give 
retirees the confidence to spend in retirement, which would help to sustain 
economic growth as the population ages and reduce the extent to which 
longevity risk falls on the taxpayer. 
The Murray Report proposal is an attempt to reverse the experience in Australia of 50% of 
Australians taking a lump sum at retirement and 25% of these running out of funds before 
they reach 70.  
 
 
 
                                                     
441 
http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf 
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Figure 3.1: A default pathway for Australian pension scheme members442 
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 Source: Figure 6: The superannuation system for default fund members 
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In October 2015, the Australian Government accepted most of the Murray Report’s 
recommendations, in particular:443 
Inquiry Recommendation 11 — The retirement phase of superannuation  
Require superannuation trustees to pre-select a comprehensive income 
product for members’ retirement. The product would commence on the 
member’s instruction, or the member may choose to take their benefits in 
another way. Impediments to product development should be removed.  
The Government agrees to support the development of comprehensive 
income products for retirement and will facilitate trustees pre-selecting 
these products for members.  
Trustees’ pre-selection of such products will help guide members at 
retirement. Comprehensive income products for retirement could improve 
outcomes for retirees, including through increased private retirement 
incomes, increased choice and better protection against longevity and 
other risks.  
The range of products available at retirement is currently narrow and does 
not always meet individuals’ needs and preferences.  
We will continue work to remove impediments to retirement income 
product development.  
Further consultation is required to develop a principles-based framework 
for pre-selection of a comprehensive retirement income product by 
superannuation trustees. This framework will be developed with regard to 
the outcomes of the Tax White Paper process and the Retirement Income 
Streams Review.  
David Murray said he was pleased the Government had agreed to remove impediments to 
the development of annuity and annuity-like products, as well as mandate that all pension 
schemes ‘soft default’ members into a CIPR when they stop working instead of offering 
them a lump sum. The proposals were also supported by Challenger, Australia's largest 
provider of annuities. Its chief executive Brian Benari said: ‘CIPRs will help people manage 
complex decisions at retirement by allowing retirees to opt-in to a retirement solution, 
which suits their circumstances including a stable income stream, flexibility and longevity 
risk protection’.  David Knox, senior actuary at Mercer, said mandating CIPRs was ‘one of the 
most important steps’ the Government could take to improve the system. However, David 
Whiteley, Industry Super Australia chief executive, said it would be ‘absolutely critical’ that 
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Australian Government (2015) Improving Australia’s Financial System: Government Response to the 
Financial System Inquiry;  
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/2015/Governmen
t%20response%20to%20the%20Financial%20System%20Inquiry/Downloads/PDF/Government_response_to_F
SI_2015.ashx 
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there be strong oversight to ensure default-account-based pensions are designed to be in 
the best interest of retirees rather than market providers.444 
 
3.5.3 Support for a default 
Academic behavioural economists have supported defaults for a long time.445 Think tanks 
and wide segments of industry also support the use of defaults. 
 
3.5.3.1 Pensions Policy Institute446 
The PPI argues that industry needs to put in place well-governed retirement income defaults 
that provide members with value for money and flexible access to their assets, without 
overwhelming them with complex choices. The interviews it conducted with DC savers 
found that many were ‘daunted’ by the array of choices on offer and want providers to offer 
them a default investment or drawdown choice, alongside appropriate guidance and advice. 
Indeed, many thought that providers had a ‘duty’ to offer a default, although they also 
recognised the need for some element of choice for those who want it. 
The PPI’s proposed default had the following key features: 
 Simplicity – defaults should aim to broadly meet a range of needs for most of the 
people most of the time 
 Value – defaults need to provide good quality and value for money. Value for money 
is a likely consequence of solutions being designed to deliver good outcomes for the 
majority, as opposed to being highly bespoke and more expensive to deliver. 
Solutions that work for the majority will also benefit from economies of scale 
 Freedom to opt out – default arrangements should not lock individuals in, but 
flexibility may be more of a priority in the earlier years of retirement than it is in the 
later years 
 Clear choice architecture – the default is one option located within a set of 
straightforward alternatives that won’t overwhelm savers. 
It also identified six principles to inform the design of default retirement solutions: 
                                                     
444
 Reported in Sally Rose (2015) Annuities and private pensions to replace lump sums as default for retirees, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October. 
445 
See, for example, John Beshears, James Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte Madrian (2008) The importance of 
default options for retirement saving outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in Stephen J. Kay and Tapen 
Sinha (eds.)  Lessons from Pension Reform in the Americas, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
446 
Pensions Policy Institute (2015) Transition to Retirement - Supporting DC Members with Defaults and 
Choices up to, into, and through Retirement: Qualitative Research with those Approaching Retirement, January;  
http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/publications/reports/transition-to-retirement-defaults 
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1. Living longer than expected and running out of money is the key risk in retirement 
and a critical input into retirement income solutions 
2. Savers should expect to spend most or all of their pension pots during their 
retirement 
3. Income should be stable and sustainable 
4. Managing investment risk is crucial as volatility can be especially harmful in income 
drawdown-type arrangements 
5. Providers should look to offer flexibility and portability wherever possible 
6. Inflation risk should be managed but not necessarily hedged. 
 
3.5.3.2 The International Longevity Centre – UK  
The ILC-UK supports a default strategy with annuities playing a key role:447 
In the face of complexity, many individuals are likely to do nothing which 
means that their retirement incomes will be dependent on whatever 
happens to the fund. We would argue that for a significant number of 
people, and especially for those who have high DC wealth concentrations, 
buying an annuity is still the right option and should form the backbone of 
any default strategy. However, annuitising is likely to remain an 
irreversible decision, so individuals need to be given appropriate warning 
that they will have part of their fund annuitised (perhaps 75% of the fund 
so as to retain some flexibility) if they do nothing. For this reason, 
consumers must be given a year’s warning, and the default must not kick 
in before they reach their respective State Pension Age. Up until this age, 
the pension fund should be invested in a balanced portfolio of safe and 
risky assets to allow for continual growth in the fund. 
However, it recommends that annuities must be rebranded as ‘safe guaranteed income for 
life’ products. 
 
3.5.3.3 The Strategic Society Centre (SSC) 
The March 2015 report of the SSC discussed above was followed up by an empirical study 
published in July 2015 which showed that the level of wellbeing experienced in retirement 
was related to the level of guaranteed income they enjoyed in retirement.448 The SSC 
analysed data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing on over 2,000 retirees in 
England in receipt of a private pension. The analysis found statistically significant positive 
                                                     
447
 The International Longevity Centre – UK (2015) Here Today, Gone Tomorrow. How Today’s Retirement 
Choices Could Affect Financial Resilience Over The Long Term, 16 March;  
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/images/uploads/publication-pdfs/Here_today,_gone_tomorrow_1.pdf 
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 Will Parry and James Lloyd (2015) Income Security and a Good Retirement, Strategic Society Centre, 14 July;  
http://strategicsociety.org.uk/income-security-and-a-good-retirement/#.Vaasr60w-70 
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relationships between an individual’s level of private pension income and a range of 
retirement outcomes such as: 
 Spending habits (such as being able to go to the cinema or own a mobile phone) 
 Sense of autonomy and control 
 Life satisfaction 
 Participation in community and civic society. 
However, the analysis also found that the level of financial wealth was not associated with 
any of these outcomes. 
At the same time, the SSC published a policy paper which considered the implications of the 
research for UK private pension policy and for the Government’s position of neutrality 
regarding how individuals use their DC pension savings.449 The paper argues that by 
adopting a position of neutrality, the Government may oversee reductions in the wellbeing 
of the older population as a result of the April 2015 changes to rules on DC pension savings. 
The main policy recommendation is that the Government should ensure that a decent 
guaranteed income is the default option for DC pension savers. Other recommendations 
include: 
 Actively promote the receipt of a guaranteed income in pension policy to improve 
the well-being of retirees 
 Educate savers before retirement about the role of guaranteed income for a good 
retirement 
 Include information about the importance of guaranteed income to wellbeing in 
retirement in Pension Wise guidance and information 
 Undertake regular research into the effect of the April 2015 changes on older 
people’s wellbeing. 
Stephen Lowe, group communications director at Just Retirement, said: ‘This report 
provides unprecedented insights into how people derive wellbeing from guaranteed income 
throughout their retirement. With so much attention being focused on the option to access 
pension savings as cash, the findings demonstrate the real benefits of treating pension 
savings as just that – a source of guaranteed pension income for life’.450  
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 James Lloyd (2015) Income, Security and Wellbeing: Helping savers choose a good retirement, Strategic 
Society Centre, 14 July; http://strategicsociety.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Income-Security-and-
Wellbeing.pdf 
450
 Quoted in Helen Morrissey (2015) Think tank calls for guaranteed income DC retirement default, 
Professional Pensions, 14 July. 
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3.5.3.4 National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) 
A report published by the NAPF in January 2015 as part of its Understanding Retirement 
Research Programme concluded: ‘To give savers the best possible chance of managing their 
money, we will need to give them three things: 
 Clear pathways that are easy-to-understand and provide access to good-value 
solutions 
 Visible and easy-to-obtain guidance that makes savers aware of their options, and 
 High-quality products designed to meet the needs of savers. 
The NAPF’s own research showed that ‘82% of the retired and 78% of the working people in 
this group said they would rather have a secure income for retirement than a pot to dip 
into’, implying that ‘lifetime annuities remain the most obvious mechanism for achieving 
this’.451 Graham Vidler, director of external affairs at the NAPF, concludes that ‘what's really 
needed is a default retirement pathway’.452 
We participated in a NAPF seminar on 27 January 2015 which discussed the above report. 
We list the key comments made at the seminar: 
 Government talk is about ‘freedom and choice’, but the pensions industry (schemes, 
employers, providers) believes that there is a pressing need for default solutions that 
combine drawdown with longevity insurance 
 The mass market is the group with the most urgent need for default solutions 
 There is a real danger that if people are not nudged/defaulted, they will withdraw all 
of their pot because they believe that they can ‘do better’ themselves and also 
because they do not trust pension providers. The biggest danger is that they will fall 
victim to scams 
 The idea is to establish a simple set of default pathways. Possibly three options. But 
many will choose the middle option, which in effect becomes the default-default 
 There needs to be realism about the extent of member engagement. The reality is 
that most are defaulters – they will not engage. Fiduciaries (trustees and investment 
governance committees (IGCs)453) will have to choose the default. This will be low-
risk because they will be worried about liability 
                                                     
451  
National Association of Pension Funds (2015) The Unpredictability of Retirement, Understanding 
Retirement: An NAPF Research Programme, January  
(http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/~/media/Policy/Documents/0425_understandin
g_retirement_first_report.pdf);  
Jackie Wells (2015) Uncertainty ahead for DC members, Engaged Investor, 9 February 2015 
(http://www.engagedinvestor.co.uk/uncertainty-ahead-for-dc-members/1474457.article) 
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Graham Vidler (2015) Helping hand: Why ordinary savers will need more than Pension Wise, Professional 
Adviser, 1 April. 
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Discussed later in the Chapter. 
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 We need to decide what ‘good’ looks like. It has to be good for the majority, it 
cannot be good for everyone. It needs to be well understood (in term of risks, 
guarantees, etc), demonstrate value for money and have clear guidelines on the 
maximum percentage of the fund that can be withdrawn. So the default-default 
might be capped drawdown plus longevity insurance 
 The NAPF research shows that consumers in mass market want a secure lifetime 
income, but this is made more difficult by the ‘freedom and choice’ regime, the lack 
of affordable regulated advice, and the lack of suitable products 
 Consumers do not understand the implications of marginal tax rates or longevity risk 
(the dispersion around the average). So the Government message ‘it’s your money’ 
requires a complicated caveat ‘… but subject to marginal tax rates and to how long 
you will live’ etc. Guidance is not enough – people need clear and simple to 
understand solutions; most will not engage 
 There is no need for policy intervention to allow defaults, as schemes can do this 
now (according to a pensions lawyer present) 
 Many employers/schemes will not want responsibility for default products – they 
need a third-party solution, i.e., to make the default a transfer to an outside scheme 
– most likely a master trust 
 Governance is crucial. There is a vital role for DC scheme trustees and IGCs. There 
also needs to be strong backing from regulators and policy-makers. We need to build 
on the NAPF’s quality mark. However, there are serious challenges: 
o Putting the right governance in place will be challenging – the governance 
issues are far more complicated than with accumulation 
o Who is responsible for governance? Employers unlikely to want this liability; 
trustees/IGCs will be worried about liability too 
o The NAPF’s quality mark involves a charge cap, yet there is widespread 
provider/adviser opposition to a charge cap in decumulation 
 It was noted that there is very little sign of product innovation. This was put down to 
first-mover disadvantage in a completely new landscape 
 There was general view that longevity insurance needs to be sorted out at the point 
of retirement/drawdown, with around 10% of the pot being used for a deferred 
annuity  
 There needs to be a minimum degree of engagement with members, since schemes 
do not know members’ bank account details because contributions come via the 
employer’s payroll system 
 Camilla Barry, partner at Macfarlanes, argued that a default option would help to 
remove the risk that trustees and employers face in terms of making decisions and 
giving advice: ‘It may be useful to think about having a default as well as pathways. 
People that don't make choices would be tipped into the default option which may 
be capped drawdown with the purchase of deferred annuity  – a model product that 
will work for most people’. Patrick Heath Lay, chief executive officer at B&CE, said 
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‘while trustees would need to ask people which route they would want to do down, 
they would also have to pick a centralised route with an element of risk removed’.454 
3.5.3.5 National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) Consultation 
Further support for a default option was contained in response to a NEST consultation 
released in March 2015.455 Paul Todd, assistant director of investments at NEST, said: ‘There 
is a remarkable consensus for big groups of people who have been automatically enrolled 
for some straightforward choice architecture and not too much confusing choice and 
definitely, in large groups, the need for default pathways… I think the two main things which 
have come out are the need for flexibility in the early years of retirement and the point that 
people at some point in their accumulation phase need to get some insurance for living 
longer than expected. I think the emerging consensus was that at some point you need to 
protect people from longevity risk’. 
 
3.5.3.6 Steve Webb  
While Steve Webb, the former Pensions Minister, dismissed the idea of creating an at-
retirement default withdrawal system, he has conceded that this might be appropriate at a 
later time in retirement: ‘It is good to give people financial flexibility in their early 60s, but 
the question is whether we want people to have to make active financial decisions 
throughout what could be a 30-year retirement’.456 
 
3.5.4 Opposition to a default 
A Pensions Buzz poll in Professional Pensions in March 2015 showed that a significant 
minority opposed a default retirement option.457 In response to the question ‘Should there 
be a default for DC members when they reach retirement age?’, 49% answered ‘yes’, while 
46% said ‘no’, with the rest undecided. The main reason given for supporting the default 
was the recognition that many people, while needing an income product, did not want to or 
were not able to manage their investments, particularly as they got older: ‘As an industry, 
we must be able to design an “annuity plus” product’, but ‘the default should exist as a 
safety net, as a last resort’. Typical reasons for opposing the default were: ‘Default option 
absolves individuals of responsibility. Who takes ownership and deals with problems caused 
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Reported in Stephanie Baxter (2015) Default option for decumulation ‘is crucial but challenging’, 
Professional Pensions, 27 January.  
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 Reported in Michael Klimes (2015) Industry supports DC retirement default says NEST, Professional 
Pensions, 16 March.  
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 Reported in Taha Lokhandwala (2015) Defined ambition not just an ‘academic exercise’ – Steve Webb, 
Investments & Pensions Europe, 8 June. 
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Reported in Michael Klimes (2015) Industry questions value of at-retirement default option, Professional 
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by lack of understanding?’ and ‘A one-size-fits all approach would disadvantage a large 
minority of retirees’. 
The poll also showed strong opposition to a default retirement option that was not initiated 
by the scheme member. Responses to the question ‘If there were such a default, what 
should it be?’ were: 
 64% – stay invested until member makes an active decision 
 13% – index-linked annuity 
 9% – capped drawdown followed by annuitisation at 75 
 9% – flat annuity 
 4% – capped drawdown 
 2% – cash/cash-like fund. 
The general view was that peoples' circumstances were too varied and complex to create a 
comprehensive default suitable for everyone. 
3.6. Information, advice and guidance 
An important feature of the success of any retirement expenditure plan will be the 
information, advice and guidance received by the member. While this would appear to be 
obvious, there are important regulatory distinctions between information, advice and 
guidance in the UK. It is possible that customers will get confused by the distinctions. 
 
3.6.1 The distinction between information and advice 
The FCA’s guidance consultation Retail Investment Advice: Clarifying the Boundaries and 
Exploring the Barriers to Market Development458 in July 2014 defined the difference 
between ‘information' and ‘investment advice'. The difference involves an element of 
opinion or judgement on the part of the adviser, either in person or online. The provision of 
information, such as facts about the performance of investments, the terms and conditions 
of investment contracts, or the price of investments, does not constitute giving regulated 
advice if the investor alone decides whether to act on the basis of this information. 
Regulated advice, on the other hand, involves recommending a course of action or giving an 
opinion or making a judgement on the merits of, say, buying or selling an investment.  If 
information is provided in a way that seeks to influence or persuade, then it may be 
classified as regulated advice. For example, if the provision of information about the price of 
an investment is given at the same time that the firm is indicating that it is a good time to 
buy, then this may constitute regulated advice.  
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Two additional criteria need to be taken into account before deciding whether or not 
information is classified as regulated advice: ‘suitability’ and ‘appropriateness’: 
 If, based on a consideration of a person’s circumstances – which would cover their 
knowledge and  experience in the investment field, their financial situation, including 
ability to bear losses, and their investment objectives, including risk tolerance – an 
investment is presented as being ‘suitable’, then this may still constitute a personal 
recommendation and, hence, regulated advice, even if the firm has a clear, 
prominent and understandable disclaimer stating that no advice or recommendation 
is being given. A suitability report needs to consist of three elements at a minimum: 
the client’s objectives, why the advice is suitable, and what could be the 
disadvantages. The suitability test also applies to a firm that sells and manages 
investment products 
 Whether a product is considered ‘appropriate’ for a customer will depend solely on 
their knowledge and experience in the relevant investment field. Customers might 
have to demonstrate that they have sufficient knowledge and experience to 
understand the risks attached to any product they are considering buying.  
 
Table 3.4: Pre-sale suitability and appropriateness assessments under MiFID II 
 
Type of sale Type of 
product 
Test required Factors to be considered 
Advised Complex 
 
 
 
Suitability Knowledge and  experience in the 
investment field 
 
Financial situation, including ability to 
bear losses 
 
Investment objectives, including risk 
tolerance 
Non-complex 
Non-advised Complex Appropriateness Knowledge and  experience in the 
investment field 
 
Non-complex 
 
 
None None 
Source: Financial Services Consumer Panel (2015) 
 
Although assessing product suitability for a particular client does not constitute advice, it 
will still be necessary to do this to determine whether a firm is able to recommend the 
purchase of a ‘complex’ MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive)  product. Under 
MiFID II, which is due to come into force in January 2018, it is expected that many pension 
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products, such as drawdown, will be classified as ‘complex’ which means that they cannot 
be sold on a non-advised (i.e., execution-only) basis to inexperienced investors. Instead, 
providers will have to conduct an ‘appropriateness test’ to assess whether the customer is 
in the position to make an informed decision about the product. But the test will not 
determine whether the product is suitable for their particular circumstances. Table 3.4 
summarises these requirements. The only ‘non-complex’ products once MiFID II comes into 
effect will be plain vanilla shares, bonds and unit trusts. 
According to Matt Connell, head of regulatory developments at Zurich UK Life, advisers 
could be required to assist providers in their appropriateness testing. Advisers who offer 
both non-advised and fully advised services could be asked to help providers with some of 
the information gathering about customers. He said: ‘The idea is if you have a [pension] 
wrapper that includes guaranteed returns, it is a bit like a derivative. Products that are more 
expensive, but with less volatility, might be less risky for consumers, but the question is do 
consumers understand them. It's bringing the whole channel closer together. There will be 
more requirements on product providers and advisers to talk to each other on a non-
advised basis. Consumers will enter conversations with providers over appropriateness not 
with the adviser, but then may have to go back to the adviser if the provider says 'no'. 
Advisers should think about how they collect information and send it to providers. They may 
have to capture information for which they do not yet have the right systems in place’. The 
practical consequence of this is that, once MiFID II comes into force, most customers might 
not be able to buy a drawdown or other complex product without first taking advice. 
According to the FCA: ‘Pensions liberalisation could give rise to new risks of inappropriate 
sales of insurance-based investments to consumers, as well as MiFID II investments’.459  The 
Tax Incentivised Savings Association (TISA) is concerned about how MiFID II will operate in 
practice, particularly in terms of appropriateness, suitability and product governance. It said 
it would establish guidelines on how advisers and providers should address these issues. In 
particular it will look at: 
 The definition of complex versus non-complex products 
 What does best practice look like for product governance? 
 What does it mean by target market? What will it look like? 
 Information flows between manufacturer (i.e., provider) and distributor? 
 How can technology be used and what will the impact be? 
 What is the impact on execution-only closed-end funds? 
 What will appropriateness look like in practice? 
 What are the implications for clients? 
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Jeffrey Mushens, technical director at TISA, said: ‘The directive makes it very clear that 
firms, which manufacture or distribute a product, will also be expected to have appropriate 
organisational arrangements that specifically address the issue of product governance. 
Whilst there has always been a requirement to understand the products under advice, this 
is now required to be more organised and formal, thus, the directive increases expectations 
on existing systems and controls’.460  
The FCA has a long-standing concern about the failure of the industry to meet suitability 
requirements. In 2011, it issued a ‘Dear CEO’ letter to wealth management firms, following a 
previous suitability review. Its 2015-16 business plan released in March 2015 announced a 
thematic review of ‘improvements in suitability standards across wealth management’, 
focusing on managed portfolios and their suitability in respect of clients’ risk profiles, 
attitudes to risk, and capacity for loss.  
The FCA is particularly concerned that the proliferation of new complex retirement products 
could confuse older consumers who have little experience in taking decisions about their 
income and who typically underestimate their longevity: ‘Firms may develop decumulation 
products or services that could highlight certain product features or the price at the expense 
of other important information, or be difficult to compare due to hidden costs and fees and 
include barriers to exiting, There is also a risk that these could result in increasingly complex 
products or a mix of products that require ongoing servicing and potentially higher costs, 
which some financial advisers may recommend in a bid to generate higher fees’. According 
to Neil Walkling, from regulatory consultancy Bovill: ‘The FCA is still finding some firms have 
not done much to improve suitability standards and the way they gather information from 
clients. There is the sense [the FCA has] run out of patience’.461   
In December 2015, the FCA published the findings from its thematic review of the suitability 
of retail investment portfolios provided by wealth management and private banking 
firms.462  Although a number of firms had taken steps to demonstrate that their clients' 
portfolios are suitable, the FCA found that, in 60% of the sample portfolios they 
investigated, the composition of the portfolios they managed did not truly reflect the 
investment needs and risk appetite of their customers, especially those who have a limited 
capacity for, or desire to expose themselves to the risk of, capital loss. Many firms also still 
have to make substantial improvements in gathering, recording and regularly updating 
customer information to support the investment portfolios they manage for customers. The 
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FCA also warned firms that they need to ensure that their governance, monitoring and 
assessment arrangements are sufficient to meet their regulatory responsibilities in relation 
to suitability. 
The FCA investigated 150 files from 15 firms. It found that: 
 23% indicated a high risk of unsuitability 
 37% were unclear 
 41% showed a low risk of unsuitability. 
Megan Butler, FCA director of supervision, investment, wholesale and specialists, said:  
‘Getting suitability right is fundamental to providing a portfolio management service that 
meets customers' needs’.463 
The FCA has five key tests for investment advice: 
1. Does the service being offered constitute a recommendation? 
2. Is the recommendation in relation to one or more transactions in financial 
instruments? 
3. Is the recommendation at least one of the following: 
a. presented as suitable 
b. based on the consideration of the person's circumstances 
4. Is the recommendation issued otherwise than exclusively through distribution 
channels or to the public? 
5. Is the recommendation made to a person in his capacity as one of the following: 
a. an investor or potential investor 
b. an agent for an investor or potential investor. 
If the answers to all these questions is ‘yes’, then it is investment advice. 
In January 2015, the FCA released a complete list of its definitions of advice.464 These are 
listed in Table 3.5.465 Between the clear and unambiguous extremes of execution-only and 
personal recommendation/regulated advice come generic advice or information, focused 
advice (which is requested by the customer) and simplified advice (a service specified by the 
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 Reported in Laura Miller (2015) FCA finds 60% of wealth managers' portfolios close to unsuitable, 
Professional Adviser, 9 December. 
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Financial Conduct Authority (2015) Retail Investment Advice: Clarifying the Boundaries and Exploring the 
Barriers to Market Development,  Finalised Guidance  FG15/1, January; 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/finalised-guidance/fg15-01.pdf 
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 The Table reflects differences in the definitions of regulated advice at the EU level under the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive and the Regulated Activities Order (RAO), The FCA applies both in the UK, but 
the former requires regulated advice to be a personal recommendation (otherwise, it is generic advice), while 
the latter does not. 
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firm, but falling short of regulated advice although might involve a personal 
recommendation). 
Table 3.5: Financial Conduct Authority’s definitions of advice 
1 Execution-only  
 
A service consisting of the execution and/or reception 
and transmission of client orders relating to particular 
financial instruments at the client’s initiative. The firm 
does not give any advice on investments or assess 
appropriateness.  
2 Generic advice  
 
Advice or information that does not relate to a particular 
investment or does not otherwise meet one of the 
characteristics of regulated advice.  
3 Focused advice or  
limited advice  
 
 
Advice focused on the provision of personal 
recommendations relating to a specific need, designated 
investment, or certain assets.  As requested by the 
customer. 
4 Simplified advice 
 
Advice focused on the provision of personal 
recommendations relating to a specific need, designated 
investment, or certain assets.  The firm sets out the 
boundaries of the service it provides and uses 
streamlined and/or automated advice processes to 
provide customers with a personal recommendation, 
based upon their personal and financial circumstances. 
5 Personal 
recommendation 
 
A recommendation relating to taking certain steps in 
respect of a particular investment, made to a person in 
their capacity as an investor or potential investor (or their 
agent), which is presented as suitable based on a 
consideration of the person’s circumstances.  
6 Regulated advice  
 
Advice relating to a particular investment given to a 
person in their capacity as an investor or potential 
investor (or their agent) and relates to the merits of them 
buying, selling, subscribing for, or underwriting (or 
exercising rights to acquire, dispose of, or underwrite) the 
investment.  
Source: Derived from FCA Finalised Guidance 15/1 (2015, pp. 2-3) 
 
3.6.2 Generic advice  
In 2007, the Treasury conducted an experiment on the effectiveness of generic financial 
advice as part of Otto Thoresen's review of generic financial advice.466 Around 5,000 people 
took part in a 12-week trial involving a free, impartial generic financial advice service 
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 H M Treasury (2008) Thoresen Review of Generic Financial Advice: Final Report, March. 
259 
 
providing information and guidance on money matters. The service was offered by A4e (as 
Money Fitness) and Consumer Direct (in partnership with Citizens Advice). The preliminary 
findings revealed that many people lack the confidence to buy savings and investment 
products without advice, and do not have a clear idea of which products would suit them. 
However, generic financial advice can act as a prompt for people to take action. Within a 
week of using the service, 80% of the people who took part in the experiment had taken at 
least one follow-up action, with 20% contacting a new supplier of financial products.  
The results of the exercise indicate that generic financial advice is potentially beneficial to all 
demegraphics, not just low-income groups.467 
 
3.6.3 Guidance 
‘Guidance’ is not specifically listed in Table 3.5. The Government is offering a free ‘guidance 
guarantee’, called Pension Wise, to all those about to draw on their pension pot.468  The 
guidance offered by Pension Wise will involve taking stock of people’s assets and liabilities 
and explaining the options available to them. This is achieved through a six-step process 
which ‘help you understand how to turn your pension pot into income for your retirement’: 
1. Check the value of your pension pot  
2. Understand what you can do with your pension pot  
3. Plan how long your money needs to last  
4. Work out how much money you'll have in retirement  
5. Watch out for tax  
6. Shop around for the best deal.469 
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Reported in Professional Adviser (2007) Generic Financial Advice would work – survey, 24 December. 
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 https://www.pensionwise.gov.uk. Pension Wise was set up by HM Treasury, but in September 2015, the 
Government announced that the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) would take over responsibility for 
Pension Wise. 
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Initial comments about the Pension Wise website expressed disappointment. For example, Katie Morley 
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Pension Wise, process the information, and relate it to their own personal pension circumstances. Knowing 
how complex the rules are, how opaque providers are about their products, and that the average person now 
has 11 different pension pots, most people’s arrangements are likely to be anything but simple to sort out. To 
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What use is reading up on the intricacies of income drawdown – if you don’t know how the rules apply to you, 
for example? Pension Wise is also in desperate need of some basic useful tools. Ones which would allow 
people to enter their personal details to produce meaningful figures. Numbers go over people's heads unless 
they related directly to them and their money. Core calculators missing from the site include showing people 
how long they're likely to live, how much tax they will pay on their pension, and how much income they can 
afford to take from their pension per year. There is no way someone can begin to properly plan their pension 
without these basic ingredients.’ (quoted from ‘I tried Pension Wise - and this is why it won't work’, Daily 
Telegraph, 23 February 2015). 
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In terms of content, a guidance session will:470 
 inform consumers of the scope, purpose and limitations of the session 
 inform consumers about the pension entitlement and other personal and financial 
information that the designated guidance provider may request from them during 
the session 
 request information from the consumer about their accumulated pension pots 
 request information about the consumer’s financial and personal circumstances that 
is relevant to their retirement options 
 alert the consumer to other sources of information and advice as appropriate and at 
relevant points during the session 
 identify for the consumer and provide them with information about: 
o the options relevant to the consumer 
o to the extent that they are relevant to the consumer’s options 
o the potential tax implications or debt obligations 
 set out the next steps for the consumer 
 provide consumers with a record of their guidance session. 
The Pension Wise service is run by two designated guidance providers The Pensions 
Advisory Service (TPAS) which offers phone-based guidance and Citizens Advice (CA) which 
offers face to face guidance sessions,471 each lasting 45 minutes. The FCA has introduced the 
following standards for designated guidance providers:472   
 ensure that the guidance is impartial, consistent, of good quality and engaging across 
the range of delivery channels 
 create consumer trust and confidence in the designated guidance providers and 
content of the guidance so that consumers actively use the service 
 ensure that the framework works for both contract-based and trust-based pension 
schemes 
 deliver helpful guidance for consumers that considers their retirement options and 
refers them to specialist advice or information where appropriate. 
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 HM Treasury (2015) Delivering Pensions Guidance: January 2015 Update, 12 January; 
https://www.gov.uk/Government/publications/delivering-pensions-guidance-january-2015-update/delivering-
pensions-guidance-january-2015-update 
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From more than 500 locations in England and Wales. 
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Financial Conduct Authority (2014) Retirement Reforms and the Guidance Guarantee, Policy Statement 
PS14/17, November, http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/ps14-17.pdf 
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Individuals delivering the guidance must: 
 have the skills, knowledge and expertise necessary for the discharge of their 
responsibilities – including good interpersonal skills (including listening skills and 
verbal communication skills) – and have knowledge that includes the following: 
o the different types of pension schemes 
o the impact of fees and charges for both accumulation and decumulation 
pension products 
o the options available to consumers when accessing their pension savings 
o the factors relevant to the selection of options when accessing pension 
savings, including the impact of guarantees, special features, restrictions or 
conditions, protected rights, and exit charges 
o the tax treatment of pensions and income generally 
o the circumstances when a consumer may require further specialist help, for 
example debt advice, or regulated advice 
 cover other issues that are relevant to consumers considering their retirement 
options, for example, long-term care needs, sustainability of income in retirement 
and life expectancy, and 
 understand the conduct that a designated guidance provider may engage in. 
Consumers must have access to a complaint management system that is fair, consistent and 
prompt. The Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman (PHSO) will handle any 
complaints about Pension Wise as a last resort. Initially, there was no recourse for people 
who receive guidance from TPAS or CA, since neither guidance nor the designated guidance 
providers are regulated by the FCA.473 However, in July 2015, the FCA – which has been 
made responsible by the Treasury for setting standards for the delivery and for monitoring 
the delivery of the guidance – clarified the issue by stating that where redress is due, it will 
be paid by TPAS or CA. The FCA said it can 'make recommendations' to the Treasury and the 
PHSO to order guidance providers to pay out: ‘We expect a recommendation to make 
redress to be comparatively rare. We would expect such a recommendation to follow our 
general process for making recommendations with the calculation of the level of redress 
based on the size of detriment experienced. Where a consumer has already received 
adequate redress, as set by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, we would 
not require it to be paid again as a result of our recommendation’.474 
In July 2015, the FCA announced that it would, for the first time, distinguish between advice 
and guidance in the way it records complaints.  Previously, the FCA categorised complaints 
against financial services firms under the headings 'misleading advice/guidance', 'arranging', 
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 Complaints involving financial advice are handled by Financial Ombudman Service. 
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 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) FCA - Pension Wise providers liable for guidance guarantee redress, 
Professional Adviser, 3 July.  
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or 'inappropriate sales technique'. Going forward, it said it would categorise complaints as 
either 'unsuitable advice' or 'unclear guidance/arrangement'. This will give the regulator a 
clearer picture about how many complaints were made specifically about regulated financial 
advice and how many related to guidance, Christopher Woolard, director of strategy and 
competition at the FCA, said: ‘Our rules will help deliver the quicker, easier and fairer 
resolution to complaints that consumers want. Getting this right is also vital for firms. A 
properly resolved complaint can keep a customer happy, and protect the firm's reputation. 
But, more than that, effective complaints handling systems can act as an early warning 
system for firms’.475 
Early evidence suggests that affluent investors were not using Pension Wise. A survey by 
Suffolk Life of its own relatively well-off clients who started a drawdown programme during 
April and May 2015 found that only 2% contacted Pension Wise. Three quarters took advice, 
while the rest acted without seeking advice. The average fund size of a Suffolk Life SIPP is 
around £330,000.476   
In July 2015, the Treasury announced that Pension Wise had delivered 18,000 guidance 
appointments since its launch. It also reported that 925,000 visitors had visited the Pension 
Wise website. However, this was only 15% of the total appointments available. Hargreaves 
Lansdown has previously said that only one in seven of its customers were using the 
service.477 Also in July 2015, the Government announced that the minimum age for 
accessing Pension Wise was being reduced from 55 to 50.478  
A survey of 700 companies by Close Brothers Asset Management in August 2015 found a 
third did not have a clear understanding about Pension Wise or how it could help retirees, 
while 13% did not feel confident recommending the service. Only 9% said it has been a huge 
support in offering help to employees. Jeanette Makings, head of financial education 
services at Close Brothers, said: ‘Four months after the pension reforms were introduced, 
it's clear that there is still some confusion. It's crucial that if employers are directing their 
staff towards Pension Wise, they really understand the support it can provide and that the 
guidance it gives is not advice and so should sit alongside financial advice rather than 
competing with it’.  On the other hand, the survey also found that 20% of companies were 
actively trying to improve their support network for staff approaching retirement, while 37% 
said the reforms had encouraged them to play a greater role in financially educating their 
employees. Ms Makings said: ‘Options at retirement have become all the more complex, 
and education is the key to helping employees navigate their new freedoms. A financial 
education programme – whether this is through seminars, clinics or one-to-one advice – can 
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help to build up understanding and engagement and can lead to them taking action to 
improve their financial wellbeing’.479  
Research published by the NAPF in October 2015 revealed that only 10% of people 
considering their retirement options had turned to Pension Wise, although 20% of people 
who had accessed their pension pot had used the service. The research was based on a 
focus group of people who had accessed some or all of their pot, and had used Pension 
Wise. According to Graham Vidler, NAPF director of external affairs: ‘The problem is not one 
of quality of service, because late on in the process we started nudging people towards 
Pension Wise, and when they went and investigated, they liked what they saw. The problem 
is one of awareness and knowing the service is there and can be used. We really need to 
crack through because at the moment there's a service out there that is not being used by 
people who in most cases could do with some expert guidance and support’. Instead, people 
were using informal sources of support such as the media, family, and friends. There is a big 
group of people who are looking at their options and they do not know what to do. One of 
our responders, June from Bristol, was typical – she said she felt “paralysed” by the choices 
on offer’.480 
In September 2015, TPAS reported that those who used the service recently were most 
concerned about avoiding tax, accessing pension freedoms, and the lifetime allowance. 
They were also considering their options more carefully than those who approached TPAS at 
the beginning of ‘freedom and choice’ in April 2015 and were looking to access their money 
as quickly as possible. Charlotte Jackson, head of information and guidance, said: ‘What we 
are seeing now is that people are more considered and taking their time. Around 20% of 
people are saying to us they want a combination, the security of an annuity and a degree of 
flexibility’.481  
In December 2015, the Government announced that Pension Wise guidance was costing 
£496 per client to deliver. The cost of the service in 2015-16 was £39.4m, with advisers 
contributing £4.7m. Steven Levin, chief executive of Old Mutual Wealth’s investment 
platform, said this represented ‘poor value’ compared with full personalised advice, which 
cost around £175 per hour. He said the industry needed to see better value for the £4.7m it 
is being asked to contribute.482 
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Steve Webb, now policy director at Royal London, believes that the resources put into 
Pension Wise would have been better used giving retirees vouchers for financial advice: 
‘Given the tens of millions that have been spent on Pension Wise, maybe that money should 
have been spent on £500 advice vouchers, so you can access financial advice and start to 
understand the value of the service. That might be the direction the Government should be 
going in’.483  In January 2016, the FCA said it would support a move for Pension Wise to 
provide a more personalised service for its clients.484 
3.6.4 The implications for members of DC schemes 
The Aon DC Member Survey, published in December 2014, of 2,000 occupational DC scheme 
members made the following predictions (which turned out to be a fairly accurate indicator 
of what actually happened in the first few months after Flexiday):485 
 Only 12% of the respondents to the survey said that they would make use of a ‘web-
based Government guidance service’. 
 One third of the survey respondents intend to make important decisions about their 
retirement on their own, or with the help of friends and family. But the very high 
proportion of DC members that currently invest in their default DC investment 
option probably indicates that members do not engage much with the investment 
process prior to retirement. 
 Another quarter of the respondents said that they would seek the help of an 
independent financial adviser (IFA).  
According to Keith Churchouse, director of Chapters Financial, it is very likely that ‘for some, 
this guidance [from Pension Wise] will be extremely useful, for others it will be like receiving 
the instructions for a flat pack furniture unit’.486  According to financial solutions firm LEBC, 
the guidance guarantee will do little more than deter people from ‘doing stupid things’ with 
their pension pots, it will not help them plan for their retirement.487 
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TISA, in an initiative supported by 50 firms and trade bodies, wants the FCA to introduce a 
‘common sense’ standard for the delivery of guidance to consumers.488 This is because the 
rules around simplified advice and the boundary between guidance and advice are ‘just not 
clear’. The initiative, part of the Savings and Investments Policy Project (TSIP), wants the FCA 
to establish a set of 'kitemarks', using, for example, decision trees, which will help advisers 
guide consumers based on what 'people like you' should do. Currently, advisers are ‘too 
afraid’ to guide consumers unless it is part of full regulated advice. 
In May 2015, MGM Advantage released the results of a survey conducted by ComRes of 
1,000 UK residents aged 55 and over who are not retired. The survey found that 65% 
thought that financial advice at the point of retirement should be compulsory. Only 11% 
said they were ‘very comfortable' managing their pension in retirement, while 35% said they 
were not comfortable doing this and indicated they needed on-going advice. Andrew Tully, 
pensions technical director at MGM Advantage, said: ‘People are making difficult, life-
changing decisions, made all the more complex by the new pension rules. We're seeing the 
majority of people recognise that without financial advice they may fail to realise the full 
implications and make decisions that end up costing them dearly. The Pension Wise 
guidance service is a good starting point for people. The service can help people understand 
the options available, but it may not be enough to help them make the choice that's right 
for their personal circumstances…We need to continue to work hard to promote the 
benefits of people actually taking the next step and getting proper regulated financial 
advice. This is the only way we can remove the status quo, ensure we improve the 
outcomes for people at-retirement and make sure the new rules benefit as many of them as 
possible’.489 
In May 2015, IFA software provider Intelliflo published the results of a survey of 1,000 adults 
earning at least £40,000 on their attitude to regulated financial advice. Around 39% said 
they would need a pension pot of at least £100,000 before they would consider seeking 
regulated financial advice, while 24% said between £50,000 and £100,000, 11% between 
£25,000 and £50,000, 11% between £10,000 and £25,000, and 14% if they had less than 
£10,000. However, 43% of respondents said they intended to manage their pension pot 
themselves.490 
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3.6.5 The implications for members of DB schemes transferring to DC schemes 
The Pension Schemes Act 2015 distinguishes between ‘flexible’ or ‘safeguarded’ benefits.491 
Flexible benefits comprise DC and cash balance benefits, while safeguarded benefits are DB 
benefits. The Act gives members a statutory right to transfer each category of benefit from 
their current scheme to another scheme. Members with DB benefits must have ceased 
accrual and made an application to transfer those benefits (following receipt of the 
statement of entitlement). Schemes do not have to provide the new flexibilities themselves. 
Further, existing scheme rules may not permit them. To enjoy the new flexibilities, members 
might have to transfer their benefits to another provider. However, if trustees do wish to 
offer the new options, they can now amend the scheme rules by resolution (with employer 
consent) or use a statutory override of the scheme rules.  
Trustees are required to give the following information to members with DC benefits at 
least four months before their retirement date: 492 
 A statement of the options available to the member under the scheme rules 
 A statement that they have the opportunity to transfer flexible benefits to one or 
more different pension providers 
 A statement that different pension providers offer different options in relation to 
what the member can do with the flexible benefits, including the option to select an 
annuity 
 A statement that different options have different features, different rates of 
payment, different charges and different tax implications 
 A copy of the guidance that explains the characteristic features of the options that 
has been prepared or approved by the regulator 
 An estimate of the value (or cash equivalent transfer value (CETV) if relevant) of the 
affected member’s flexible benefits (if the benefits are ‘transferrable rights’ in 
accordance with the disclosure regulations), the date that this was calculated, an 
explanation that this is not guaranteed and information about any guarantees or 
features, restrictions or conditions that could affect the value, and 
 A statement that there may be tax implications associated with accessing flexible 
benefits, that income from a pension is taxable and that the rate at which income 
from a pension is taxable depends on the amount of income that the member 
receives from their pension and other sources. 
                                                     
491 
See The Pensions Regulator (2015) Regulatory Guidance: DB to DC Transfers and Conversions, April; 
http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/db-dc-transfers-conversions-regulatory-guidance.pdf 
492
 The Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Disclosure of Information) (Amendment) Regulations 2015  
(https://www.gov.uk/Government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/405622/occupational-and-
personal-pension-disclosure-of-information-draft-amendment-regulations-2015.pdf); The Pensions Regulator 
(2015) Communicating with Members about Pension Flexibilities, March 
(http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/draft-essential-guide-pension-flexibilities-march-2015.pdf) 
267 
 
In the case of DB benefits, trustees are required to inform members that they have the right 
to DB benefits and how they can access information about them. Trustees must also direct 
members to Pension Wise on the options available to them, provide them with generic risk 
warnings on each option, and inform them that they should consider taking independent 
advice to help them decide which option is most suitable for them if they have flexible 
benefits, and must do so if they have safeguarded benefits. 
A poll of consultants to DB schemes conducted by Towers Watson showed that many 
members want to know what their transfer value is. Trustees should therefore consider the 
most cost-effective way of doing this, such as adding transfer values to all retirement letters 
rather than responding to individual requests. The poll indicated that around 20% of 
schemes had decided to automatically quote transfer values at retirement, 40% had decided 
not to, and around 40% were still undecided.493 
Fidelity’s Retirement Service announced in October 2015 that there had been a ‘significant 
increase’ in interest in DB-to-DC transfers since April 2015, although the take-up had been 
small so far: 12% of its calls were about this topic. Richard Parkin, head of retirement at 
Fidelity International, expected partial transfers to become more popular than full transfers: 
‘If you have £25,000 [in DB benefits] and you trade in £5,000 for a pot of money, it's much 
easier to have conversations about that, because you're not giving up your guaranteed 
income’. Some customers were concerned about the tax treatment of their DB benefits 
when they die, believing that it would be better to transfer to DC. Others just wanted to get 
their hands on the cash. But overall, there has also been a general increase in interest in 
pension planning since April. Mr Parkin went on to say: ‘One thing I've started to think about 
recently is that, as an industry, we're very nervous about DB-to-DC transfers because of 
what's happened in the past. We've tended to say that we can't do it – but that doesn't 
mean we shouldn't check. Are trustees or sponsors of DB plans really serving members 
properly by not looking at whether a transfer value makes sense? For example, if members 
are single or sick – or both – then DB may not be giving them value. We should be giving DB 
members much better retirement help rather than just saying “you've got a gold-plated 
pension, so you're lucky”. DB is great quality, but you can't just make the assumption that 
that's always the case. Plan sponsors have an interest in doing that, because if they can 
reduce their liabilities in a way that also works for the members, then it's good for both 
sides’.494  
Matthew Arends, partner at Aon Hewitt, speaking at the NAPF annual conference in 
October 2015, said that while transfer quote requests had risen since Flexiday, fewer than 
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1% of members had actually taken up the option. He questioned whether only 1% of people 
are better off by transferring out of their DB scheme. He argued that DB schemes needed to 
employ different communications methods – such as telephone and online chat facilities as 
well as online modellers – if members are to understand options such as transfers to DC 
schemes. He pointed out that 40% of schemes that provide CETVs to members also provide 
access to independent financial advice, but despite this, take up of this advice remains 
low. 495  However, in December 2015, Xafinity reported that the number of people 
transferring out of DB pension schemes each month had doubled since January.496  
The FCA’s review of enhanced transfer values (ETVs) published in July 2014 found that 
advisers had failed to assess whether the transfer was suitable for customers for a number 
of reasons including: 
 generic templates which were inadequately ‘tailored’ so the advice did not reflect 
specific member circumstances or give sufficient priority to the members’ own 
requirements 
 advice where the outcome focused solely on critical yield analysis497 without full 
consideration of wider member circumstances  
 not establishing adequately the level of risk a member is willing and able to take 
 fund recommendations which did not match the assessed risk profile of the member 
 the use of default receiving schemes (in some cases, with uncompetitive charging 
structures) and limited consideration of the suitability of a member’s other existing 
pension arrangements, and  
 limited consideration of the tax and, in a small number of cases, means-tested 
benefit implications of accepting the offer.498  
There were also failures concerning disclosure, such as: 
 incomplete record keeping 
 the ‘annuity risk’ of transfer from DB to DC not being fully explained 
 over-emphasis on the possible ‘flexibility’ under a DC scheme in undertaking the 
transfer analysis 
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 offers being structured against a reduced transfer value and therefore appearing 
artificially generous, and  
 no consideration of the members’ additional voluntary contribution (AVC) funds as 
part of the advice process.  
Clive Adamson, director of supervision at the FCA, said: ‘Transferring from a DB to a DC 
scheme is an important decision for consumers. It is disappointing that our review saw 
failings in the advice given, particularly when incentives [such as a direct cash offer499] have 
been provided to transfer. All firms active in this complex area of pension transfer activity 
should think very carefully about the quality of the advice process and assurance framework 
required to deliver fair customer outcomes’.500  
The same FCA review found that 59% of members who accepted an ETV from a DB scheme 
did so as an ‘insistent client’ against their adviser’s recommendation.501  The FCA wants 
advisers to ensure they have recorded the client's reasons for wanting to transfer out of the 
scheme and have discussed the risks involved as well as alternative options.  
Those who want to transfer pension pots worth less than £30,000 are not required to take 
advice. While this would lead to cost savings for trustees, it was not without risk for scheme 
members.  According to Stephen Green, senior consultant at Towers Watson: ‘The fact that 
advice isn't required for small pensions does not mean that this is a decision to be taken 
lightly – especially where people have little else besides their state pension to fall back on. 
But if someone's other final salary pensions will provide them with a good income in any 
case, their desire to swap a small pension for a pot of capital that they can access as they 
like may have overridden any financial advice not to do so.’502  
The situation could be even worse for people living abroad who want to transfer their UK 
pension scheme. According to a FCA rule update published in July 2015, they might have to 
pay twice for advice. This is the interpretation given by Intelligent Pensions technical 
director, David Trenner: ‘While most focus has been on the definition of safeguarded 
benefits and the need for a pension transfer specialist, there is a small section in the FCA 
feedback document which seems to have passed without comment. This is the section 
dealing with overseas residents and that they may end up having to pay for two advisers 
and therefore paying twice’. This is because there are two stages in the advice process: (a) is 
a transfer suitable? and (b), if it is, where should the money be transferred to? The FCA 
points out that UK-authorised advisers may not have knowledge of local tax regimes and 
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pension rules, and says that it is in discussion with the DWP to consider whether 
amendments should be made to the rules for non-UK residents. Mr Trenner added: ‘While 
we can have some sympathy with clients needing to pay two advisers, it is absolutely 
essential that the requirement for a UK-registered transfer specialist is retained. We have in 
the past seen overseas advisers transferring DB values into QROPS [Qualifying Recognised 
Overseas Pension Scheme] with no benefit comparison and the only “reason why” given 
being that they are no longer in the UK, so they would not want their pension to remain in 
the UK. A professional firm will set up an arrangement with offshore specialists to ensure 
that the UK adviser understands all of the relevant aspects of the overseas jurisdiction, and 
the resulting team will be stronger than the sum of the two parts’. The key reason was to 
protect consumers: ‘We were approached by a couple who had emigrated to Dubai, but 
decided it was not right for them. They were only in Dubai for two years, but this was long 
enough for a local adviser to transfer benefits from two DB schemes (one the NHS Pension 
Scheme), and to deduct 12% in hidden charges. It is essential that the rules are not watered 
down in any way’.503 
In July 2015, the Government accepted that some consumers were frustrated by the new 
legislative and regulatory requirements to seek financial advice in certain circumstances, 
although it said there was no legal requirement to follow the advice offered. It believed 
there was ‘insufficient clarity’ on when advice was required and said that this issue would be 
raised as part on a Treasury consultation on pension transfers and early exit charges.504 
Also in July 2015, The Pensions Regulator (TPR) announced that it was considering bringing 
its guidance to pension scheme trustees on communicating the new retirement flexibilities 
into line with the FCA rules. Previous TPR guidance was to give members only generic 
information if they were considering accessing their pension pot, while the FCA rules say 
providers of contract-based products must give tailored risk warnings. The reason for the 
initial difference was that trustees were concerned about ‘straying too close to giving 
financial advice’ which could be avoided by giving only generic warnings. Going forward, 
particularly for large DC schemes and master trusts that plan to offer the full suite of 
drawdown options to members, TPR will discuss with the DWP and the FCA whether 
trustees ‘should also be able to offer specific risk warnings which would be as similar as 
possible to the FCA's second line of defence for providers’. TPR believes it is ‘important for 
regulators to work together to make sure there was no regulatory gap’.505 
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3.7 Opportunities for advisers 
The new pensions environment was seen by some as a ‘huge opportunity’ for advisers. Not 
the least of these was Steve Webb when he was Pensions Minister. Speaking at the 
Retirement Planner Forum and Awards 2014,506 Mr Webb said ‘the guidance guarantee 
would only get people to the starting line, giving them just a basic understanding of what 
their options are and issues such as taxation and longevity. [T]here was only so much that 
could be covered in such a limited conversation, which would only equip them with the very 
basics of retirement planning. There are some in the advice community who see this as a 
threat. I see it as a huge opportunity. I liken the guidance guarantee to wine tasting and you, 
the advisers, are a vintage wine. When people realise what choices they have; when there is 
innovation in product, which I am sure there will be; when people start to consider all their 
retirement wealth and income and all their partner's retirement wealth and income and all 
the different permeations of the new freedoms they have got, I think many people will want 
to talk further to someone who can help and that seems to me to be an adviser…who can 
give them personal tailored advice’.507  
 
3.7.1 Opportunities for advisers in regulated advice 
Others agree and see an important role for regulated advice going forward. For example, 
Duncan Jarrett, retail managing director at Aegon, said: ‘There's a massive opportunity for 
advisers, as 65% of people don't understand the pension reforms and even those who do 
are likely to require support selecting the right combination of income products. Advice has 
never been so important and to help advisers we've introduced Your Retirement Planner to 
bring customer options to life and the tool responds based on the combination of income 
options they select. We expect advised customers will want to take full advantage of the 
new flexibilities and combine a range of different income options’. Aegon said consumers 
using the site direct would be more likely to seek regulated advice afterwards.508 
Similarly, Richard Nuttall, head of compliance policy at SimplyBiz Group, said: ‘It is expected 
that one of the main outcomes for these individuals [from the guidance guarantee] will be 
to obtain regulated financial advice. For those firms wishing to engage in this activity, it 
represents a great opportunity. Where individuals require, or are guided towards, regulated 
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financial advice, the Money Advice Service will have a directory of advisers for the individual 
to access’.509 
Standard Life’s head of platform and wealth propositions, David Tiller, also believes that 
pensions freedom has handed advisers their biggest business opportunity ever on account 
of ‘the fact that pensions can now be fantastic for wealth transfer and supporting the next 
generation on their retirement savings is a compelling opportunity to open clients’ eyes to 
the art of financial planning’.510  According to Mr Tiller, retirement planning has become 
much more complex, but it is filled with opportunity for three reasons: 
1. Baby boomers reaching retirement means demand will remain at an all-time high for 
some time. 
2. These people are the wealthiest retirees this country has ever had. 
3. For many, choices are now so complex they may find it challenging to get good 
outcomes by themselves. 
Mr Tiller estimates that drawdown was about 5% of adviser business in 2014, but by 2024, it 
could be 80% of adviser business. He believes that the key to coping with this increase in 
demand is what he calls a ‘centralised retirement proposition’, which will cover: 
 Tax advice policy – having established client needs around income and wealth 
transfer, working out the best tax wrapper to take this from. Subject to using tax 
allowances, this is often going to mean taking from the pension last (turning 
previous advice on its head) 
 Cashflow modelling – how much income can they take given total assets and any 
goals on wealth transfer. With the removal of GAD limits, many advisers are using 
GAD as a proxy, but we are seeing different standardised approaches to projecting 
assets and sustainability of income 
 Investment advice – creating an investment strategy for clients who may live off 
their portfolio for 30 years is a sophisticated multi-goal investment challenge. Many 
advisers have already developed disciplined CIP [centralised investment proposition] 
processes around accumulation; it is now about doing the same thing for 
decumulation 
 Accessing investment solutions – creating a decumulation CIP will inevitably demand 
accessing new investment solutions that manage volatility and sequence-of-returns 
risk in retirement (pound cost ravaging)511 
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 Withdrawal policy – setting clear customer expectations of how their income will 
change over time – streamlining annual reviews as expectations already set and 
avoiding difficult conversations when significant changes happen as the customer 
expectations set. 
The new pension freedoms have encouraged a number of advisers to extend the range of 
services they offer to well-off clients, with a new focus on wealth management and financial 
planning. There had already been a major change in advisers’ business models following the 
introduction of the Retail Distribution Review (RDR)512 in 2013, with a move to discretionary 
services and away from the low end of the advised market. Examples include: 
 Brewin Dolphin expands financial planning business (May 2014) 
 Rathbone launches private office (February 2015) and acquires independent financial 
advice network Vision Group (October 2015) 
 Charles Stanley refocuses business entirely on wealth management (April 2015) 
 Investec Wealth launches private office for ‘under-served’ investors with a minimum 
of £10m (April 2015). 
By contrast, life assurers – which traditionally had a dominant role in providing retirement 
income solutions – have responded to the new pension environment by offering a 'vertically 
integrated' service that has been put together through acquisitions. Examples include: 
 Old Mutual acquires the Intrinsic network (July 2014) and launches national advice 
business called Old Mutual Wealth Private Client Advisers (October 2015) 
 Standard Life buys adviser Pearson Jones with the aim of building up a face-to-face 
advisory service in addition to telephone and online advisory services. The new 
service will be called 1825  (February 2015).513 
In November 2015, Tilney Bestinvest and Saga introduced a financial planning and 
investment service offering regulated advice, guidance and execution-only services to the 
over-50s. The service is aimed at the estimated 12.5 million people who have made no 
financial plan for retirement. Customers can ‘do it on their own’ with free online and 
telephone support, take one-off guidance, or have a longer-term relationship with a 
professional adviser. Initial adviser charges range from between 1% and 3% – depending on 
complexity – plus ongoing fees of between 0.75% and 1.25% per year. Nici Audhlam-
Gardiner, Saga Investment Services managing director, said: ‘By combining Tilney 
Bestinvest's investment expertise with Saga's 60-year history of improving the lives of the 
over-50s, we have created a service that will help make investment easier to understand 
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and more accessible, particularly for those who have been underserved by the financial 
services industry in the past’. Customers will also have access to flexi-access drawdown.514 
Another trend that is developing is increasing collaboration between advisers and 
accountants as the demand for tax planning increases following the introduction of 
‘freedom and choice’. These findings came from a poll of 120 advisers conducted by 
Prudential in August 2015. Vince Smith-Hughes, director of business development at 
Prudential, said: ‘Pension freedom has underlined the importance of independent financial 
advice….Markets which might have been closed before are potentially opening up, but there 
is a realisation that advisers may need additional expertise. Working with the ICAEW 
[Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales] financial services faculty, we 
hope to explore the opportunities presented by pension freedom legislation for advisers and 
accountants’.515 
 
3.7.2 Opportunities for advisers in simplified advice 
John Porteous, head of client proposition at Towry, argues that ‘simplified advice is a clear 
missing link between guidance and full advice, but there are numerous challenges, 
'validation' [or suitability] among them…. [T] technology-led innovation around the principle 
of simplified advice creates an opportunity for firms to reach out to different client 
segments’.516 
The greater use of existing IT and computer-generated advice is critical to the success of 
simplified advice,517 not least because of the significant decline in advisers post-RDR to 
around 22,500.518 The FCA has offered help to advisers to build simplified advice models, by 
giving them an 'informal steer' on, for example, how to clarify the boundary between 
guidance and advice. This is part of its Project Innovate and will be managed through 
Innovation Hub, launched in October 2014. Innovation Hub was set up both to help firms 
negotiate the regulatory landscape and to allow the FCA to assess what it can do to promote 
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innovation in financial services.519 This is in response to advisers’ fears about possible 
‘systematic mis-selling’ using simplified advice models.520 
At the lower end of the market, companies, such as Scottish Widows, have established 
online guidance and a call centre to help those who want to transfer, but do not have a 
financial adviser. Peter Glancy, head of corporate propositions at Scottish Widows, said: 
’Traditionally, it has been people with hundreds of thousands of pounds who really know 
what they are doing [using drawdown]. Now we are going to be working with people who 
just want to get some money out and may be putting it into drawdown by default without 
realising the tax implications. We need to make sure we’re engaging with them more 
intuitively and not allowing them to do anything silly’.521 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Prudential has launched a non-advised drawdown product for 
customers who want to take advantage of pensions freedom, but choose not to consult an 
adviser. Its Pension Choices Plan offers access to its PruFunds range, its Dynamic Portfolios, 
and its cash fund.  The minimum investment is £25,000.522 Similarly, Zurich has launched a 
non-advised drawdown product with a minimum investment of £30,000, as has Blackrock.523 
Aegon’s online Retirement Choices platform has a drawdown option which requires 
customers to take advice, but the firm is planning to introduce a simplified non-advised 
version. 
Just Retirement has launched a simplified telephone-based advice service for providers to 
offer to their clients when they retire. Stephen Lowe, group external affairs director, said:  
‘The service is designed for clients with simple, straight-forward needs and savings of 
between £30,000 to £40,000. It's aimed at life companies that want to ensure their pension 
savers are more actively engaged in the decision-making process at retirement, while 
passing on the responsibility for the regulated advice. Charging structures for the service will 
be agreed with the individual life companies and will be charged separately from other 
products, but clients will only have to pay if they act on the recommendation. Clients opting 
for the service will receive personal recommendations about how to use their pension 
savings to generate income or access lump sums. The advice will also look at whether clients 
should keep funds invested based on their attitude to risk and capacity for loss or whether 
they should defer taking benefits. Simplified advice is set to be a cost-effective way of giving 
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retirees, who usually wouldn't choose to engage in accessing advice, the helping hand they 
are going to need in the future. The majority of these Middle Britain pension savers won't 
have complex requirements, so a simplified advice service should be a good option’.524  
Hargreaves Lansdown has introduced a restricted advice service which has allowed it to 
simplify its fee tariff and remove the minimum portfolio size for advice. It will now advise 
clients over the telephone, regardless of the size of their portfolio, for a minimum fee of 
£495. Face-to-face advice costs a minimum of £1,495.525 
AllianceBernstein’s Retirement Bridge product, which covers members between age 55 and 
75, includes ‘embedded advice’. Tim Banks, managing director of the Pensions Strategies 
Group, said: ‘You can take out any amount of money you like as cash any time, but the 
impact of you taking additional lump sums is clear, because you sell ‘units’ in the fund and 
can see what income you are swapping for cash.’ 526 
3.7.3 The frequency of advice 
There is also a question about how often advice is needed. Many advisers felt that there is 
more to retirement planning than can be covered in a single meeting. For example, Buck 
Consultants said: ‘The implication…that the guidance…can be delivered on one occasion, at 
which the member will take decisions on all aspects of their retirement planning, is not 
credible - even if the expected outcome, in most cases, is that the member will choose to 
select a packaged solution. [Employers could hold] regular informal discussions with groups 
of employees on pensions matters [so when specific situations arise, individuals can take 
professional advice which can be] focused and kept to a minimum, [thereby reducing 
costs]’.527  
Clients apparently want to receive communications from their advisers 11 times a year, 
according to a survey of client satisfaction conducted by NPG Wealth Management, SEI and 
Scorpio Partnership in which 3,113 investors globally were questioned. Clients who only see 
their relationship manager 6 times a year gave a poor satisfaction score. On the other hand, 
more than 13 annual contacts was considered too much. Most 'heavily invested' clients 
preferred to deal directly with their adviser, while those with less than a quarter of their 
assets with a wealth management firm prefer to contact product specialists or use a digital 
                                                     
524  
Carmen Reichman (2015) Just Retirement launches simplified advice for life company customers, 
Professional Adviser, 13 April.  
525
 Reported in Laura Miller (2015) Hargreaves Lansdown dumps independent advice; overhauls charges, 
Professional Adviser, 1 October. 
526 
Quoted in Peter Davy (2015) Complexity and Cost will limit pensions freedom, Financial News, 16-22 March.  
527
 Quoted in Carmen Reichman (2014) Revealed: What advisers told the Treasury about pensions 'guidance', 
Professional Adviser, 12 August. 
277 
 
service. The two main reasons for a contact were to discuss overall progress and to consider 
relevant portfolio changes.528  
Others suggest less frequent contact is acceptable if this is what the client wants. According 
to Paul Harrison, head of business consultancy at Prudential, advisers should tailor their 
ongoing services to their clients and do not need to see all of them annually to satisfy an 
unwritten rule about treating active customers fairly. While the core service a firm offers 
should be consistent – and have the charging structure for it – advisers should think about 
modifying how often they see their clients and through which channels in order to free up 
capacity. For instance, some clients may not require annual check-ups and could be seen 
every two or three years. Others could be serviced over the phone or online to supplement 
face-to-face meetings. Nevertheless, many advisers are concerned about the FCA’s attitude 
to adviser charging for ongoing advice. In its reviews of the implementation of RDR in April 
and December 2014, the FCA found evidence of firms receiving an ongoing adviser charge, 
while not providing a genuine service in return. It said that the value of an ongoing advice 
service acted as an ‘important motivator’ in consumers' decisions to pay for financial advice 
in the first place.529 
3.8 The impact of technology on advice 
Technology was at the heart of affordable advice, according to a poll of advisers conducted 
during a Professional Adviser web-seminar on 6 October 2015. Around 91% of advisers 
polled thought technology was important or extremely important when trying to provide 
affordable advice. Just 3% thought it was unimportant and the rest were non-committal.530   
 
3.8.1 Platforms 
 ‘Platforms will be the primary facilitator for many pensioners and advisers in managing 
retirement funds’, according to Alistair Wilson, head of retail platform strategy at Zurich. 
Advisers need to be aware of the functionality of different providers’ platforms in terms of: 
 Access to income through flexible access drawdown, some may also offer annuities 
 Taking the whole pot as a cash lump sum 
 Partial (ad-hoc) lump sums without crystallising the pot 
 Existing capped drawdown plans on their platform going forward 
 Transfers of existing capped drawdown plans on to their platform 
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Mr Wilson adds: ‘Where a client wants to have a fixed monthly payment, this should be 
relatively simple, but where the payments may include ad hoc requests, the dynamics 
become very complex. Understanding what at first glance appears to be a piece of trading 
functionality becomes ever more important. And so, it is important to look in detail at the 
challenges relating to platform functionality and associated costs when taking an income, 
especially if these costs change if income is stopped, reduced or restarted. Add to this, 
understanding the “in-flight” events such as corporate actions and the impact these can 
have on income, there is an increasing amount to be considered…Providing clients faster 
access to their cash, or at the very least, not imposing processes that delay access, comes to 
the fore. Clients don’t expect technology to slow down access and, for some platforms 
which don’t prefund some transactions, this is exactly what can happen….The problem is 
further compounded by the fact that many clients will be expecting to stagger their entry 
into retirement, such that, at the same time as withdrawing funds as efficiently as possible 
across tax wrappers, they may also still be making contributions. It goes without saying 
clients are not going to be happy to have to pay extra and wait longer for their cash if they 
could also face a scenario where there is insufficient cash to pay income on time….Those 
platforms that support cash management automation will come into their own with pension 
freedoms, providing clients and advisers with an additional safety net’. The following costs 
also need to be taken into account: setting up and management of pension income, ongoing 
fees for effectively ‘payroll’ administration, ad-hoc payments, and additional costs when 
releasing individual pots.531  
Richard Budnyj, director of Platform Action, considers the pricing challenges facing  
platforms in the post-RDR world. The client needs to pay for the services offered by the 
adviser (if the client is advised), the investment manager and the product provider’s 
platform. Mr Budnyj discusses these in turn: 
 Advisers: 
o Pre-RDR, advisers typically received 50bps in commission from the product 
provider. Post-RDR, though many advisers have fared well by adapting their 
business models and segmenting their clients to focus on those who believe 
in the service value they bring, not enough clients have been willing to pay 
directly for advice. As a result, we have seen a rationalisation of advisers. We 
are also left with a great swathe of clients who, due to the size of their 
investment pots, are not a viable proposition for advisers anymore, but who 
do need advice. Yes, there are people out there who can 'DIY', but a large 
population have been left in limbo, leading many providers to see this as an 
opportunity and set up direct-to-consumer (D2C) propositions 
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 Investment managers: 
o The investment managers have had to deliver new fund classes, but overall 
one could argue they have not had to cut their cloth to the same extent as 
providers are having to. I suspect they'll argue they are about value and that 
the net return given to investors is the most important thing. As an investor, I 
am happy to pay the value premium 
 Product providers 
o The product provider level is where we are seeing significant pressure for 
reductions in price, with some calling it a race to the bottom. But for how 
long can they sustain this position? We currently have a number of smaller 
independent wrap platforms who arguably have the right business model but 
are struggling to make profit because they don't yet have the required scale. 
To succeed long-term, they need to increase assets under management and 
their low-cost base means the break even point is far lower than platforms 
with a life company heritage. But, given the huge influx of assets onto 
platforms in recent years, successful independent platforms are likely to be 
those which can now attract assets transferred from other platforms. For the 
platforms which have grown out of traditional life companies, although they 
have the scale in terms of assets, they also have the high costs associated 
with servicing legacy business and so are also struggling to make a profit. 
These companies are under greater pressure to scale further as their 
breakeven point is much more challenging. 
 Mr Budnyj believes that updated technology alone cannot create long-term profitability for 
many platforms and he proposes two solutions: greater operational efficiency within the life 
companies (with new digital technology at the core) and consolidation with the smaller 
players, through mergers and acquisitions.532 
Standard Life’s David Tiller also predicts a contraction of the platform market from 25 to 
about 15 platforms by 2018, but only around six of these will cater to advisers. He warns 
advisers to avoid being trapped in dying platforms which may find it hard to find a buyer. 
This is because rival platforms would find it difficult to integrate systems and so would only 
be interested in the assets not the rest of the business. Adviser platforms would therefore 
have to switch to a D2C or workplace model or become ‘zombies’, closing to new business 
but limping on as has happened in Australia. Advisers who become trapped in such 
platforms risk falling behind their competitors which have their clients' assets invested on 
more modern platforms. Mr Tiller argues that there are nine things advisers should be 
looking for in their platforms: 
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1. The advisers using the platform have progressive business models, are successful, 
compliant and are growing ahead of the market 
2. Operating a successful UK adviser platform is core to the business strategy and 
commercial model of the platform owner 
3. The platform has access to capital funding from committed long-term owners 
4. The platform has seen sustained new business growth from advisers, as opposed to 
direct or workplace assets 
5. The platform has a stable pricing position and business strategy 
6. The platform has maintained a consistent level of service and support for advisers as 
it has grown 
7. There is a track record of continuous enhancement of the platform, such as by 
investment in the underlying technology 
8. The platform has a clear business plan and roadmap of further development for 
advisers 
9. The platform has proactively embraced the RDR and helped advisers adapt to it.533 
Average platform costs have fallen by 18% over the last five years, according to a study 
published in July 2015 by Steve Nelson and Terry Huddart called Platform Pricing 
Prophecies: Past, Present and Phuture.534 For an average sized portfolio of £200,000, the 
annual platform cost has fallen since 2011 from 0.38% to 0.31%, or by £140.  The main 
explanations for this are: RDR, competitive pressure, a focus on due diligence among 
advisers, and a significant migration of assets to platforms enabling scale economies to be 
passed on to customers.  
Nevertheless, it is hard for advisers to compare platform costs and this could help to explain 
why cost appears to be low on advisers list of priorities when recommending a platform, 
with the study finding ‘no real evidence pointing to a disproportionate amount of assets 
flowing into cheaper propositions’. Instead, advisers choose platforms based on factors 
other than price, such as suitability to their clients and their own business requirements. 
The study predicts that the price falls seen in recent years will come to an end as platforms 
fail to see them translating into more business. On the other hand, the study argues that the 
asset management charge is an item to look at if the cost to the customer is to be reduced 
further: ‘let's be honest, there is more fat to cut here’.535 
As a result of price pressures, poor back-office systems, and outdated front-end 
technologies, some even predict that platforms in their current form are finished. This is the 
view of the lang cat consultancy in its report Platforms are Dead published in October 2015. 
                                                     
533
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2105) Standard Life urges advisers to check platform deals to dodge 
'zombies', Professional Adviser, 18 September. 
534
 http://langcatfinancial.co.uk/blog/price-only-important-in-the-absence-of-clear-value/ 
535 
Reported in Laura Miller (2015) Platform pricing report: Average costs cut by 18% vs. pre-RDR, Professional 
Adviser, 13 July. 
281 
 
Mike Barrett, consultancy director at the lang cat, said: ‘We're convinced that platforms –  
at least in the guise that we've known them for the last decade and a half – are dead. With 
most of the sector's 25 platforms now operating for at least a decade, more should be 
running at a profit and with clear strategic objectives and charging structures. There's an 
urgent need for platforms to improve back-office systems and processes to reduce costs, 
and to improve their online offerings. In several cases, a platform's customer portal requires 
you to use a PC with Internet Explorer, and even then you can only get a valuation. That's 
just crazy. In a digital world, customers expect much more and a number of direct platforms 
are starting to address this’. Mr Barrett also agrees that future platform consolidation is 
limited by technology: ‘With six main suppliers providing the necessary systems for most 
platforms – Bravura, FNZ, GBST, IFDS, JHC Figaro and SEI – and with re-platforming between 
providers operating different systems so difficult, this could affect consolidation’. He does, 
however, believe that an increasing demand for advice following Flexiday have thrown a 
lifeline to platforms: ‘Those platforms that enable advisers to deliver their advice 
proposition in a manner befitting the digital age will flourish’.536 
An example of an online platform launched to give scheme members access to ‘freedom 
and choice’ is Bigblue Touch 4life from Aon Employee Benefits. The following services will be 
offered to those reaching retirement: an annuity broking service to compare prices and 
select the provider and annuity which matches their needs; flexible drawdown, access to 
cash and a range of investment funds and strategies; online modelling tools; and access to 
advice if needed. Debbie Falvey, head of DC proposition, said: ‘With increased freedoms 
since April this year, there is now a great deal, more choice, but this needs to be supported 
and guided responsibly. Bigblue Touch 4life helps members make sense of their options. It 
allows them to make fully informed decisions and to structure their retirement savings in a 
way that has previously been impossible’.537  
In January 2016, Zurich reported the results of a survey of 120 advisers which found that  
64% of them were reassessing their platforms as a result of concerns over functionality and 
the range of products on offer. Pension freedoms have put greater demand on providers for 
additional services, such as automated processing of funds and being able to split funds over 
different risk profiles.  Advisers want the platform they use: 
 To offer the full range of drawdown options (flexi-access/ capped / UFPLS) – Advisers 
are most worried about whether or not their platform offers all products accessible 
through pension freedom. Legally all products do not have to be provided, so some 
platforms have decided to offer a selection only, However, advisers seem to mind, as 
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45% thought this issue was very important, compared with only 6% who said this 
was unimportant 
 To allow the adviser to amend income levels online – Equally important for advisers 
is whether they can make adjustments to their clients' income levels online. For 18%, 
it was of utmost importance. 
 To allow the adviser to select more than one model investment portfolio538 for an 
individual client – Pension planning can involve a range of different risk profiles, as it 
combines long and short-term planning. Advisers wanted to be able to have multiple 
portfolios on the go. The majority of advisers were concerned about this, while 8% 
thought it very important.539 
3.8.2 Robo-advice  
 ‘Robo-advice' is portfolio management advice, typically derived from Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT),540 with the following characteristics:541 
 Automated with little, or no, human intervention 
 Delivered online 
 Self-service 
 Use algorithms to match portfolios to clients, based on assessed risk tolerance and 
other factors such as age, and 
 Confined to relatively simple portfolio construction matters. 
It therefore operates without the features of traditional face-to-face advice, namely 
questioning, explaining, reassuring and guiding clients. However, some believe that the term 
robo-advice is a misnomer. An example is Adam Jones, senior consultant at Altus Consulting, 
who believes that it should be separated into two components, ‘automated advice’ and 
‘automated investing’. According to Mr Jones, ‘the first of these is the automated or partly 
automated delivery of the advice process. Many of the solutions still involve real advisers to 
some extent, but aim to take the steps of the advice process that we know and love, and 
execute them automatically. This is creating propositions which are cheaper to operate for 
firms and thus cheaper to procure for customers….Importantly, this type of service is most 
definitely regulated financial advice. It results in a personal recommendation and carries 
with it all of the liability associated with that…. [The] second type of proposition is a service 
where the customer picks a goal, a timeframe and a risk rating. The customer is then 
presented with a suggested portfolio (usually from a range of pre-packaged investment 
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solutions) and a proposed investment amount. If the investor chooses to go ahead, their 
contributions are invested into the selected portfolio and it is managed for them in line with 
the agreed investment strategy, rebalancing as required. Importantly, clients using these 
services do not provide lots of information about themselves, and the companies providing 
these services usually argue that they do not constitute regulated advice, as they are not 
providing a personal recommendation’.542 
Robo-advice has been used in the US since around 2005. The key US providers are Financial 
Engines543 with assets of $104bn and an annual charge of $150 per year, Guided Choice with 
assets of $12bn and an annual charge of $500, Vanguard’s Personal Advisor Services with 
assets of $10bn and a charge of 30bps, and Wealthfront with assets of $2bn and a charge 
of  25bps. In the case of Vanguard, clients need a minimum of $50,000. Vanguard also offers 
more human intervention than the existing offerings: clients with more than $500,000 will 
have a dedicated adviser, while those with less have a team to draw on. Advisers will design 
a financial plan for the client based on attitude to risk, objectives and investment horizon. 
Clients can monitor their portfolio’s performance and will receive a quarterly report.  Fund 
management charges are in addition and, the case of the Vanguard funds, range from 5bps 
to 19bps. 
In May 2015, the US financial regulators – the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority – issued a warning to investors and advisers to 
beware the limitations of automated investment tools:544 
 Be aware that an automated tool may rely on assumptions that could be incorrect or 
do not apply to your individual situation. For example, an automated investment 
tool may be programmed to use economic assumptions that will not react to shifts in 
the market 
 Which questions the tool asks and how they are framed may limit or influence the 
information you provide. Be aware that a tool may ask questions that are over-
generalised, ambiguous, misleading, or designed to fit you into the tool's 
predetermined options 
 An automated investment tool may not assess all of your particular circumstances, 
such as your age, financial situation and needs, investment experience, other 
holdings, tax situation, willingness to risk losing your investment money for 
potentially higher investment returns, time horizon for investing, need for cash, and 
investment goals. 
Pauline Vamos, CEO of the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, speaking at 
the NAPF annual conference in October 2014, said that Australians had already moved 
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towards self-service pension advice models. She warned that internet-based comparison 
sites were driving decisions, rather than third-party advisers: ‘You don't know who the 
organisation is behind the comparator….Unless you capture the member early in terms of 
giving them simple advice services, simple tools that they will use, they will soon be able to 
get those sorts of services outside. And that may not be in the best interests of the 
members’.545 
Robo-advice is not yet common in the UK, although a number of companies have set up in 
recent years to offer simplified advice. We report the following developments: 
 Nutmeg was the first to launch in 2011-12 
 Wealth Horizon started in 2014 with a portfolio structuring service on the Parmenion 
platform on the basis of simplified advice for clients with assets between £10,000 
and £150,000, with a charge of 0.75% annually (plus a 0.25% set-up fee in year one). 
Advice is delivered online and, where required, over-the-phone by CF30 registered 
advisers 
 Wealth Wizard. In August 2015, insurer LV= bought a majority stake. It said it would 
inject additional capital to assist with its plans to develop a ‘white-label’ automated 
advice platform and expand its own CORA (clear online retirement advice) service. 
Richard Rowney, managing director for life and pensions at LV=, said: ‘The way 
people fund their retirement is changing and so is the way that people access their 
savings. This deal is a great opportunity for us to support the development of digital 
solutions to meet the evolving demands of retiring consumers’546  
 Saidso, owned by Chapters Financial, offers an online, three-stage financial planning 
service charging £299 for a full report which records users' circumstances, 
objectives, attitudes to investment risk and tolerance to loss before suggesting 
solutions. It caters for retirement, investment and protection needs 
 Postcard Planning which has a minimum charge of £149 for investment, retirement 
or regular savings advice, and a maximum charge of around £5,000 for wealthier 
clients 
 Echelon Wealthcare’s Fiver-a-Day which charges an upfront fee of 0.5% plus an 
ongoing flat rate of 0.7% (0.25% of which represents the cost of advice)547  
 In August 2015, BlackRock announced that it had bought a San Francisco-based 
robo-adviser which it will use to give mass affluent clients 'holistic' personalised 
advice on their investment and pension accounts and the management of taxes 
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accrued in their portfolios. It will recommend BlackRock's multi-asset model 
portfolios and investment products, as well as the products of other asset managers. 
FutureAdvisor will operate within BlackRock Solutions, BlackRock's technology and 
risk business. Tom Fortin, head of retail technology, said: ‘As demand for digital 
wealth management grows, we believe that our combined offering will accelerate 
our partner firms' abilities to serve the mass affluent in a convenient, scalable way’. 
The nascent robo-advice market in the UK is typically associated with giving 
simplified advice, but BlackRock believes that the acquisition of FutureAdvisor is 
consistent with its ‘mission to help clients solve their most complex investment 
challenges through technology’548  
 Intelliflo plans to launch a simplified advice service for advisers which will be 
embedded in its existing Personal Finance Portal (PFP). This will enable advisers to 
service a broad base of clients, regardless of the size of their assets. The service will 
use investment risk profiling tools and several pre-defined investment portfolios. It 
will also allow the construction of bespoke risk-rated portfolios by advisers for their 
individual clients. The tool will ‘red flag' clients with high value assets or 
requirements that are not straight-forward, automatically directing them to their 
adviser to seek more personal advice. Nick Eatock, Intelliflo's executive chairman, 
said: ‘It's a form of robo-advice that keeps the adviser central to the process’549  
 Towry is launching online services for clients, to supplement its existing face-to-face 
restricted advice service. Clients will be able to make transactions electronically. Rob 
Devey, chief executive, said: ‘We, like many other wealth managers, have been a 
face-to-face driven service. The whole of the services industry is changing, people's 
expectations are changing. The iPad has changed everything. We need to respond to 
that’550  
 Charles Stanley is also investigating the possibility of introducing a low-cost 
automated advice service551 as is Investec Wealth & Investment  
 In January 2016, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds and Santander UK announced that 
they were entering the robo-advice market in an attempt to reconnect with the 
lower value mass market customers they dropped following the Retail Distribution 
Review.552 
 FinaMetrica has launched a robo-advice toolkit targeting investors with under 
£100,000 to invest. Investor Profiler creates investor scores which link to a range of 
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multi-asset portfolios. The tool is intended for advisers who have clients with simple 
investment goals, or for use by directly consumers. It bases its investor scores on a 
12-question scientific risk tolerance test and questionnaire, which takes into account 
investors' time horizons, capacity for loss, risk tolerance, knowledge of investments 
and investment experience.553 
There are very mixed views about the value and future of rob-advice in the UK. We now 
consider these. 
Mark Loosmore, executive general manager (wealth) at technology group IRESS, argues that 
most consumers are now very comfortable with accessing information online and with using 
price comparison websites. An IRESS report entitled Data, Disruption and the Digital 
Consumer found that 80% of consumers now carry out research online before making a 
significant purchase or investment decision, 39% said it makes interacting with firms more 
convenient, 21% said it speeded the process up, and almost a quarter said they wanted to 
view their financial world – bank accounts, mortgages, investments, insurance – in one 
place. The report found that consumer appetite for both conducting financial activity online 
and seeking financial advice varies depending on wealth and the type of transaction: 25% of 
respondents across all income groups are willing to pay for financial advice, while this figure 
rises to 42% in the case of those with a household income above £60,000. Mr Loosmore 
believes ‘there is an opportunity for advisers here: as well as harnessing the benefits of 
digital in their own work, they can also shape their proposition to help efficiently deliver this 
style of advice to a wider audience…[D]igital or ‘robo' advice can be implemented as part of 
a ‘menu' of options, with the ability to switch channels as required…Personal input will 
always be necessary, but this could then be focused on taking the time to develop 
relationships with the client’.554 
Andrew Storey, technical sales director at eValue, believes that advisers who harness the 
power of technology will outpace their rivals: 
The good news is that the robo-adviser can be harnessed to work for flesh-
and-blood adviser, rather than against it. In fact, used correctly, 
technology-based solutions can be a valuable tool for segmenting an 
adviser's customer base and servicing legacy clients. Forward-looking 
advisers will be able to white-label simplified advice propositions offered 
by networks, platforms and providers, and will be able to offer customers 
simplified advice for between £150 and £250. 
By partnering with an organisation that has already done the due diligence 
on the algorithms and messages under the bonnet of the system, advisers 
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can be comforted they are not exposing themselves to unnecessary 
regulatory risk. 
Not only can robo-advice provide an adviser with a revenue source in itself, 
but it should also be a way to filter large volumes of individuals – whether 
direct clients or those engaged with through the workplace – and identify 
those nuggets that can be turned into valuable full advice clients. 
Simplified robo-advice systems will present anyone with complex affairs or 
large portfolios towards messages telling them need to speak to a financial 
adviser. The workplace, in particular, could prove to be a rich seam of new 
business for advisers that adapt to this new technology..555 
 
Bruce Moss, strategy director at eValue, believes that robo-advice could help to solve the 
pensions freedom advice/guidance conundrum:  
Robo-advice has frequently been seen as a threat to advisers, or as sub-
standard and gimmicky. This is wrong and seriously misses the important 
point that robo-advice is a complement to traditional advice. Robo-advice 
not only caters for clients who have traditionally been financially inefficient 
for advisers to serve, it also allows adviser firms to deal with volumes that 
are way beyond their existing capacity. 
The phase the UK is currently in is similar to that which happened in the US 
some seven years ago. When robo-advice started in the US, it mostly 
focused on investing new money without reviewing existing investments. 
In the main, robo-advice in the US has been targeted at the younger 
investor as a low cost pre-packaged investment option, but even if advisers 
use the technology to reach the masses, it is still far from a threat to 
advisers on either side of the Atlantic. 
The robo-advice process is simple and short. A few simple questions and a 
risk assessment questionnaire, a stochastic forecast to help investors 
understand what the outcome might be, and a recommendation of a 
model portfolio of mostly ETFs [exchange traded funds] to keep the costs 
down. 
It is a process that is not exactly rocket science and can be easily applied in 
the UK….Firstly, it is not very difficult to create an investment robo-advice 
process which ticks all the regulatory boxes. Secondly, it is only really 
necessary because the dividing line between information/guidance and 
advice is unclear. Essentially, the more help given to the consumer, the 
more likely it is that the line between guidance and advice may be crossed. 
In spite of the FCA's attempts to clarify the distinction between guidance 
and advice, it remains a grey area which may ultimately be decided by the 
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courts. The distinction between online guidance and robo-advice needs 
legal clarity as the market develops. 
Robo investment advice is undoubtedly useful as a means of resolving an 
area of regulatory uncertainty and providing a source of income for adviser 
firms from consumers who it would otherwise be uneconomic to serve…  
To understand the real potential of robo-advice, we need to understand 
what it can do to meet the biggest challenge facing the financial services 
industry today in the UK – that of pensions freedom. Every year more than 
300,000 people retire with defined contribution (DC) pensions. Many have 
comparatively small funds of circa £50,000. With a typical fee of over 
£1,200 plus VAT for conventional "at-retirement" advice, the fee aversion 
of most consumers at present seems very understandable. 
Beyond being able to reduce the cost of advice dramatically to around 
£150, robo-advice has the capability to handle hundreds of thousands of 
cases a year – a feat which would be impossible by conventional means. 
The numbers needing robo-advice will grow rapidly because all those 
retirees who don't buy an annuity at outset will potentially need ongoing 
advice on how to invest and drawdown their retirement savings over the 
rest of their lives. This combination of high volume and low cost is the real 
advantage of robo-advice. 
As with almost all innovations, there are some potential downsides, but 
they can all be managed. Robo-advice cannot handle complex cases, but it 
can handle the majority. In those complex cases, conventional advice can 
be offered with a substantial discount as a considerable amount of 
information captured by the robo-advice process can be made available to 
a human adviser. 
The process must be very well-designed and a good model is vital, for any 
weaknesses in the model will continue to be replicated. Validation checks 
and monitoring are essential with borderline cases being identified and 
reviewed. There is also the risk that consumers may struggle to understand 
and use robo-advice, but innovative design and gamification techniques556 
can help to engage consumers. 
Robo-advice is important because it helps address the greatest challenge 
faced by our industry – helping consumers make wise retirement 
choices.557 
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Jamie Fiveash, chief operating officer at The People’s Pension, believes that there is no 
reason why pension scheme members could not receive advice for less than £100 per head: 
‘I am surprised trustees are not thinking around advice….We see no reason why you cannot 
get advice to your members for less than a £100 each. So we are committed to looking at 
how we can do that and are looking at digital advice as a solution’. He said that the pensions 
industry was behind other sections of the financial sector in its use of modern technology 
and could learn from the US: ‘I think we will see a lot emerge from the market into this 
space and there is a lot of learning from the US where they use robo-advice a lot. We think 
that you can get the cost of advice down through some digital solutions’.558  
In November 2015, Vanguard released the results of a survey of 70 UK wealth managers. 
Around 40% viewed robo-advice as a threat, while a similar 40% viewed it as an opportunity 
to increase efficiency and attract new clients. The rest said the impact would be minimal. 
Janine Menasakanian, head of wealth for Vanguard UK, said: ‘The advent of the robo-advice 
age is creating significant hype and so it is not surprising that wealth managers are 
considering the impact over the long-term. What we do know is that technology is here to 
stay, so wealth managers will need to consider how to embrace the advantages of 
technology whilst still emphasising the personal, trust and relationship-based parts of their 
value proposition’.559 
Also in November 2015, Finametrica published a report entitled The Robo Revolution. The 
report argued that rob-advice is ‘paradigm changing’ and ‘the most significant development 
in the delivery of financial advice in the past three decades’. However, it noted that the 
biggest obstacle facing robo-advisers is the same one facing the entire financial services 
sector, namely the cost of acquiring new clients. This is estimated to be £200 per client in 
the UK, a sum which is ‘beyond the means’ of many advisory firms and explains their slow 
growth. The way around this, according to the report, lies in the white label market via 
channels that target communities, such as corporations, community groups, and even 
bloggers: ‘The cost of acquiring a customer within a community is a fraction [of the cost] of 
going to the wider market. We all know this to be true – it is why financial advisers join the 
golf club….Imagine, for a moment, the impact of Apple offering financial services through a 
robo embedded into the operating system of its iPhones and iPads’. 
Another big challenge in the UK are the regulatory hurdles. The report states that the 
automated models that do exist operate at the ‘lowest levels’ of restricted, focused, or 
simplified advice and are ‘basically transactional machines’: ‘Robo-advisers aspiring to rise 
any further up the ladder towards more sophisticated advice which includes a portfolio 
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recommendation become caught in a strange clash of regulatory and compliance regimes’.  
These include not only the FCA and the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), but also EU 
legislation, such as MiFID II which has expanded the extent of its ‘appropriateness' test.  
Nevertheless, the report sees robo-advisers as the solution to the advice gap ‘as they have 
scalability and can service customers at low cost’ and can help to ‘democratise' financial 
advice.560 
Chris Woolard said the FCA, via its Project Innovate, is keen for firms to come to market with 
robo-advice models, so that firms are able to deliver regulated advice ‘more cheaply, 
efficiently and effectively’ by employing a ‘mixture of technology and human beings’. 
However, Mr Woolard did accept that financial services firms were reluctant to introduce 
new advice models because of ‘nervousness’ about the boundaries separating advice and 
information. He said the FCA was seeking to clarify its definitions of ‘regulated advice' and 
‘personal recommendations' to help firms develop new, lower cost, distribution models 
with confidence.561 
The FCA hosted a forum on robo-advice at the end of September 2015. The FCA said it 
wanted the industry to provide more people with access to financial 'help', whether advice 
or guidance. It was therefore planning future policy work around both simplified advice and 
simplified regulation to make it easier for firms to develop solutions.  
The following issues emerged at the forum: 562 
 The Government is keen to support fintech (financial technology) 
o Harriett Baldwin, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, said the 
Government recognises ‘fintech is good news for all concerned’ and will 
support innovation in the sector ‘in any way we can’. The Government 
recognises that too many consumers are put off by the cost of advice and 
hopes to find ways to deliver financial help more cheaply through the use of 
technology 
 Safe haven for product testing 
o The Government and FCA want to create a 'safe haven' for firms to test new 
products on consumers without the regulatory backlash if something goes 
wrong. The FCA wants to hear ideas built with the intention to act in the best 
interest of the consumer and will vet the ideas it allows in 
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 Do people need advice or guidance? 
o The Government is looking at how guidance providers, such as the Money 
Advice Service and Pension Wise, can be made more effective for consumers. 
People who fall into the advice gap may not actually need advice, instead 
they might need guidance 
 Is there a role for pure robo-advice? 
o Delegates agreed robo-advice was needs-based, making it suitable for people 
with a well-defined need. However, most forms of automated advice 
currently in the market are a combination of an online process and human 
interaction. They use hurdle questions to identify clients with complex needs 
and refer them to a human adviser. Some delegates thought certain areas of 
advice, such as DB-to-DC transfers, could never be automated as they are too 
complex 
 What type of consumers love robo-advice? 
o According to Charlie Nicholls, managing partner of Money on Toast, there are 
four types of consumer groups: self-directed, validators, delegaters, and 
avoiders. Self-directed and avoider types do not need or cannot be helped, 
respectively. Validators and delegaters are interested in to varying degrees 
but may be confused about their finances. They want help and as such are 
the target group for robo-advice. Mr Nicholls said: ‘Robo-advice is needs-
based. It's suitable for low- and high-value investment. Just because HNWs 
[high net worth investors] are served well by the traditional financial advice 
market doesn't mean robo can't go into that market and take a large market 
share’ 
 Bridging the affordability and accessibility gap 
o Keith Richards, chief executive of the Personal Finance Society, believes that 
automated services will form a key part in bridging the affordability and 
accessibility gap created after advisers moved upmarket following the RDR. 
He also believes that robo-advice is ‘complimentary rather than a threat [to 
regulated advice]. We have seen a number of regulated firms have integrated 
robo or automated solutions into their processes. Simplified advice was put 
into RDR as [a means] to bridge the advice gap. We do have challenges we 
have to address including perception, affordability and accessibility [for 
which] we need different mechanisms’ 
 Role of the FOS 
o Ian McKenna, director of the Finance and Technology Research Centre, 
argued that the FOS needs to be reformed if robo-advice is to stand a chance 
of flourishing in the UK. He said it was operating a ‘20th century mandate in 
the 21st century’ and needs to be reformed to allow low-cost advice 
solutions to enter the UK market. The only thing preventing the growth of 
robo-advice in the UK is stringent regulatory standards around consumer 
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protection, in particular, around ‘assessing suitability, pension switching and 
self-defeating transactions’.   
Delegates at an Intelliflo conference in June 2015 were warned that advisers who fail to 
embrace technology, and do all their business face-to-face and via paper, will lose out to 
more tech-savvy firms which better serve pensions freedom clients. Jane Hodges, chief 
operating officer at Alexander House Financial Services, also said that the sheer number of 
people who will need retirement income advice following the introduction of pensions 
freedom means advisers need to think differently about how to use their skill set to help the 
maximum number of clients.563 
This view was shared by participants at a round table on robo-advice hosted by eValue in 
November 2015. Jason Chapman, managing director of Willis Owen, argued that robo-
advice does not pose a threat to face-to-face. Instead, what could pose a threat is advisers' 
lack of skills in using technology, particularly around building consumer friendly websites 
and a creating a better digital experience. He added that advisers could embrace technology 
better than they do today: ‘What we need to worry about is the huge sway of individuals 
who have no access to any advice or any product solution and create the journeys that will 
enable them to use technology and have a choice of the way that they purchase’. Samantha 
Seaton, CEO of eValue, said: ‘We are always going to have a tension whereby a traditional 
adviser is probably going to feel alienated and threatened by robo-advice and I think that's 
perfectly natural. But I don't think that will stop robo-advice from happening’. Others 
agreed robo-advice was an opportunity to increase the overall size of the market: ‘It seems 
to be an opportunity to expand the market rather than cap the market you've already got. 
It's to build a whole new group of consumers, who if they may not pay so much to begin 
with, they use your pipeline and they are paying something’.564  
Some, on the other hand, believe robo advice will only have a limited future in the UK. For 
example, Numis doubts whether consumers will ever truly ‘entrust their life savings to a 
computer’.565  Sheriar Bradbury, managing director of Bradbury Hamilton, does not believe 
that robo-advice ‘will fully replace skilled, professional advisers. I appreciate that tools 
offering automated solutions are sought by the DIY investor but, in the main, our clients are 
discerning and want to be challenged. They actively seek the value of strategically and 
tactically thought-through advice which only a human can provide…There will be aspects of 
advice that an algorithm is unlikely to replace. Holistic advice involving financial planning for 
more complex areas of, for example, inheritance tax, retirement, investment planning and 
the taxation interplay, is unlikely to be replaced by an algorithm any time soon. The 
                                                     
563
 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Tech averse advisers risk ‘losing pension freedom market share’, 
Retirement Planner, 23 June. 
564
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Adviser tech real threat not robo-advice, specialist warns, 
Professional Adviser, 19 November. 
565
 Reported in Dan Jones (2015) Will robo-advice take off in the UK?, Investment Week, 14 May. 
293 
 
question is which wealth management firms will be on the right side of that technology? 
These are the firms which will survive extinction’.566  
Steve Hagues, founder of Retiring IFA, believes that ‘nothing beats comprehensive personal 
service…The challenges that high net worth individuals face in managing their wealth range 
from the complexity of investing to working with multiple providers – banks, asset 
managers, accountants, lawyers, insurance agents and so on – to the complications of 
estate and tax planning…[There] is a benefit for forward-thinking firms to improve their 
focus and free up resource which can be achieved through tie-ups with other professional 
service companies, such as lawyers and accountants… [As] the advice market becomes more 
intricate, raising the value and scope of the service offered to clients is more than likely 
going to be key to professional services firms' success in the future’.567 
Chris Williams, chief executive of Wealth Horizon, argues that robo-advice could well push 
out generalist advisers: ‘A generalist adviser who is just really managing portfolios of funds 
for people has got a problem because fees are going to come down. Investment 
management and portfolio management are easy to automate. There's an abundance of 
information out there. People will question the fees they are paying. But where there is real 
complexity, where an individual doesn't really understand what's happening people are 
happy to pay for it in that space. That is where we will see fees increase because there is a 
real need for advice and for getting it right…Robo can go a very long way towards meeting 
financial advice. What it can't do is replicate the emotional, the empathetic [element] of 
having a human work with you. It's simply a choice whether they want that or whether they 
are happy to do it online’.568  
The Finametrica report The Robo Revolution cited earlier considers 10 ways in which robo-
advisers will affect human advisers:569 
 Robos are big 
o You're going to hear a lot about them and they will impact on your life. We 
believe that the impact will be overwhelmingly positive! Don't believe the 
gloom that says robos will replace human advisers. They won't 
 Robos will be everywhere 
                                                     
566
 Sheriar Bradbury (2015) Robo-advice: 'Some conversations an algorithm can never replicate', Professional 
Adviser, 8 October. 
567
 Steve Hagues (2015) Client satisfaction: Why professional tie-ups trump robo-advice, Professional Adviser, 
13 November. 
568 
Carmen Reichman (2015) Wealth Horizon CEO: Robo-advice will push out generalist advisers, Professional 
Adviser, 10 August. 
569 
Reported in Scott Sinclair (2015) Ten ways robo-advisers will impact human advisers, Professional Adviser, 5 
November. 
294 
 
o Everyone in the financial services supply chain will have a robo, either as a 
direct-to-consumer offering or as a tool for financial advisers to use 
 Your client base may be under threat 
o Robos will be everywhere and your clients will be courted by them. Your new 
competitor might be a club or a community based organisation or affiliate – 
any organisation with a large membership could soon be in the market for a 
while-label robo 
 There will be many different robos for different purposes 
o You will have a choice of robos, which will not all be the same. If you plan on 
working with any one you will need to assess it carefully to ensure it will be 
fit for your purpose 
 Early-movers don't necessarily win 
o Better to make a considered decision and use proven technology and 
processes  
 Robos will have to adopt suitability standards 
o To flourish, robos will have to meet the same suitability standards as human 
advisers. It is unimaginable that an advice business would want the same 
client getting a different recommendation depending on whether they used 
robo or human advice. A business built on a multi-factor assessment of risk 
tolerance, risk capacity and risk needed will, of course, expect those same 
standards in a robo 
 Dealing with non-assigned clients and other relationships 
o Robos are quick and accurate at process work, like collecting data. And they 
make things fast – an investment recommendation can be on the table 
moments after the data is collected. It will, of course, be expected that robos 
must integrate with your business practices 
 Low-cost, multi-asset portfolios are here 
o Robos deal in very low-cost investment structures and that is going to 
challenge current thinking, current practice and profitability. Like ripples in a 
pond, over time the effect becomes unpredictable even when it started out 
very structured 
 You will have to prove your value proposition 
o Advisers are professionals who add value to their clients' financial lives. Be 
ready to prove that, because you will have to be able to supply that proof to 
charge higher fees than a robo 
 Fees may come under pressure 
o Just as low-cost airlines lowered airfare costs, robos are likely to bring down 
the base-cost of advice. But, just as with the airlines, some people will not 
want to fly with the cheapest; some will be happy to pay full economy and 
some will want the silver-service that comes with first-class. The more holistic 
and detailed you are, the more you will win. Robos are not currently good at 
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complex matters, such tax or estate planning or insurance. Possibly, we will 
see traditional advice operating to create the financial plan, with robos 
dealing with ongoing transactional needs 
Finally, UBS predicts direct advice and simplified advice’s share of the UK retail savings 
market will rise from 21% to 29% by 2025, although it does not identify how much of this 
will be robo-advice. It also predicts workplace advice’s share will increase from 19% to 31% 
by 2025.570  McKinsey believes the market for virtual wealth management advice has the 
potential to generate annual revenues of $66 billion.571 
 
3.8.3 RetirementSaverService 
The RetirementSaverService is a proposal made by Mark Hoban in January 2015 when he 
was MP for Fareham:572  
The RetirementSaverService (RSS) would facilitate better retirement 
planning by supporting savers to see how their current savings might 
translate into income in retirement and what this means for how much 
they save, how long they plan to work and their appetite for risk. The 
service would do this by bringing together the multiple strands of 
information about an individual’s assets and sources of income on a user-
friendly online service. The RetirementSaverService would also provide 
tailored guidance to people approaching retirement. It would bridge the 
gap between the limited guidance currently provided and regulated advice, 
which remains unaffordable for most people. The service would help them 
choose suitable approaches and avoid unsuitable products through a 
narrowing of choices. The service would be independent and provided in 
the first instance by the Money Advice Service, building on its existing 
operations in this space…. 
The RetirementSaverService is targeted at meeting [two] needs: guidance 
to support savers and a focal point of drawing together savings 
information. It would be a digital service providing guidance for users. It 
would be a self-directed service; offering tailored guidance driven by 
answers given by users to a series of questions. Although focused on 
retirement planning, it will use data about pensions and other assets 
alongside personal information to produce tailored guidance. It will not 
produce personal recommendations but will present a series of choices to 
users with the user making the final decision. 
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Figure 3.2 shows a network map which illustrates how data could be shared and aggregated 
across the RetirementSaverService, while Figure 3.3 shows how users might interact with 
RSS from joining to retirement.573 
 
Figure 3.2: RetirementSaverService network map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
573 Respectively, Figures 6 and 7 in Mark Hoban (2015) RetirementSaverService, Reform, January. 
 
297 
 
Figure 3.3: Lifecycle of the RetirementSaverService 
 
3.9 Is there an advice gap? 
3.9.1 A number of advice gaps have emerged 
Things do not appear to have gone according to plan. The year between the 2014 Budget 
and Flexiday, 6 April 2015, was devoted to establishing a system of guidance and advice to 
meet the needs of those exercising their pension freedoms. The Government would provide 
the guidance guarantee and, following this, people would be queuing up to seek advice. 
Now it was not clear at first whether they would be looking at simplified advice or fully 
regulated advice and there were different views within the advice community about which 
was more appropriate. It was felt that those with pension pots less than £30,000 would take 
cash and not seek advice at all. It was also felt that those with pension pots above a certain 
size (£100,000 or some amount above this) would be likely to – and certainly should be 
encouraged to – seek full regulated advice. The debate within the advice community was 
about how many of those with pension wealth between £30,000 and £100,000 would look 
for simplified advice and how many would take the full regulated route. A new kid on the 
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block is robo-advice. It is too early to predict what effect this will have on the advice market 
as a whole, except to say that it could be significant, despite not being able to deal with the 
‘emotional’ needs of customers. 
But this is not the way things have worked out. According to Robert Cochran from Scottish 
Widows: ‘The 'guidance guarantee' offered via Pension Wise will offer savers access to 
information, but early indications suggest this is being sorely under-utilised, with barely 15% 
of the available appointments being used. For those who do reach the door of the Pension 
Wise offices, they will find it only gives a certain level of support, and for those who want a 
recommendation appropriate for their circumstances, they're likely to struggle finding it at a 
“reasonable” cost. The clincher is that this new segment may not even be aware they need 
advice. For those who've been saving for a few years and are now approaching retirement 
with a modest pot, they have a plethora of choice and little understanding of what the 
options are, or what the tax implications could be. Some may even be confused about the 
differences between advice and guidance and believe they've already had advice from their 
providers or Pension Wise, or think the guidance they've had is enough’. 
Arguments such as these have led to the view that an advice gap has developed in the UK. 
Mr Cochran believes ‘there's a growing number of people with relatively modest pension 
savings, and it's becoming apparent that there's a gap in the market for advice aimed at 
people with smaller drawdown pots. This gap stands to widen as the effects of auto-
enrolment start to unfold, and the full potential of the new freedoms truly hit home.  … 
Advice may well be perceived as a luxury for richer clients, but what many consumers won't 
realise is how much of that fee could be offset as a result of the advice they receive’. He 
then provided an example to demonstrate the point. The individual has a £45,000 pot which 
they want to take as cash. Their marginal tax rate is 40%, so will pay £13,500 in tax. But if 
advised to split the amount taken over two years , the individual could save up to £8,870 in 
tax, offsetting the £1,500 cost of advice. 
Mr Cochran also appeals to providers to help: ‘Some providers apply a charge per 
withdrawal when people take encashment, which eats into the capital which could be used 
to pay for an adviser. By making products simpler and limiting or removing charges from 
encashment, it would make it easier to sell into employees with smaller pots, enabling them 
to seek out paid-for advice without eroding their modest savings’.574 
Stuart Wilson, managing partner at Later Life Academy, goes further than Mr Cochran and 
argues that advisers should offer Pension Wise retirees free regulated advice up to a limit. 
He believes that ‘guidance represents an untapped opportunity which, if executed correctly, 
could deliver a large number of new clients with varying later life advice needs, plus of 
course, the referrals that naturally come with any satisfied individual…. [This follows 
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because Pension Wise] is a long way away from tailored advice which delivers a clear route-
map and recommendations for what to do next….[F]or  advisers interested in these clients, 
the important part is developing a proposition which takes these individuals on the next 
stage of the client journey…By that I mean advisers are probably going to have to offer up 
some “free” time and advice in order to move the client on – this means taking the 
information provided by Pension Wise and making it much more specific, it means 
highlighting options and areas which guidance will not have covered, it will mean a 
discussion of pension options, but also offering some clear idea of what that may mean for 
tax burdens and benefit entitlement…And this should be offered free of charge because a 
client leaving Pension Wise may well recognise their need for financial advice, but they may 
not yet be in the headspace which means they are willing to pay for it. After this initial 
session however, the adviser will be able to make clear that any next steps come with a 
charge’.575 
Some argue that any controversy over a widening gulf between those who need financial 
advice and those who can actually afford to pay for it is not actually the advisers' problem.  
For example, Geoff Mills, founding director of Rayner Spencer Mills Research, says ‘The role 
of the [advice] industry is to educate those who can pay for [advice] about the benefits of it. 
Yes there is an advice gap but that's not for advisers to solve. That is for the Government to 
worry about, not businesses’.576  
The Association of Professional Financial Advisers (APFA) has pressed for advisers' 
contributions to funding Pension Wise to be reduced because they are not winning 
sufficient follow-on advice business.577 Nevertheless, APFA reported that by September 
2015, 90% of advisers had received an average of eight new enquiries about getting 
financial advice on accessing pensions. Around half the advisers surveyed said the request 
for advice was on how to transfer out of a DB scheme. Although not all enquiries resulted in 
a transaction, the survey suggests that up to 150,000 people had contacted an IFA. This 
compares with the 400,000 people who reach retirement age each year. It is recognised that 
many people fail to take advice because they say that they cannot afford it, resulting in an 
'advice affordability gap'. APFA agreed that more needed to be done to lower the price of 
advice and for Pension Wise to explain the value of regulated financial advice.578 
It is also becoming clear that a different type of advice gap has emerged – the inability of 
some segments of the market to find advisers even when they want advice. Whatever the 
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merits of using advisers, some believe that customers with small pension pots will struggle 
to find advisers who will take them on. According to Graham Bowser, a certified financial 
planner at QS Financial Planning: ‘In practice, most IFAs will not be willing to engage with 
these “extra” low value retirees who might want to extract funds or use drawdown because 
the regulatory/compliance risk will be so much higher than is the case when dealing with 
people in the traditional drawdown market (those with £100,000-plus in pensions and have 
other savings/investments)’. 579  Chris Smallwood, chief executive of 2plan, said 2plan 
advisers have been instructed to turn away clients wanting to cash in their pots or move 
into drawdown when the amount is between £30,000 and £100,000. The firm would only 
recommend drawdown for pots above £100,000 if it believed it was a suitable product after 
giving full advice. For many others, an annuity is ‘still the right option’.580 
A related issue is the shortage of advisers following the implementation of RDR which 
significantly reduced the number of advisers in the market. David Thompson, managing 
director of business development and proposition at AXA Wealth, has looked at the number 
of advisers in different countries in relation to population size. Hong Kong, which had an 
RDR-style reform in 2015, has a one financial adviser for every 156 people. In the US and 
Australia, there is one adviser for every 1,400 people, while in Canada, there is one adviser 
for every 1,900 people. By contrast, in the UK, there is one adviser for every 2,700 people.581 
Mr Thompson believes ‘we run the risk that people will go looking for advisers and there's 
going to be no one there to answer the call’.582 
Steve Hagues of Retiring IFA expects more consolidation of the adviser market via mergers 
over the next couple of years as a consequence of increased competition from simplified 
and online advice. He said: ‘Advice firms need to be on the ball to make sure they don't lose 
clients….Do you remember when garages sold fuel and not much else? Most are mini-
supermarkets now….Accountants are increasingly interested in investment advice, while 
financial advisers are beginning to understand the power of doing a client's tax return and 
probate. The advantage of servicing clients' needs across the board is slowly starting to gain 
acceptance in the advice industry…As the decade progresses, if you don't ring fence your 
clients, you will be faced with having to defend them relentlessly from the other 
professions. Those who move across the professions are likely to succeed at the biggest 
client land grab wins due to the principle of first mover advantage. As the industry develops, 
it's clear the lack of a linked up or overarching strategy across different professional service 
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offerings could be a missed opportunity. At the moment, everyone is doing their job, but no 
one actually owns the client’s overall real outcome’.583 
The issues of mass access to advice and people being priced out of advice has been an 
increasing concern of the FCA since RDR. As we mentioned earlier, its solution was 
simplified advice. But a perceived lack of clarity from the regulator around the rules and 
liability for simplified advice has meant the concept has not yet taken off.584 
The FCA is working on a middle-ground category where advice is offered but not a personal 
recommendation.585  
We have therefore been discussing with our stakeholders the options for 
low-cost, simpler ways of recommending retail investment products, 
particularly for customers with relatively modest amounts to invest and 
relatively straightforward investment needs. It is clear that there has been 
some reluctance on the part of firms to develop these models and we are 
keen to understand more about the barriers firms believe they face.  
We are also aware that firms offering retail investments without personal 
recommendations want greater clarity on how they can support customers 
in making informed decisions – increasingly via technology-rich solutions – 
without stepping over the boundary into providing a personal 
recommendation.586  
 
3.9.2 The Financial Advice Market Review 
 In August 2015, the Treasury and FCA launched a major review of the financial advice 
market. The Financial Advice Market Review (FAMR) has been set up to improve consumers' 
access to financial advice. 
Its terms of reference are to examine:587  
 the advice gap for those people who want to work hard, do the right thing and get 
on in life but do not have significant wealth 
 the regulatory or other barriers firms may face in giving advice and how to overcome 
them 
 how to give firms the regulatory clarity and create the right environment for them to 
innovate and grow 
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 the opportunities and challenges presented by new and emerging technologies to 
provide cost effective, efficient and user friendly advice services, and 
 how to encourage a healthy demand side for financial advice, including addressing 
barriers which put consumers off seeking advice. 
The review will consider the current regulatory and legal framework governing the provision 
of financial advice and guidance to consumers and its effectiveness in ensuring that all 
consumers have access to the information, guidance and advice necessary to empower 
them to make effective decisions about their finances. 
The review will also consider the interplay between the regulatory framework for advice 
and the role of the FOS and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) in redress. 
The initial evidence gathering will have a broad scope before narrowing down to consider 
those areas where the so called advice gap may be most acute. The initial evidence 
gathering will request examples of problems in obtaining advice in the following markets: 
 investments, savings, pensions, and retirement income products (including 
annuities) 
 mortgages (including Help to Buy and equity release) and consumer credit 
 general insurance. 
The review will also examine evidence from consumers about the barriers they face in 
seeking advice, the value they place on it and how easy it is to understand where advice can 
be found and what it means. 
While focusing on consumer financial services and products, the review will also look at the 
provision and effectiveness of advice across retail markets to assess whether differences in 
regulatory requirements around advice lead to unintended consequences for consumers 
and firms.  
Finally, the review will come forward with:  
 a package of reforms to:  
o empower and equip all UK consumers to make effective decisions about their 
finances 
o facilitate the establishment of a broad-based market for the provision of 
financial advice to all consumers  
o create a regulatory environment which give firms the clarity they need to 
compete and innovate to fill the advice gap  
 a set of principles to govern the operation of financial advice 
 measures to ensure standards of behaviour for firms within all types of financial 
advice market are in accordance with those principles 
 proposals as to whether the regulatory perimeter for financial advice should be 
amended, taking into account European legislation  
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 an examination of the role that might be played by regulatory carve-outs, such as a 
so called safe-harbour 
 a consideration of the proportionality of rules and their impact on affordability and 
availability of financial advice and products 
 indications of  
o the resources needed for implementation of these proposals 
o a framework for evaluating how successful reforms have been in closing the 
advice gap, post implementation.  
The FCA said it understood advisers' concerns about their liability for simplified advice that 
focuses only on specific client needs and dealing with this issue would be a core part of the 
review. The regulator said it would need to consider clearer and simpler options from both 
the consumer and adviser point of view. However, it was unlikely the FCA would consider 
removing liability for 'simple' advice solutions altogether. Speaking at a Work and Pensions 
Select Committee hearing on 16 September 2015, Christopher Woolard said: ‘There is a 
further jump…to create a safe harbour where if you give someone advice and charge for 
that in some way and yet not take responsibility for that advice given – that feels like a step 
too far. But there is a lot we can do listening to those concerns to come up with something 
to help consumers and the advice community’.588 
The Treasury (represented by Charles Roxburgh, director general of financial services at the 
Treasury) and the FCA (represented by Tracey McDermott, acting FCA chief executive) will 
lead the review with an advisory panel of industry and consumer experts, chaired by Nick 
Prettejohn, chairman of Scottish Widows. The Treasury said it wanted to make sure people 
can access high-quality, affordable, tailored guidance and advice to help them make 
informed financial decisions. Harriett Baldwin said: ‘Making sure that our financial services 
sector supports working people at every stage of their lives is a key part of our long-term 
plan. That's why we've launched a major new review to explore what more can be done to 
make sure consumers can access high quality and affordable advice so they can make 
informed decisions with their hard-earned money’.   
Huw Evans, director general of the ABI, said: ‘This is a welcome step which comes at a good 
time. The new pension freedoms have highlighted how important it is that proper advice is 
accessible to all, not just those that can afford it’.  
Chris Hannant, director general of the Association of Professional Financial Advisers (APFA), 
said: ‘We welcome Government recognition of the need to examine the legislative barriers 
to accessing affordable financial advice. We believe there needs to be a fundamental rethink 
of the current regulatory environment, particularly around liability’ and listed, as examples, 
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the lack of a long-stop [i.e., an open-ended liability] for advisers, the levy approach of the 
FSCS which penalises regulated advisers for those unregulated investments which go wrong, 
as well as imposing an unpredictable and seemingly ever-increasing fee burden, and 
concerns that the Financial Ombudsman Service faces ‘systematic problems’ in its decision-
making. He said: ‘Consumers need to understand that investments can never be 100% risk-
free. We look forward to continuing to work with HM Treasury and the FCA as part of this 
review and elsewhere to ensure liability is assigned more fairly and that steps are taken to 
minimise the cost of regulation for professional financial advisers’.589 In evidence to a Work 
and Pensions Select Committee hearing in September 2015, Mr Hannant said: ‘There had 
been incidents where an adviser had, for example, set up a self-invested personal pension, 
the client had then undertaken their own investments but the adviser had still been held 
responsible. There is no time limit on which a complaint can be brought to the ombudsman. 
There are long tail liabilities. The way the FSCS is funded needed a fundamental hard looking 
at…. [Further], many advisers can foresee problems further down the line as pensions 
freedom beds in over the coming years. Everyone is saying things have gone reasonably 
well, they haven’t fallen over. But the biggest concern among my members is that they 
foresee problems further down the track. We won’t know until five or ten years down the 
track [if the reforms have been a success]’.590  
In October 2015, the FCA announced that it was considering five options for re-introducing a 
complaints long-stop for advisers: 
 Maintaining the current regime –  not putting in place a long-stop 
 Introducing a single long-stop – for example, a longstop of 15 years (such as that 
applying to certain causes of action under the Limitation Act 1980), or using a 
different time period recognising the long life of financial services products 
 Introducing varied limitation periods linked to the terms of products – for example, 
differential time limits which reflect the nature of products or advice, so that liability 
extends for a longer period when it relates to longer-term products (for example, 25 
years for a mortgage) 
 Enhanced professional indemnity insurance (PII) – strengthening PII for firms so that 
it includes cover sufficient to meet claims relating to long-term advice, whether the 
firm is still in business or not 
 A compensation fund – setting up a compensation fund which would pay out in the 
event of a justified claim older than 15 years against an individual firm, which all 
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firms would contribute to, but which would not require the firm concerned to be 
insolvent before paying.591 
The review was also welcomed by advisers. For example, Keith Churchouse of Chapters 
Financial and Saidso, said: ‘There are millions of people who are just not engaged in the 
financial advice process who should be. There is a mass market, we are talking millions of 
people, who are totally disenfranchised from financial advice but not through either their 
own choice or their own knowledge….The reality is that unless people are guided towards 
taking advice they will carry on probably doing not a lot and missing out on great 
opportunities to make their money work harder….There are always those who think that 
everything in life should be free, but I do not think they will get the answers that they want. 
However, I do think there is a middle market who are prepared to pay a nominal fee for 
good quality guidance and advice. To say “this is what you should be doing, this is who you 
should be doing it with”. It is those [people] who need to be dealt with. The question is how 
much is a nominal fee? At Saidso it is £299. I am not saying that is the answer, but it is an 
answer. I am sure there will be competitors across the market’. Mr Churchouse also believes 
financial advice aggregator sites will come to the fore over the course of the next ten years. 
Such sites would compete for business to guide investors towards individual 
recommendations. This is a different concept from robo-advice which he believed would 
also become popular: ‘Robo-advice might be another low-cost solution, people might be 
prepared to pay less for that. They are a bit like tracker funds – they are very cheap but run 
by a computer to keep costs low. Some people might want that, [but] some people might 
want a bit more of a personal approach’. He does not believe either of these initiatives will 
be a threat high quality financial advice: ‘The reason why this review is going through is that 
these people are not being serviced at all. Even when internet services come into place, they 
still won't be a financial adviser's target market’.592  
Similarly, Wealth Horizon’s Chris Williams believes the introduction of safe harbour 
legislation for financial advisers would be a welcome step towards rebalancing liability 
between advisers and clients. Safe harbour legislation exists in both the US and Australia. In 
the US, it means employers cannot be sued if they followed certain steps when arranging 
employees' pension investments that later underperform; in Australia, it sets out the steps 
financial planners need to take to ensure they meet a statutory obligation to act in clients' 
best interests. Mr Williams believes safe harbour legislation could bring about a regulatory 
environment that recognises caveat emptor, or buyer beware: ‘There has to be a view that 
consumers are able to make their own decisions based on relevant information. Trying to 
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instil that level of responsibility and determination for consumers would be really 
important’.593  
In October 2015, the FCA reported that it had identified eight main reasons which 
prevented people from seeking financial advice, and hence created an advice gap. The FCA 
defines an advice gap as ‘any situation where consumers cannot get the form of advice that 
they want on a need they have, at a price they are prepared to pay’. 
The eight reasons are: 
1. Price 
Consumers may view the price for advice, particularly for professional, face-to-face 
advice, to be too high. A survey by unbiased.co.uk found that consumers are paying an 
average hourly rate of £150 for professional, regulated advice (though this represents a 
14% drop compared to 2013). Some consumers may also find it hard to judge the value 
of advice because the benefits are usually deferred over time and more intangible than 
for purchases of non-financial products. 
2. Lack of trust 
Consumers may not trust firms in the financial services market to act in their best 
interests, or be able to identify which firms are trustworthy and could provide valuable 
service. 
3. Lack of knowledge 
Consumers might not recognise the need for advice or be aware of it. They also may not 
understand how to obtain it. As many people engage only infrequently in the market, 
this is not an area where people can easily gain experience to inform future decisions. In 
addition, consumers may lack confidence about the process, feel embarrassed about 
their lack of knowledge or concerned they may be judged for previous decisions – this 
may cause consumers to make non-advised financial decisions with poor outcomes. For 
example, a Mintel report showed that there might be a sizeable group of consumers 
who lack a basic understanding of what professional advice involves and how to obtain 
it. Of the consumers surveyed, 44% believe it is too complicated to understand how 
financial services firms can help them manage their finances, and 34% do not believe 
that professional advice is geared towards them. Moreover, 14% of consumers said they 
would not know where to begin looking for a financial adviser. 
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4. Engagement 
Consumers who are disengaged with financial services generally are unlikely  
to engage with the process of seeking advice. Others may not recognise the complexity 
of their financial needs, e.g., longevity, tax, long-term care, benefits and investment 
returns may be relevant to a decision about retirement planning. Still others may feel 
they need financial advice but never be prompted sufficiently to seek it. 
5. Overconfidence 
Some consumers might believe they are as competent as a professional adviser, even 
though they could benefit from using one. As a result, consumers might not seek 
professional advice or, if they do, not follow the advice. 
6. Access to face-to-face advice 
Depending on their location, some consumers may not have easy access to advisers, and 
others may not wish to make the time to meet with an adviser. 
7. Access to the internet and concerns with sharing data online 
Where advice is available via the internet (for example, in the form of information, 
generic advice or an automated online advice service), lack of ability to use such 
channels and tools may prevent some consumers from getting advice in this way. 
Consumers may also have concerns about sharing sensitive personal data online. 
8. Advice not necessary 
Consumers may make a rational and reasonable decision that they do not need advice 
and are capable of making a decision themselves. This could be the case, for example, 
where the situation and options are simple and the risk is low, or where the effort or 
cost of seeking advice is disproportionate to the benefits.594 
In the same month as FAMR was announced, the results of a survey by comparison website 
Money showed that the majority of the 669 over-55s with a pension pot who were surveyed 
neither wanted advice nor were willing to pay for it. The reasons respondents gave for not 
taking financial advice were: they do not feel they need it (59%), they think advice is a waste 
of money (28%), they could not afford it (27%), and they want their money quickly without 
any hassle (15%); further 10% of women said they felt intimated by advisers. Just one in five 
said they would use Pension Wise and give this as a reason for not going on to pay for 
advice. Only one in five of the over-55s – and just 13% of men – are willing to pay for 
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financial advice. Of those who are planning to pay for advice, 82% said they wanted to get 
such a major financial decision right. In terms of cost, the average amount the respondents 
would be willing to pay for advice was £253, with more than half saying they wanted to pay 
£200 or less; according to Money, the average cost of an initial financial review is double 
this at around £500. Around 25% of respondents were planning to make a withdrawal from 
their pot, but only a third of these said they fully understood the tax implications of doing 
so.595 The results of this survey indicate another aspect of the advice gap, namely the 
unwillingness of people to actually seek advice in the first place. 
David Brooks, technical director at corporate advice firm Broadstone, explained the results 
of this survey in terms of the ‘Dunning-Kruger effect’, described by David Dunning as 
follows: ‘...incompetent people do not recognise – scratch that, cannot recognise – just how 
incompetent they are…What's curious is that, in many cases, incompetence does not leave 
people disorientated, perplexed or cautious. Instead, the incompetent are often blessed 
with an inappropriate confidence, buoyed by something that feels to them like knowledge’. 
While competent individuals tend to underestimate their ability, the opposite is true for 
incompetent people.596 
A survey by Aegon, published in November 2015, found that consumers thought they 
needed a pension pot of around £121,000 before advice was needed, and that they were 
reluctant to pay for advice with assets below this amount. While some advisers believe that 
£30,000 is a viable sum to make advice worthwhile, only 6% of potential clients thought 
paying for advice on a pot of £30,000 would be worth it. The survey also found that 
customers with £50,000 would, on average, be prepared to pay £191 for advice, while those 
with £250,000 would pay £314. The benefits perceived by customers from taking advice 
were the potential to grow their investments (42% of respondents), peace of mind that they 
have been advised by an expert (34%), and the feeling that they had made the best decision 
for their circumstances (28%).  
Commenting on the findings, Duncan Jarrett, Aegon UK managing director, retail, said: 
‘There is a significant gap between what consumers believe they need to have saved before 
they seek advice, and the amount advisers believe is required to make advice worthwhile. 
The Government's consultation on methods of extending advice needs to look at ways of 
reframing consumer thinking. Take a household example, as a car gets older many people 
opt for an annual service which can spot potential problems early. While it involves a regular 
cost, it could pay you back many times over if it prevents a major expense at a later date. 
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The same is true of advice. When people understand that the cost is potentially securing 
them a much more comfortable retirement or removing a major worry, then the value 
becomes apparent’.597 
In October 2015, Citizens Advice released a report called The Four Advice Gaps.598 The 
report concludes that more than 5 million people would be willing to seek out and pay for 
regulated advice, but are not prepared to pay current prices. The report also argues that 
there is not a single advice gap, affecting those who want advice but cannot afford it. 
Rather, there are four gaps which lead to a range of people missing out on the benefits of 
advice and the security that it affords. The results are based on responses from more than 
2,000 individuals and ‘scaled up’ based on the 2011 population total of 48.3 million. 
The four advice gaps are: 
1. The affordable advice gap affects consumers who are willing to pay for advice, but 
not at current prices. According to Citizens Advice research, up to 5.4 million 
additional people would consider paying for advice if it cost less. While 20% of the 
population would consider paying for advice when making an investment, just 6% 
would pay £500 or more for simple investment advice. 
2. The free advice gap affects people who want advice, but who are unable to pay for 
it. Citizens Advice said up to 14.5 million people who think they would benefit from 
free advice haven't taken any in the past two years. This includes some 735,000 
people who have apparently tried to access free advice but have been unable to due 
to a lack of supply. 
3. The awareness and referral gap affects people who are not aware that advice exists, 
or where to get that advice. As many as ten million people who think they would 
benefit from free advice are not aware of public financial guidance, according to the 
Citizens Advice report. 
4. The preventative advice gap affects those who need financial guidance at key points 
in their lives, but do not take it because it is not marketed properly, or do not get the 
required breadth of help they need when they do. 
In addressing these advice gaps, the FCA has announced it seeks to explore how access to 
advice can be ‘radically improved’. It has therefore announced, as part of FAMR, an advice 
consultation which will focus on the following questions: 
 What kind of financial advice do consumers want? 
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 Are there gaps between the financial advice that consumers want, and the financial 
advice that they can access and afford?  
 How can these gaps be closed?  
 What role could technology, such as robo-advice, play in improving access to 
financial advice? 
There will be a simultaneous guidance consultation which will consider how the 
Government should structure the provision of free, impartial guidance, including that given 
by the Money Advice Service (MAS) and Pension Wise, to give consumers the information 
they need, either to make financial decisions directly or to seek the right additional advice 
to help them do so. The two reviews will provide a complementary and comprehensive 
analysis of the advice landscape.599 
While recognising that the advice gap exists, firms could be opening themselves to risks 
further down the line if they rush to fill it, according to Simon Laird, a partner at law firm 
RPC. Addressing an audience of financial advisers at the Wealth Management Association’s 
Investment Conference 2015, he said that ‘ordinary people need to make crucial decisions 
about how to invest their money to last them for 30 years or more….The reality is if firms 
get tempted into that advice gap [by offering simplified or flat-fee products] without some 
sort of thought-out structure behind it, then they might only be wanting to help, but if it 
goes wrong, they’re going to be turned on and people are going to lay criticism at their door 
later down the line… If people do start taking shortcuts to keep costs down, they could fall 
foul of the regulator’.600  
The FAMR consultation drew the following responses: 
 Thomas Miller Investment has called on the Government to extend a tax exemption 
for employers who arrange financial advice for employees. The HMRC exemption 
from an employee benefits tax charge for regulated advice costing an employer up 
to £150 per person per year should be increased to as much as £1,000 per individual. 
This would confront the ‘inconvenient truth’ that ‘the only way to ensure people 
make good decisions is to ensure they get good, sound advice from highly-qualified, 
highly-regulated advisers’. Matthew Phillips, managing director, said that the 
Government must face up to ‘where the country finds itself. The reality is that 
retirees' choices are varied, older pension schemes are complex and a 45-minute 
guidance session will offer nowhere near the level of assistance that most people 
need to make an informed decision. Sorting out the regulatory befuddlement 
between advice and guidance is welcome, as is anything that reduces the jargon of 
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the financial services industry, but here is the catch: it rather misses the point. The 
only way to help people is for them to receive advice, and the reality is that with 
advice there are no half measures. If you have a regulated advice community, it is 
binary - it either gives advice, for which it is liable, based on an individual's full 
position, or it does not. It is a tailored solution and tailored solutions come at a 
price…An increase in the HMRC tax exemption is the best and most practical 
solution, actively encouraging the use of professional regulated advisers’.601 
 The Financial Inclusion Centre has called for the establishment of a funded national 
advice network to help bridge the advice gap, with the funding provided either by 
industry or the Government. The network would ‘provide advice, guidance, and 
information to consumers who are not commercially viable for the for-profit 
financial services industry. This must involve some form of cross-subsidy either from 
the public purse or from the industry. Closing the advice gap means focusing on 
making the financial services industry more efficient, so it can extend its reach to 
more consumers and providing alternative provision for consumers who are not 
commercially viable for the for-profit advice sector’.602 
 The ILC-UK has called for a new type of advice for older retirees that would sit 
between the non-advised and advised categories and be cheaper to deliver than full 
regulated advice. In a report published in December 2015 and entitled 
Understanding Retirement Journeys: Expectations vs Reality, the ILC-UK said: 
‘Bringing financial advice to the mass market – whether face to face, over the phone 
or on the internet – is long overdue and we call on the Financial Advice Market 
Review to facilitate real change in this area’. Using data from the Living Costs and 
Food Survey and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, the report found evidence 
of under-consumption among the older population who hold the majority of their 
savings in low interest current accounts. Further, people typically started reducing 
their consumption around the age of 70, so their saving levels start to rise, thereby 
creating a drag on economic growth. Much of the decline in consumption came from 
reduced spending on non-essential items, such as holidays and eating out, whereas 
spending on essential items such as food remained flat. Some of the reduced 
spending could be explained by consumers becoming more uncertain about their 
income. To circumvent this, consumers should be actively re-engaged in the planning 
process at this point by being offered regular full financial health checks, through 
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both Pension Wise and the proposed new type of advice. That advice would mention 
the importance of buying a lifetime annuity to provide security of income.603 
 The Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA) called on the Government to 
replace the environment where savers are left largely in the dark about the specific 
options open to them to one where they are signposted to quality-assured 
retirement income solutions: ‘While leaving savers with the right to decide how to 
use their own retirement pot, this would ensure that the path of least resistance is 
much more conducive to good outcomes than today's effective default of taking 
cash’. Although wider access to advice would help (‘but only for the few not the 
many’), the reality is that most people are not inclined to seek advice and are 
reluctant to pay for it. The PLSA’s own research showed that, among those who have 
already accessed their pension, only 39% sought out financial advice and only 21% 
had used Pension Wise (mostly using the website only).604 
  
3.10 Adviser charging 
It is clear from the previous Section that RDR, which required advisers IFAs to move to a fee-
based and away from a commission-based charging model, has made the cost of regulated 
advice more explicit to the consumer. To illustrate, prior to RDR, a typical annual 
management charge (AMC) of 1% was split 50/50 between the provider (e.g., an insurance 
company) and the adviser. The insurer provided the administration, premium collection and 
the investment funds, while the adviser provided advice to both the employer and the 
scheme members.605 Following RDR, the adviser has to charge the customer directly for 
advice. Furthermore, from April 2016, the FCA also banned trail commission on products 
sold after 31 December 2012, although it still allows trail commission on legacy products 
that were sold before 2013. This could make the advice business unsustainable for between 
20-40% of current advisers, according to some estimates.606  To reduce adviser costs, in 
particular regulatory costs, the advisers’ trade body, the Personal Finance Society (PFS) has 
called for the introduction of a product levy – an explicit fee on investments and policies – 
to be paid for by the client. 607    
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In the lead-up to the new pensions regime, there was a debate amongst advisers, conducted 
in Professional Adviser, concerning the most appropriate charging model going forward. The 
main choice is between a fixed fee (based on an hourly rate) and a percentage-of-assets (or 
ad valorem) model.608  The debate was inititated by Alan Smith, who argued that fixed fees 
was the ‘modern, professional way' to charge, and Clive Waller, who supports a tiered 
percentage-of-assets model (e.g. 1% to 250,000, 0.75% to £500,000 etc...), with only specific 
pieces of work, such as an inheritance tax report, charged on a fixed-price basis.609  
Keith Robertson, managing director at Armstrong Financial, said that the debate exposed a 
worrying element of conflict: advisers appeared uncertain whether their profits or their 
clients' outcomes should be the main focus. He added: ‘As always, it pays to look through 
the clients' eyes… The only time ad valorem charging is rational (and therefore likely to be 
considered reasonable in principle by clients) is if the practitioner is providing genuine 
investment management advice. If this amounts to no more than passing the client to a 
discretionary investment manager (DIM), a client could, and should, question what 
additional skill you add for receiving a kick back on the fees; the DIM does all the work’. 
Instead, Mr Robertson recommends performance-related fees: ‘according to research, it 
turns out that investors would pay reasonably generous performance-related fees - perhaps 
20-25% of all gains above an agreed benchmark. However, this is only the case if the 
investment manager also participated in the bad years by giving something back. So perhaps 
this sort of remuneration would have to be on some sort of rolling basis, with a portion of 
fees held in escrow against possible future negative returns’. His specific suggestion was as 
follows: ‘Say one set a target annual return of an inflation benchmark plus, maybe, 4%. If 
that return was achieved, an ad valorem fee of, say, a standard 1% would be payable. If the 
return was higher, the adviser/manager would receive 25% of the excess and the investor 
75%. The problem is what happens if the target return is not achieved. Perhaps a sliding 
scale from 1% at the target down to close-to-zero if no return were generated and, if the 
return went negative, the adviser to give back some proportion of previously paid fees. 
Making adviser-managers liable for losses (to a limited extent), as well as gains, would 
change their behaviour and investment strategies; an interesting thought indeed. Non-
investment work is obviously a matter of fixed or time-charged fee, negotiated with the 
client prior to starting the work, exactly as prescribed by the Retail Distribution Review’.610  
Simplified advice firm Wealth Horizon argues that advisers should set charges according to 
the service their client wants, rather than offering a full service that charges ‘for everything 
rather than what is required’. The firm argues that ‘significant changes’ are required to 
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make the industry more accessible for consumers in the light of the new pension 
flexibilities. Advisers need to avoid expensive packaged bank account-style add-ons that are 
designed for 'pandering to the wealthy’. CEO Chris Williams said that customers with less 
than £100,000 in the bank ‘simply don't know where to turn’.611  
In May 2015, a new association of directly authorised advisers called Libertatem was 
established with the aim of introducing a type of service for which commission-like 
payments will be payable. Libertatem would also set fixed fees for certain work, which 
would allow people currently unable to access advice to get that advice. The new 
organisation is led by Garry Heath, former IFA Association director general.612 
The May 2015 survey published by Intelliflo discussed earlier also asked respondents how 
they would be prepared to pay for advice: 35% preferred a fixed pre-agreed hourly rate, 
while 12% preferred a fee based on a percentage of assets, with 10% preferring a 
combination of the two. In terms of what was considered to be a reasonable hourly rate for 
a fully qualified IFA, a third said less than £50 per hour, a third said between £50 and £100, 
18% said between £100 and £150, 10% between £150 and £200, and 4% said between £200 
and £300 per hour.613 
A survey by APFA found that around 60% of advisers had turned away clients seeking 
pension advice in 2014 because they were concerned that the advice was too expensive, 
given the clients' needs and circumstances. Chris Hannant called on the FCA to relax 
regulation to allow advisers to come up with simpler, cheaper processes.614  
In December 2015, the Schroders Adviser Survey was published. The survey of 575 financial 
advisers showed that financial advisers' fees had increased during 2015 as advisers have 
increasingly segmented their client bases by asset size. The average fee was 75bps, 
compared with 50bps prior to RDR. Robin Stoakley head of UK intermediary at Schroders, 
said: ‘There has been an increase in fees by financial advisers, with 75bps becoming the new 
norm. Now, clients are paying different amounts as IFAs are cutting deals with bigger 
clients. Some 87% of respondents offer different levels of service based on a client's asset 
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size or revenue generated, with 61% of those clients being formally asked to leave having 
under £50k. Most advisers have no place for smaller clients, usually under £150k’.615  
According to a study by Which? in January 2014, more than half of the advisers surveyed did 
not reveal their charges until they had met with customers to see what they wanted.616 In 
June 2015, only five of the 50 largest financial advice firms published their fees on their 
websites, according to research by low-cost adviser Candid Financial Advice. These are 
Hargreaves Lansdown, ranked second largest with gross sales of £6.6bn 2014, Brewin 
Dolphin, ranked third with sales of £2.5bn, Investec Wealth & Investment, ranked tenth with 
sales of £1.3bn, Saunderson House, ranked 23rd with sales of £620m, and Vestra Wealth, 
ranked 37th with sales of £370m. Most advisers refuse to be transparent about their fees 
because they say it is too difficult to assess how much their advice will cost without fully 
knowing a potential client's circumstances. However, this is making life difficult for 
customers, according to Justin Modray, founder of Candid Financial Advice, who said: ‘While 
the commission ban forces advisers to tell clients how much they charge, it seems the vast 
majority will only do so when you agree to speak to or meet with an adviser. This makes 
shopping around for a fair deal very tiresome and in my experience too many clients feel 
compelled to use an adviser after meeting them, even if their fees are high… I would be very 
wary of financial advisers who do not publicly disclose their fees, as in my experience it's 
often because they are expensive’.617  
In October 2015, Which? renewed its call for advisers to display their fees and charges 
online. But, it now wants the FCA to act and make displays mandatory. Again, there were 
mixed views amongst advisers about the issue of greater disclosure, but there was little 
support for making this mandatory. 
Supporters of greater disclosure argue that the move would promote transparency, clarity, 
and certainty. For example, Al Rush, founder of Echelon Wealthcare and online adviser 
Fiver-a-Day, said that showing prospective clients how much a service will cost gives clients 
what they want: greater transparency.  To illustrate, the website ‘will tell clients that, if they 
want XYZ, in 85% of cases it will cost you x. This will only increase if the work gets too 
complicated or there is more work involved’. He did not accept the argument that it is 
impossible to display generic charges due to the ‘bespoke nature’ of their service: ‘Some of 
our clients might be bespoke with old pensions and trusts all over the place, but for most 
people, if they want to consolidate a pension, start investing, re-investing, we know straight 
away how much it's going to cost. I know within half an hour. The reality is lots of our clients 
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are not bespoke; they've got pretty similar needs and circumstances. We are not tying 
ourselves to anything. We give an estimate, which is subject to change’. But while ‘it makes 
good business sense to do it’, Mr Rush did not want to see charges disclosure become 
mandatory.  
Those against greater disclosure argue that the focus on cost is ‘misleading’. According to 
Chris Budd, managing director of Ovation Finance, clients should be focusing on services, 
not fees, and leading them to think otherwise is misguided: ‘I don't think Which? calling for 
the FCA to make it mandatory is helping anybody. Clients need to get the right type of 
service for them, not focus on costs. A list of possible fees is not going to tell anybody what 
type of service they will receive. Which? should be telling people to focus on shopping 
around for the service that's right for them. Cost is secondary. People focus on the wrong 
thing because they are being misguided by Which?’.618 
The fee charged by advisers also covers the cost of regulation, which includes fees levied by 
the FCA and the FSCS. APFA surveyed its member firms in 2014 and found that regulatory 
costs – which included 'indirect' costs such as case-checking and general compliance – could 
be as high as 12% of turnover. The FCA and FSCS levies comprise around 0.5% and 4% of 
turnover, respectively. Sam Caunt, director of Future Life FP, says: ‘The real cost of 
regulation is covering your backside. The fees and levies are just headline noise. The real 
cost is sitting down with the client, finding out their needs and objectives, doing the 
research and, on the back of that, the compliance it demands. We spend three times as 
much on IT and compliance as we do on FSCS. Most of our cost is labour: doing the job, 
documenting it all and doing the IT’.619 
A study by consultancy Investment Trends of the Australian advisory market showed that 
profit margins have narrowed following the introduction of regulatory reforms in 2013 
similar to the RDR which banned commission on products. The average profit margin has 
fallen to 1.2% for upfront advice (defined as 'the total cost of providing full advice to the 
typical client') and 3.2% for ongoing annual advice (defined as 'maintaining a client file, 
including periodic reviews’), compared with corresponding UK margins of 4% for both 
upfront and ongoing advice.  
The two markets responded in different ways to the reforms. The UK switched mainly to 
percentage-of-assets charging (or 'explicit commission') and focused on high net worth 
clients. This allowed UK advisers to earn higher fees per client, although the client base was 
smaller. In contrast, Australian advisers moved more to fixed fees, because clients told 
advisers 'we don't want to pay asset-based fees'.  
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Investment Trends' research shows the average Australian adviser earned 21% of its income 
from fixed fees in 2011, compared with 22% from asset-based fees and 54% from 
commission. This grew to 33% via fixed fees in 2014 and is projected to grow further, to 42% 
by 2017. In the UK, the average firm earned 14% from fixed fees, 20% from percentage fees 
and 65% from commissions in 2011. This changed to 21% fixed fees and 52% asset-based 
fees in 2014 and is projected to change to 25% fixed fees and 56% asset-based fees in 2017. 
Australian advisers also started to compete more directly with each other – there are 70,000 
advisers in Australia, more than thrice the number in the UK – while product providers also 
started offering low-cost advice and the result was to drive down prices. Investment Trends 
believes the UK could come under similar pricing pressure as cheaper forms of advice – such 
as simplified advice from providers such as Standard Life and robo-advice – enter the 
market  to fill the 'advice gap' created by RDR. 
 
3.11 The implications for a default pathway 
To be feasible, any default pathway using a decision tree would need to be aligned with the 
guidance guarantee process in a way that it is not classified as regulated advice or a 
personal recommendation. To meet this requirement, the decision tree would, according to 
the FCA, need to ‘avoid making any judgement or assessment that would result in a single 
product or a list of products being identified as suitable’.620 Under the current regulatory 
framework, this is clearly a challenge, but it suggests we should be looking at the simplified 
advice route. 
 
3.11.1 A default pathway with simplified advice 
If the objective is a well-designed default pathway based on simplified advice, there are six 
important hurdles to cross.  
The first relates to suitability: over what wealth range will simplified advice be suitable? The 
industry consensus seems to be up to £100,000 (the exception being those who believe 
almost everyone needs bespoke regulated advice). According to Rachel Vahey, independent 
pensions consultant: ‘At the moment, it is clear drawdown is only suitable for those with 
large funds and who understand the risks and take them on comfortably’. A particular issue 
was the cost of guarantees in the new range of drawdown products being offered: 
‘Guarantees serve a useful purpose, but can be expensive. It is important people understand 
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what the costs are, what the implications are for their money management, and importantly 
what the alternatives are’.621 
Joel Adams, adviser with LIFT Financial, argues that, while drawdown will become more 
mainstream, it will not be viable for people with smaller pots: ‘Complete flexibility is a very 
dangerous thing, especially for those without an adviser. I anticipate that there will be a cut-
off level where it is not profitable for advisers to be involved and I think it will be at about 
£100,000. You have to look at it realistically as to whether it is worth getting involved with 
small pots. There is a cut-off line where the benefit of advice will be outweighed. That is 
exactly why we need to see innovation from product providers to make sure advisers can 
offer simple solutions to clients’.622  
The second relates to cost. The process needs to be sufficiently commoditised that the cost 
of the advice (or at least a typical rate) is transparent to the customer at the outset. This 
allows customers to shop around to get the best deal. This is particularly important, since 
less than a tenth of the population has complex enough needs to warrant the fees they 
would pay for full advice, and would be better served by guidance, according to a study by 
IFA Prydis in December 2014.623  
The third relates to the quality of and trust in the advice. As mentioned above, research 
commissioned by the FCA suggests that customers are put off seeking financial advice 
because they are unable to trust the advice they receive or judge its quality. The research 
was conducted by consultant Ignition House as part of the FCA’s Interim Report for its 
Retirement Income Market Study.624  The main findings from the research are:625 
 cost is seen as a ‘barrier to advice’ rather than a sign of quality, leading to a 
‘tendency for consumers to revert to a DIY approach’ 
 providers were not communicating with clients effectively about their retirement 
options, and were ignoring the code of practice produced by the Association of 
British Insurers 
 a ‘strong mistrust’ towards IFAs by those yet to retire and those not currently with 
an adviser, due to a combination of ‘poor past experiences’ and a belief that IFAs 
‘might not always work in their best interests’. Respondents were ‘surprised to hear 
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that pension advice in the post-RDR environment would be paid for through an 
explicit fee, and that this could cost them in excess of £1,000’. This put some 
customers off using an IFA, especially those with small pension pots 
 pre-retired advised customers were content with how much they paid their adviser 
and would be happy to continue the relationship post retirement. 
 there were mixed views from those already retired about the value of advice, with 
some respondents reporting that they had sufficient information available for them 
to confidently make decisions on their own, while others saying that they would seek 
advice if they did not understand the options facing them 
 many retirees using advice reported that they had no way of telling whether the 
service they had received was good. 
The fourth hurdle relates to a potential confusion by customers about the difference 
between information and advice. Providers are concerned that that customers will wrongly 
assume that any information and guidance that they receive is in fact advice.626 According to 
Fiona Karlin, director at Momentum Partners, FCA guidelines suggest that firms should treat 
simplified and focused advice in the same way as full advice and this would include risk 
profilings. Advice firms need to protect themselves and hence should include hurdle 
questions to assess client suitability in online advice.627 
The fifth relates to the ‘model investment portfolio’ which the FCA defines as a ‘service 
which provides access to a pre-constructed collection of designated investments that meet 
a specific risk profile sometimes offered with a periodic rebalancing of investments to 
maintain a consistent asset allocation’. A model investment portfolio is used by advisers to 
illustrate to clients the outcome of different investment and drawdown strategies.  
However, when a model investment portfolio is re-balanced, an adviser will be acting ‘with 
discretion', according to the FCA. This means advisers must ensure each re-balancing is 
suitable for the client. 
The final hurdle relates to how the FOS treats complaints. The FOS’s view is that if suitability 
has been appropriately assessed or some effort made to ‘know the customer', the case 
would be assessed as if regulated advice had been given. Otherwise FOS will ‘expect 
customers to be responsible for their own choice'.628 
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3.11.2 Can simplified advice work in a default framework? 
There are strongly differing views as to whether a default framework with simplified advice 
can work. Interestingly, opinion splits according to whether those giving a view work for a 
provider or an adviser/wealth manager. 
Barry O'Dwyer, managing director at provider Standard Life, believes that the financial 
services industry ‘ought to take [simplified advice models] very seriously’. Similarly, Tom 
McPhail, from Hargreaves Lansdown which has been providing non-advised drawdown for 
eight years, is confident that guidance alone can work: ‘Our own experience of dealing with 
non-advised drawdown – and we know more about it than any other business in the UK – is 
that you have to engage with the customer, walk them through the relevant information 
and ensure that they understand what they are doing. If the pension provider fails to take 
responsibility for these simple steps, then it is not unreasonable for them to be called to 
account for their failings. One of the biggest risk areas will be trust-based schemes offering 
drawdown. It can be done, but doing it safely requires care and robust processes’.  
Chris Daems, director of Principal Financial Solutions, believes that the guidance guarantee 
can work, but customers need a clear route to more specialist advice. He uses the analogy of 
the NHS: ‘so, where the NHS has a flow like this:  
NHS Direct (or NHS 111) > Paramedic > Doctor > Specialist (with referrals 
going to the next stage if the ‘patient’ needs more help than the current 
level can provide) 
...the guidance guarantee version might look like this: 
Web site > Phone > Unqualified face-to-face support > Qualified face-to-
face support > Specialist qualified face-to-face support (this also needs to 
be within a clear framework so when certain information is disclosed or 
questions asked, it can be passed on to the next level)’.629 
 
Those working for advisers or wealth managers tend to disagree that simplified advice can 
work in a default framework. The following views are typical. 
Kay Ingram, divisional director of individual savings and investments at LEBC, said: ‘There is 
a whole lot to take into account [when planning for retirement]. [It includes] everything 
from drawdown to deferring pensions and looking at clients' other sources of income. The 
point is, to [deliver guidance] that people can follow and take action on, it is going to take 
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more than a decision tree. The only way really to get an idea is to consult an IFA. It is 
something that has got to last the test of time and that's what's difficult’.630 
Austin Broad, technical director at AFH Wealth Management, goes further:631  
Retirement options remain one of the most complex areas of financial 
planning, driven in part by the fact that, when an individual enters the 
decumulation phase of their life, it is rarely a simple matter of considering 
their pension plans in isolation. Most retirement planning requires the 
retirees' whole financial situation to be considered in formulating the best 
outcome for them. 
Clearly this is most acute where the retiree has sufficient assets to consider 
drawing their future income directly from their retirement funds, avoiding 
the purchase of an annuity. Known as drawdown, the options and 
variations available are significant and careful consideration and 
professional advice is essential. 
This is completely at odds with the guidance guarantee and more 
importantly, non-regulated individuals delivering guidance in a strategic 
area that requires professional understanding of the retiree's tax position, 
their total assets, their income and their expenditure. 
The new rules in many ways further compound matters as there are likely 
to be more complex solutions and greater alternate options for the retiree 
to consider. 
This is not about whether to use a particular insurance product or 
independent option, this is about the strategy adopted, which according to 
Treasury, does not need a regulated individual to deliver. 
The delivery of strategic drawdown solutions in the new world will require 
advisers to consider the holistic financial position of the retiree, together 
with their objectives and needs. It will require an understanding of life 
expectancy and tax in order to promote the concept of retirees taking 
seriously the need for their plan to be sustainable for life and yet meet 
their other income objectives in the most tax efficient way. 
Trying to guide somebody through this maze, with what could amount to 
limited information, is an accident waiting to happen and therefore the 
emphasis of any guidance, where drawdown is a likely outcome, is to refer 
to a professional adviser.  
I am sure that insurance companies will be very interested in the potential 
for retirees to take on drawdown themselves. Again, for many retirees, 
following this course of action is likely to present challenges which would 
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benefit from professional advice input. In some of the cases where a retiree 
goes direct, the problems that are created could take many years to 
surface and could potentially prove very costly. 
In conclusion, retirement options, in all but the smallest of pension funds, 
will benefit from professional advice.  
The provision of guidance on drawdown, outside of delivering an education 
is dangerous and should be referred to a regulated source. 
The decisions made at retirement are by definition long term decisions that 
need to take account of the whole, not just a part, of the story. 
Therefore, a fee-based, preferably independent advice approach should be 
recommended. This would allow the adviser to manage any conflicts they 
may have, within the agreed fee structure they adopt for the work to be 
done. 
 
Jamie Smith-Thompson, managing director at Portal Financial, is concerned about people 
cutting out advice to reduce costs: ‘Who is going to direct the investments and why are they 
selecting those investments? To be able to do that as an IFA, you need a few years' worth of 
exam taking and knowledge before you can recommend that to the client. Do you think 
these DIY people have got that extent of investment knowledge? That is a real concern’.  
Rachel Vahey argues: ‘There is a worry that those going into unadvised drawdown will not 
understand the risks involved or how to manage them. Guidance will have a role in 
explaining this, but professional advice will obviously be the best route to those considering 
drawdown’.632  She was concerned about people ending up in their existing provider’s poor 
value drawdown fund: ‘So we might have the unappealing situation where instead of failing 
to shop around for an annuity (as is the case now), people fail to shop around for a 
drawdown fund and just go for the one with their current provider’.633 
David Thompson, managing director of business development and proposition at AXA 
Wealth, said: ‘Few would argue that the pensions reforms….are not to be welcomed. Having 
greater choice and greater flexibility over pension arrangements is surely a good thing. 
However, we believe that, with greater choice and flexibility, there is also a greater risk that, 
without professional financial advice, a lot of people will not achieve their financial 
expectations in retirement…. Less scrupulous providers may be lured by a quick buck and 
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exploit the opportunities to get assets under management… We need to find a way forward 
that allows people to access professional financial advice which is detailed enough to give 
confidence in the expected outcome, yet at the same time affordable for individuals – or 
their employers – with smaller pension pots’.634 
Despite Tom McPhail’s views that guidance alone can work, Hargreaves Lansdown launched 
a low-cost retirement planning service in June 2015 aimed at filling the advice gap between 
Pension Wise and regulated financial advice. The HL Retirement Planning Service, which 
charges a flat fee of £395 plus VAT, ‘is an advisory service but stops short of providing 
specific, personal recommendations’. Mr McPhail said: ‘The Pension Wise service provides 
investors with an invaluable introduction to the key issues they need to think about. The HL 
Retirement Planning Service takes investors a stage further than Pension Wise, walking 
them through the issues they need to consider when setting up their retirement income’. 
The service would help people understand: 
 their retirement income options and the tax position of each 
 how much secure income they might need 
 the risks of drawdown and provides guidance on sustainable income 
 the need for contingencies, protecting dependants and factoring in potential care 
costs 
 provides a sense check to their current thinking 
 where to go and how to convert their pension into income. 
If clients who use the service want to progress to full advice the £395 fee will be knocked off 
future bills. Mr McPhail noted that HL’s service costs ‘only around a quarter of a typical full 
advisory service’.635 
 
3.12 Consumer vulnerability and regulatory responses 
The purpose of regulation is to protect the consumer. But the nature and effectiveness of 
the regulation will depend on which model of consumer behaviour – econ or human – 
comes closest to describing real world consumers. In the case of econs, the role of the 
regulator is to ensure that the customer has the information needed to make well-informed 
decisions, sure in the knowledge that econs are perfectly capable of assessing value for 
money and protecting themselves against fraud. In the case of humans with their limited 
understanding and interest in pension matters, the question becomes whether any amount 
of information, however well presented, will be sufficient for consumers to make well-
                                                     
634
 David Thompson (2014) Mind the trap: The unintended consequences of pensions flexibility, Professional 
Adviser, 27 October. The potential conflict between providers and advisers was also noted in Chapter 2. 
635 
Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Hargreaves Lansdown aims to ‘fill advice gap’ with low-cost pension 
planning service, Professional Adviser, 23 June.  
324 
 
informed decisions. What does the regulator do in the case of such potentially vulnerable 
consumers?   
Our research reveals a conflict in the regulatory response to the new pension flexibilities.  
This can be illustrated by the statement made by Christopher Woolard in his forward to the 
FCA’s discussion paper Smarter Consumer Communications, published in June 2015:636 
A well-functioning market needs informed and engaged consumers. It 
requires consumers to have access to high quality, appropriate information 
to help them understand the product or service they have or plan to buy. 
This is especially true in the financial services sector, where it is important 
that the information helps empower consumers to make informed 
decisions about their finances. 
 
This statement is much more consistent with the econ model than the human model of 
behaviour and econs are typically not classified as vulnerable consumers. 
 
3.12.1 Governance of pension schemes in the new pension environment 
The Government has introduced new governance requirements for both trust- and contract-
based pension schemes from April 2015 in response to the new pension environment.637 
Governance in trust-based schemes – which are regulated by TPR – require the setting of 
minimum quality standards from April 2015 which ensure: 
 default investment strategies are designed in members’ interests and regularly 
reviewed 
 core scheme financial transactions are processed promptly and accurately 
 scheme rules do not restrict the trustees’ appointment of advisors and 
administrators 
 trustees assess the levels of charges borne by members and the investment costs, 
with a charge cap of 0.75% on default funds 
 trustees have, or have access to, all of the knowledge and competencies necessary 
to properly run their scheme 
 the scheme has a chair of trustees with responsibility for preparing an annual 
governance statement setting out how the scheme has complied with these 
governance requirements.  
Deloitte has produced a seven-point checklist for trustees: 
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1. Consult with employers on issues such as the cost to set up and administer new 
pension options, to determine the amount of flexibility to be granted to scheme 
members, and what defined benefit de-risking strategies the employer may wish to 
implement. 
2. Communications to members should cover the latest changes and the degree of 
flexibility their pension scheme will offer. Frequent communications will be required 
throughout the implementation phase. 
3. Scheme administration should be reviewed, particularly around new minimum 
requirements to signpost members to the guidance guarantee during their 
retirement process. Similarly, another requirement seeks to ensure members are 
properly instructed to find independent financial advice at the appropriate time. 
New pension flexibilities may have additional administrative complexities and costs. 
4. Seek legal advice on issues arising from the ‘freedom and choice’ changes. Conduct a 
review of the trust deed and rules which may unearth amendment requirements, 
and consider the implications of the statutory overrides. 
5. Get actuarial advice. Changes will be applicable for DB schemes specifically, and 
centre on cash equivalent transfer values (CETV) calculations. The basis of these 
should be reviewed and its consistency with cash commutation factors within the 
scheme considered. Seek advice on whether CETVs should be reduced, by what level, 
and whether the employer is willing to support payment of full CETVs. Other 
considerations include the Code of Practice on DB-to-DC transfers and conversions, 
as well as the impact on scheme funding. 
6. Benefit options 
a. DC schemes: A final decision should be made as to the flexibilities offered 
within the scheme, including a review of annual benefit illustrations to reflect 
the new freedoms. The process of notifying and recording should also be 
considered when the money purchase annual allowance is triggered.  
b. DB schemes: As a minimum regulatory requirement, receipt of independent 
financial advice must be confirmed and recorded before CETV completion. 
Additional, and optional, considerations include whether CETVs should be 
provided as part of the retirement process, or whether individuals may take a 
non-statutory CETV at normal retirement as part of their standard scheme 
options. 
7. Investment strategy 
a. DC schemes: A review should be taken of the default investment strategy, as 
well as the lifestyle strategy and switching period, to assess their 
appropriateness. The range of investment funds available to members should 
also be a consideration both pre and post ‘retirement' age. 
b. DB schemes: The investment strategy here should take into consideration the 
membership profile of the scheme which could change rapidly, and DB CETV 
requirements in response to possible liquidity and disinvestment issues. 
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Ongoing trends should be monitored in this regard for future investment 
strategy reviews. 638 
Some believe that the new pension regime combined with the terminal decline of DB 
schemes is likely to reinforce the move away from individual trusts as the vehicle for 
operating pension schemes. Instead, employers are likely to switch to contract-based DC 
schemes or enter into master trusts. According to Alan Morahan, head of DC consulting at 
Punter Southall, ‘we are going to see a move away from individual trusts. Many trustees and 
sponsoring employers are going to struggle to open up the full range of freedoms that are 
available. So with that flexibility readily available elsewhere, it will mean that those trusts 
will get wound up and there will be further reduction in the number of trustees that are 
operating in the market’. Penny Cogher, head of pensions at Charles Russell Speechlys, 
believes: ‘The move to contract-based frees [companies] and their employee trustees from 
the heavy burden of running a scheme. Classic trusteeship will fade away as business 
owners follow the example set by large companies in establishing ... a pension committee. 
These will make sure that their pension provider is delivering a scheme that is fit for 
purpose’.639 
From April 2015, governance in contract-based schemes – which are regulated by the FCA –  
will be based around independent governance committees. IGCs must have at least 5 
members, the majority of whom (including the chair) will need to be independent of the 
firm. Their role is as follows: 
 act in the interests of active and deferred members 
 assess the value for money of the scheme (comparing the cost with the benefits and 
services it provides) 
 where the IGC finds problems with value for money, to raise concerns (as it sees fit) 
with the firm’s board 
 raise concerns to the FCA, alert relevant scheme members and employers, and make 
its concerns public, and  
 produce an annual report of its findings.  
Schemes in small companies can appoint an independent third party (known as ‘a 
governance advisory arrangement’ (GAA)) to take on their IGC responsibilities. 
Questions have been raised about the real powers of IGCs. For example, Jacqui Reid, 
pensions lawyer at Linklaters, said: ‘The jury’s out on the extent to which IGCs will bridge 
the gap between contract-based schemes and trust-based schemes. IGCs can make 
recommendations to contract-based providers, but they have little power in practice. They 
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cannot make changes to improve value for money where they find that value for money 
does not exist [e.g., if the member is in an old-style high charge fund]. Even where it is clear 
that a fund is underperforming, neither IGCs nor providers can vary existing members’ 
contractual arrangements by moving their members from that fund without the members’ 
express consent’. Richard Wilson, policy lead for DC at the NAPF, said IGCs didn’t ‘have any 
actual powers’ and were ‘essentially advisers’.640  An insider told us: ‘The Government 
considers IGCs and trustee boards to be essentially equivalent. This is not remotely true. 
IGCs were set up as a way defending the failure to impose a fiduciary duty (i.e., trustees) on 
insurance companies. IGCs are neither independent nor governing. Insurance companies 
appoint the members of the IGC, half of whom can be employees and the other half can be 
representatives of companies which supply the insurance company. The IGC can only make 
recommendations. The conflicts of interest are extreme’.  However, Steve Webb, the then 
Pensions Minister, said that providers that ignore their IGC would face huge reputational 
damage.641 
There is third governance model – the master trust – which has been around since the 
1950s, but has been given a new lease of life with the introduction of auto-enrolment. A 
master trust is a multi-employer occupational pension scheme where each employer has its 
own, effectively ring-fenced, division within the master arrangement.642 They can benefit 
from economies of scale and hence have lower charges. NEST, The People’s Pension and 
NOW: Pensions are set up as master trusts. These schemes have also joined the master trust 
assurance framework (MAF).643   
Specific benefits of the master trust model include: 
 the ability for members to benefit from the ongoing management and oversight of 
investments 
 the ability to drive down operating costs through bulk purchasing 
 the need to appoint just one group of professional advisers for the whole scheme 
rather than a group for each division 
 one board of trustees for the whole scheme, rather than a board for each section, 
thereby coming under TPR rather than the more onerous governance rules of the 
FCA 
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of trust which is or has been promoted to provide benefits to employers which are not connected and where 
each employer group is not included in a separate section with its own trustees. For this purpose, employers 
are connected if they are part of the same group of companies (including partially owned subsidiaries and joint 
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 Introduced in April 2015, MAF was developed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales in association with TPR; http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/master-trust-assurance.aspx 
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 consolidated accounting and governance requirement. 
A potential disadvantage is that the trustees are typically appointed by the provider of the 
master trust, which can lead to employer disengagement with the pension arrangement. On 
the other hand, some, especially small employers, might welcome this.644 
Both trustees and IGCs will have to define and assess ‘value for money’ in their DC schemes. 
In the case of trustees of  an occupational DC scheme, this means assessing whether scheme 
charges and transaction costs represent ‘good value’. In the case of IGCs, this means 
assessing the ‘ongoing value for money’ of a provider’s contract-based workplace DC 
pension schemes. 
 
Table 3.6: Factors to be taken into account by trustees and IGCs in the new pensions 
environment 
 
Factor Trustees IGCs 
Objective Calculate the charges and (in so far 
as they can) transaction costs borne 
by members 
 
Consider investment return 
 
Compare to others in the market, 
where possible 
Consider the level of charges borne 
by members and the direct and 
indirect costs (including transaction 
costs) incurred in managing and 
investing 
 
Consider the design of default 
investment strategies and the net 
performance of all investment 
strategies 
 
Compare to others in the market, 
where possible 
 
Subjective Weigh up benefits and services 
received by members against what 
members value in: 
 Governance 
 Communications 
 Administration 
 
(This includes a statutory 
requirement to consider whether 
core financial transactions are 
processed promptly and accurately) 
Weigh up benefits and services 
received by members against what 
members value in: 
 Governance 
 Communications 
 Administration 
 
(This includes a FCA requirement to 
consider whether core financial 
transactions are processed promptly 
and accurately) 
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 This is drawn from Graham English (2011) Master Trusts - Making a comeback, Pensions World, November. 
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There is no statutory definition of value for money, so according to Helen Ball, head of DC, 
Sackers, both trustees and IGCs will need to develop their own assessment process which 
will involve comparing costs against the benefits provided.645 A well-run scheme in terms of, 
say, good administration and clear communication might cost more, but could result in 
better member outcomes and hence be of ‘good value’. Table 3.6 shows the factors that 
need to be taken into account.In assessing value for money, trustees/IGCs will need to 
establish what factors members value most and then decide how to weight the different 
factors.646 
Some information will nevertheless be hard to gather. An important example of this is the 
disclosure of the full costs of fund management, including transactions costs.647 This is a 
needed for assessing value for money and the AMC, total expense ratio (TER) or even the 
ongoing charges figure (OCF) are inadequate and incomplete measures of fund 
management costs. From April 2015, trustees and IGCs will have to report transaction costs 
for the first time.648  
The DWP-FCA Call for Evidence on this issue in March 2015 stated:649  
Work to increase transparency of transaction costs in the workplace 
pensions market should be viewed in the wider context of efforts to ensure 
other consumers are fully informed about all costs and charges associated 
with other retail investments. Efforts at European Union level are already 
moving towards including transaction costs in any pre-contractual cost 
figure disclosed to the end consumer for retail investment products. This is 
being developed through the Packaged Retail and Insurance-based 
Investment Products (PRIIPs) Regulation and the recast Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II). Neither PRIIPs nor MiFID apply to 
workplace pensions, whether occupational pensions or workplace personal 
pensions, but it is important to work towards achieving consistency across 
the information consumers will receive in relation to these other retail 
investments. Negotiations also continue on European Commission 
governance and transparency proposals within a recast directive on 
Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP II).  
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Helen Ball (2015) Assessing ‘value for money’ in DC arrangements, Pensions Insight, 1 April. 
646  
The Pensions Regulator (2015) Regulatory Guidance for Defined Contribution Schemes, April 
(http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/guidance-dc-schemes.pdf) 
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Transactions costs are just the visible costs. There are also the hidden costs of investment management 
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On the Disclosure of the Costs of Investment Management, Pensions Institute Discussion Paper PI-1407, May 
2014. (http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1407.pdf). See also the response by the 
Investment Association (2015) Meaningful Disclosure of Costs and Charges, February. 
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 Pensions Act 2014. 
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 DWP-FCA (2015) Transaction Costs Disclosure: Improving Transparency in Workplace Pensions – Call for 
Evidence, March; https://www.gov.uk/Government/consultations/improving-transparency-in-workplace-
pensions-transaction-costs-disclosure  
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Disclosure of fund management costs will be particularly important in the decumulation 
phase, since retirees may find it difficult to return to work if their pension pot is depleted 
too quickly by excessive withdrawals, poor investment performance or high fund 
management charges, particularly for offering guarantees. However, ‘any cost information 
disclosed to members should be understandable and relevant, and presented in a format 
that contains sufficient, yet succinct, information to inform the member’.650 
3.12.2 Vulnerable consumers 
Notwithstanding Mr Woolard’s statement at the beginning of this Section, the FCA is 
certainly aware of potential consumer vulnerability and has introduced a number of 
regulatory initiatives in relation to concerns raised by the new pension flexibilities. 
In February 2015, the FCA published an Occasional Paper which identified up to half the UK 
adult population as being 'vulnerable' consumers.651  The paper found ‘problems at every 
stage’ in the way firms deal with vulnerable consumers from high-level policy, through 
system design, to the products that are available and ways that staff implement policies and 
sell products. Vulnerable consumers are those with poor literacy skills, those who have 
caring responsibilities, people with disabilities, dementia or the elderly. 
The paper gave the following examples: 
 Policy 
o Many firms lack an overarching strategy or policy on consumer vulnerability 
o Policies designed to prevent financial abuse and fraud can inhibit staff 
empowerment to use discretion, particularly regarding legitimate access by 
third parties (e.g., those with power of attorney) 
 Systems 
o Failure of internal systems, where firms fail to communicate and connect 
information internally. For example, this can lead to customers having to tell 
firms multiple times about bereavement, resulting in numerous duplicate 
letters from different areas of the business being sent 
o Interfaces or channels of communication that are not inclusive 
o Increasing automation and use of call centres may create challenges in 
spotting potential vulnerability and ensuring customers are referred on to 
specialist teams where necessary 
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 Page 48 of DWP-FCA (2015) Transaction Costs Disclosure: Improving Transparency in Workplace Pensions – 
Call for Evidence, March. 
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 Martin Coppack, Yasmin Raza, Simon Sarkar, Kate Scribbins (2015) Consumer Vulnerability, Financial 
Conduct Authority Occasional Paper No.8, February; http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-
papers/occasional-paper-8.pdf 
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 Products 
o Inflexible products and services that are designed for a standardised perfect 
customer and do not factor real-life events into their design. Some customers 
who face a change in circumstances are therefore not able to receive a 
flexible, tailored response 
o Product and information complexity and confusing communications 
o Lack of suitable affordable products for people in some non-standard 
situations 
o Lack of solutions for temporary delegation (enabling a family member or 
carer to manage your affairs for a short time) which retain privacy and safety 
 Implementation 
o Policy/practice gap at firms, where frontline staff are not aware of or do not 
implement head office policies. Frontline staff may not refer people on to 
specialist teams 
o Consumer time is not valued highly and many people give up if the process is 
too time consuming, especially if they are in a stressful situation with other 
demands on their time 
o Inconsistent approach around flexible temporary forbearance 
o Arrangements around temporary delegation (enabling a family member or 
carer to manage your affairs for a short time) and accompaniment (sitting in 
or helping with a phone call or interview) not sufficiently developed and 
flexible to enable family and carers to help 
o Inappropriate selling and sales practices which exploit behavioural biases 
o Issues around disclosure of a vulnerability and data protection – inaccurate or 
overzealous application creates unnecessary problems 
The paper then goes on to describe what ‘good’ looks like to consumers, based on research 
that the FCA conducted:  
 Having financial products that are clear and easy to understand 
 A choice of ways of communicating to be available whenever you need to make 
contact and for these to be designed in an inclusive way so that they are clear, easy 
to understand and meet your needs. This could relate to the method of 
communication (e.g., audio/braille/face-to-face) or the service delivery (e.g., 
agreement to talk at a particular time of day depending on carers and medication) 
 Feeling that firms will treat you as an individual and you won’t face the ‘computer 
says no’ response just because your personal circumstances do not fit the standard 
mould 
 Knowing that, should you experience a sudden change in circumstances, you will be 
offered a flexible and tailored response from your financial services provider 
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 Being able to talk to someone who will take the time to listen, who is flexible enough 
to let the conversation take its natural course, and who is sufficiently trained to spot 
signs of vulnerability and refer on to specialists where necessary 
 Being referred on to someone who has the authority and discretion to take a tailored 
approach to your situation and offer flexible solutions, including use of specialist 
sources of help and advice if necessary 
 Feeling confident that your firm encourages disclosure, that they will work with you 
in your best interests 
 Knowing that if you do disclose information about your needs, that information will 
be recorded properly, so that you do not have to repeat it every time you make 
contact with all departments of a particular firm 
 Knowing firms will proactively contact you if they suspect you may be having 
financial difficulties 
 Knowing appropriate action will be taken if a firm spots suspicious activity that may 
signal abuse or fraud 
 If you are trying to speak to a firm in a caring capacity, finding that the firm listens 
and makes a note of your concerns even though it may not be able to divulge any 
information to you 
 If you are recently bereaved, have a power of attorney or a third party mandate, 
receiving consistent advice and treatment. 
The paper concludes by describing what can firms do to deliver good customer outcomes: 
 To ensure a consistent approach that is embedded across all operations, it is 
important to have a high-level policy on consumer vulnerability in place 
 It is important that all relevant staff are aware of the policy 
 Firms could begin by auditing current practice 
 Ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of a vulnerability strategy plays a significant 
role 
 Research demonstrates that it is important for staff on the front line to have 
sufficient training to facilitate a proper conversation and that they know where 
internal expertise lies 
 Flexibility in the application of terms and conditions of products and services plays a 
significant role in ensuring the needs of consumers in vulnerable circumstances are 
met 
 An efficient process for referring consumers on to specialist teams who have 
authority to make flexible decisions is important 
 Good policies and practice in handling disclosure or communication needs of 
consumers and recording of that information effectively play a key role for 
consumers and are helpful to staff. Actively encouraging disclosure, by staff able to 
have proper conversations, has been shown to be helpful here 
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 Clear, simple information and explanation throughout the product life cycle is 
important to all consumers 
 Policies around data protection in particular, but also safeguarding and affordability, 
need to be implemented based on a correct understanding. If staff are well trained, 
they are less likely to apply such policies in an overzealous manner which can create 
problems for customers. For example, proper affordability is vital to the wider 
protection of consumers, but firms should have systems in place to allow for 
appropriate discretion. 
3.12.2.1  Vulnerable DC consumers 
In November 2014, the FCA announced in a Policy Statement that it would protect 
vulnerable consumers and review requirements where money is taken directly from 
pensions.652 The regulator noted that (p. 23): ‘Drawdown itself may be used quite differently 
in the new environment. As we assess the impact on the requirements that relate to 
drawdown, we will consider how to ensure consistent protection for consumers and review 
requirements on firms where money is taken directly from the pension. One particular area 
we will explore is non-advised sales of income drawdown and uncrystallised pension fund 
lump sums. A number of respondents raised concerns here as currently most drawdown 
products are sold with regulated advice’. The FCA also stated it would modify its rules on 
projections in drawdown products which currently assume a regular income is being taken 
over time. If retirees access their pension pots more flexibly, the current rules may produce 
‘confusing or irrelevant information’. 
On 26 January 2015, the FCA announced a new layer of consumer protection called 
‘additional protection’ or a 'second line of defence'. It did this in a ‘Dear CEO’ letter.653  Prior 
to allowing a pension pot to be cashed in, providers will be required to find out clients’ 
health and their comprehension of issues such as tax, impact on means-tested state benefits 
and pension scams before giving them personalised risk warnings. In particular, providers 
must do the following: 
 Ask retirees a set of questions about ‘key aspects of their circumstances that relate 
to the choice they are making’ such as their ‘health and lifestyle choices or marital 
status’ in order to protect them from making the wrong choices654 
 Issue ‘relevant risk warnings’ such as the tax consequences of a decision to take cash 
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 Financial Conduct Authority (2014) Retirement Reforms and the Guidance Guarantee, Policy Statement 
PS14/17, November, http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/ps14-17.pdf 
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guarantee.pdf 
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The people most likely to benefit from transferring out of a DB scheme will be single people, who do not 
need the partner’s benefit in a DB scheme, and those in poor health who have impaired life expectancy. 
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 Make a recommendation, in customer communications about retirement options, 
that consumers consult Pension Wise or take regulated advice.  
The ‘Dear CEO’ letter was followed up by a FCA Policy Statement in February 2015 which 
formally set out the new rules to come into force on 6 April 2015.655  They will apply to 
providers operating personal pensions, stakeholder pensions, selling pension decumulation 
products or facilitating the access of pension savings on an execution-only basis. The FCA 
also announced that it plans to consult in summer 2015 on whether to retain, modify or add 
to these rules, as part of a wider consultation on the rules around consumers’ interaction 
with providers as they approach retirement. It also stated that TPR will be publishing 
complementary guidance for trustees of trust-based schemes.  
The introduction of additional protection or second line of defence  followed criticism of the 
FCA at a hearing of the Work and Pensions Select Committee on 17 December 2014 at 
which Christopher Woolard stated: ‘What we can never do, in any area we regulate, is stop 
fools behaving like fools’. The committee felt that this attitude was a dereliction of the FCA’s 
responsibilities. Mike Thornton MP, a member of the committee said: ‘You are the Financial 
Conduct Authority. How providers act towards their customers is at the centre of your 
responsibilities’.656 The effect of the criticism was to raise the level of concern within the 
FCA about the possibility of not only mis-selling but also theft via scamming.  
Some welcomed the changes on the ground that they challenged the inertia of the existing 
system. Tom McPhail said: ‘This second line of defence….is exactly what we have been 
calling for. Without this, it would have been far too easy for pension providers to carry on 
rolling their customers over into poor value or inappropriate retirement income products. 
However it will also raise the bar, making it more challenging for pension companies to deal 
with their customers; some may decide it just isn't worth the effort’.657  
Some were concerned that consumers, overwhelmed by the array of new pension options, 
could easily become confused or misinterpet the new questions about their personal 
circumstances as advice. For example, Claire Trott, head of technical support at Talbot and 
Muir, said: ‘I am concerned that some retirees who have opted to avoid the use of Pension 
Wise will also opt not to answer the prescribed questions [put by the provider] fully or 
honestly and therefore won't receive the most appropriate risk warnings’.658  Similarly, Paul 
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 Financial Conduct Authority (2015) Retirement Reforms and the Guidance Guarantee: Retirement Risk 
Warnings, Policy Statement PS15/4, February; http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/policy-
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  House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2014) Oral Evidence: Progress with Automatic 
Enrolment and Pension Reforms, HC 668, Wednesday 17 December. 
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 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) FCA introduces emergency rules to prevent mis-selling from April, 
Professional Pensions, 26 January.  
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Quoted in Jenna Towler (2015) Providers back FCA's 'second line of defence' for retirees, Professional 
Adviser,  26 January. 
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Evans, pensions technical manager at Suffolk Life, said: ‘There will be a lot of providers who 
are concerned they will be seen as giving advice in asking the “relevant” questions. It is 
essential clients understand the questions they are being asked. There's clarification needed 
on what the regulator wants and what providers can do in order to make it work’.659  
Ms Trott believes that if the second line of defence is insufficiently robust, there could be 
future mis-selling scandals: 
The second line of defence is actually an important stage when trying to 
combat pensions liberation, the time it takes to complete the forms and 
sign the disclaimers should hopefully give just enough time for people to 
stop and realise what they are being asked to do, even if they don't read 
the carefully crafted risk warning letter presented to them. The fact they 
have to complete a questionnaire in order to access the benefits might be 
enough for them to reconsider their options. 
I don't believe conducting the second line of defence over the phone is 
sufficient enough to ensure that clients who haven't taken advice are 
suitably warned about the implications of what they are doing, having to 
sign something to say you want to proceed is much more significant to 
people than listening to someone and agreeing… 
Anything we as providers can do to protect clients without infringing their 
right to access their benefits is great, but it still goes back to full personal 
advice from an FCA regulated financial adviser is clearly best. 
The fact that the FCA require providers to give risk warnings to clients who 
have used the Pensions Wise service is a clear indication that they also 
consider this guidance to be inadequate. 
I would like to see all clients taking advice, but it is wholly unacceptable to 
limit their retirement options just because they've chosen not to. For years, 
annuities have received a poor press. Many people view annuity purchase 
as inflexible and representing poor value. If clients' options are curtailed in 
this way, it could be a real disincentive for the next generation of pension 
savers. I don't believe that an annuity is a better non-advised option than 
drawdown and taking the whole fund as cash is a significantly more risky 
course of action for a non-advised client. 
I can see a new mis-selling scandal here by creating new default options 
for clients and this could all be prevented with robust second line of 
defence practices.660 
 
                                                     
659 
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 Quoted in Claire Trott (2015) Providers pushing pensions freedom advice demands 'too far', Professional 
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Even where they do take advice, many members might not like the advice they receive and 
disregard it. In this case, they are classified as ‘insistent clients’, although this is not a 
recognised regulatory term and, from a regulatory point of view, they fall into the non-
advised category. Advisers took different views on ‘insistent clients’. Some believed that 
they have a 'moral obligation' and a 'duty of care' towards their clients and would not 
implement anything they regarded as unsuitable, irrespective of whether the client insists, 
even if it means they would lose the client’s business. Others said they have no moral 
obligation as long as the client is sufficiently informed and would not want to ‘browbeat 
clients’, although they remained concerned about risks to their business.661  
 
In September 2015, the ABI’s Huw Evans told a Work and Pensions Select Committee 
hearing: ‘We must resolve the tension that came to light when the reforms were 
implemented around safeguards that have been put in place. Some customers deeply resent 
those safeguards and want to find a way round them. A decision has to taken by 
policymakers to find a way forward. A resolution to that has to be sorted. As a part of that 
we absolutely need to clarify what the advice requirements are. Some providers were still 
unclear when they had to ensure customers take regulated financial advice’.662 
 
In January 2016, the FCA announced that 42% of customers taking drawdown were doing so 
on a non-advised basis.663 
 
3.12.2.2  Vulnerable DB-to-DC consumers and others with safeguarded benefits 
In February 2015, TPR issued guidance for trustees of DB schemes on dealing with member 
requests for DB-to-DC transfers.664  The guidance aims to: 
 help trustees ensure they have appropriate processes in place to manage transfer 
requests 
 prompt trustees to consider the impact of transfer values as part of an integrated 
approach to the risk management of their scheme 
 require trustees to provide clear information for members so that they can get 
independent advice on the best option for them. 
The guidance recognises that ‘it is likely to be in the best financial interests of the majority 
of members to remain in their DB scheme’.665 If a member’s CETV is over £30,000, the 
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member must take independent financial advice from a D60 qualified specialist pension 
adviser before transferring.666 The member must pay for this advice (unless the transfer is 
initiated by the employer). The adviser will send a questionnaire to the scheme to establish 
the benefits in the scheme and then perform a full benefit comparison with the DC pension 
arrangement the member wishes to switch to. The member is required to provide written 
evidence to the trustees that the advice has been given. However, trustees are not 
‘responsible for checking what advice was given, what recommendation was made or to 
confirm whether the member is following that recommendation’. Further, it is not ‘the 
trustee’s role to second-guess the member’s individual circumstances and choice to transfer 
[DB] benefits. Nor is it their role to prevent a member from making decisions which the 
trustees might consider to be inappropriate to the member’s circumstances’. The trustees 
are required to ensure that the receiving scheme is a legitimate arrangement and not a 
pension liberation scam.  
In March, 2015, the FCA announced new rules on pension transfer advice. In particular, it 
would change its Regulated Activities Order, amend the definition of ‘pension transfer' to 
reflect the new pension environment, and introduce a requirement for firms to appoint a 
pension transfer specialist (PTS):667  
 New Regulated Activities Order 
o Advice on transfers from a DB occupational scheme to a DC occupational 
scheme will require the firm to be FCA-authorised for pension transfer 
permission 
o Advice on conversion of safeguarded benefits within a DC occupational 
scheme to access flexible benefits will require the firm to be FCA-authorised 
for pension transfer permission 
o Advice on transfer of safeguarded benefits within a DC occupational scheme 
to access flexible benefits will require the firm to be FCA-authorised for 
pension transfer permission 
o Pension trustees/managers of occupational schemes must check a scheme 
member has received advice before a transfer of safeguarded benefits to 
flexible benefits is carried out. Pension trustees/managers will not be 
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Professional Adviser, 1 May.  
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required to check advice has been received where the fund is less than 
£30,000, or where an annuity is being purchased. 
 Definition of pension transfers 
o A transfer of deferred benefits (regardless of when these are to be 
crystallised) from: 
 an occupational pension scheme 
 an individual arrangement providing fixed or guaranteed benefits that 
replace similar benefits under a DB scheme 
 an arrangement that contains safeguarded benefits (for example, 
guaranteed annuity rates and guaranteed minimum pensions) 
o To:  
 an occupational pension scheme 
 an individual pension plan (personal pension/stakeholder) 
o Or: 
 to transfer safeguarded benefits to obtain a right to flexible benefits 
o These proposals mean firms not authorised for pension transfers must 
consider pension advice with extra precaution to ensure they do not carry 
out activities beyond their scope of permissions. 
 Appointment of a pension transfer specialist 
o Firms that wish to continue to advise clients on some/all of the above areas 
will be required to apply for a variation of permission. This process will 
necessitate the appointment of a pension transfer specialist (a person 
holding an appropriate qualification and who can demonstrate knowledge 
and experience in this area). Firms that currently hold pension transfer 
authority need take no action as their permissions will automatically be 
updated to reflect the proposed definition of this activity. 
 In June 2015, the FCA issued an amended Policy Statement (PS15/12) on pension transfer 
rules. It creates a new regulated activity of ‘advising on conversion or transfer of pension 
benefits’. It also clarifies the meaning of safeguarded benefits, a term introduced by the 
Pensions Schemes Act 2015 and defined in the negative as all benefits that are not a money 
purchase benefits or cash balance arrangements.  
It was not clear at the time whether benefits offering a guaranteed annuity rate (GAR) 
would be included in the definition. In principle, they are money purchase benefits, but the 
guarantee could imply that they are safeguarded benefits. The FCA has now decided to 
exclude GARs from the new regulated actively to avoid possible confusion. It argues that the 
transfer of a GAR to flexible benefits is less complex than a transfer of a final salary scheme 
and therefore a PTS is not required, although advice will still be required if the benefit being 
given up is valued at more than £30,000.  
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In May 2015, the Daily Mail reported the case of a 65-year old customer with a valuable GAR 
on his £67,000 DC pension pot, but who wanted to cash it and spend it on a holiday and 
home renovations. His provider insisted he had to take professional advice. But due to the 
GAR, he could not find an adviser willing to sign the form authorising the release. The 
customer says: ‘I thought this would be easy. Some of the companies I’ve spoken to have 
said it’s just not worth the risk of being hit with a future compensation claim.’ The same 
thing has happened to a 60-year old customer who had a pension pot currently worth 
£21,501, but due to the GAR it will be worth more than £30,000 when he reaches 65. His 
provider insisted he get advice before cashing in the pension, but eight adviser firms have 
turned him down. The provider says: ‘Mr [customer’s name]’s policy has an attractive 
guaranteed annuity rate, which is available at age 65. This could be worth over double what 
he could find in the open market with immediate annuity rates. We don’t feel we have been 
overzealous. These rules protect the customer and ensure they do not lose very valuable 
guarantees without being fully aware of what they might be giving up.’ However, the FCA 
says the provider was wrong to interpret the rules like this. It says firms should look at the 
size of someone’s pension pot today – not what it may pay out in future.668 
In November 2015, the DWP announced it was looking to establish a simpler method of 
valuing pensions with GARs to help consumers gauge whether they need to take financial 
advice. It accepted that both providers and consumers were struggling to determine when 
the £30,000 threshold is breached because of the ‘considerable variety’ of ‘safeguarded’ 
pensions and the challenges presented by the potential value of a GAR when the ‘promise’ 
element is taken into account.669 In January 2016, the FCA announced that 68% of GARs 
were not being utilised by pension freedom clients, although this was concentrated amongst 
those with small pots who had GARs: 79% of those with pots below £30,000 and 90% of 
those with pots below £10,000 did not take up their GARS. However, 59% of those with pots 
over £30,000 did take up their GARs.670 
The FCA requires, as a further protection for consumers, that all other transfers in excess of 
£30,000 from safeguarded benefits to flexible benefits be checked by a PTS where advice is 
given, whether the benefits are deferred or for immediate vesting (crystallisation). A 
transfer value analysis will still be required for these cases where the transfer and 
immediate vesting is not at the final salary scheme’s normal retirement date. A transfer 
from an occupational scheme with safeguarded benefits to another occupational scheme 
with flexible benefits will now need PTS involvement, whereas previously this was not 
required. Even a move from one part of a scheme that has safeguarded benefits to a part 
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that has flexible benefits will require a PTS to be involved in the advice. One the other hand, 
a transfer from an occupational scheme with no safeguarded benefits to a personal scheme 
with flexible benefits will now not need a PTS, whereas previously it would have. The 
Pensions Scheme Act does not require advice for members whose benefits are worth less 
than £30,000. However, if advice is given, the same rules above apply: there is no 
exemption from the FCA rules based in fund size.671 
Despite the new freedom to do so, it is likely to be the case that many if not most DB 
scheme members would not benefit in the long run from moving from a DB scheme to a DC 
scheme, as the FCA has itself acknowledged. Even in a well-funded DB scheme, members 
who transfer might get only 80-90% of the value of their benefits,672 but for a scheme in 
deficit it could be as low as 60%.673 Someone who switches from a DB scheme to a DC 
scheme and uses the transfer value to purchase an index-linked annuity (the same type of 
pension as in their DB scheme) at current rates will get little more than half their initial 
pension.  
DB scheme members appear to be frustrated by the requirement to take regulated advice 
before transferring out if calls to Fidelity Worldwide Investment's pensions hotline are 
anything to go by. Around 10% of calls are from DB clients who just want to take their 
cash.674   
Furthermore, not only will many members be reluctant to seek and pay for this advice, they 
might actually find it hard to find advisers willing to offer it.675 Henry Denne, head of private 
clients at Punter Southall, argues: ‘Much of the advice process will start on the presumption 
that remaining in DB is in the best interests of the individual. ..[P]roviding this advice could 
cost a few thousand pounds and this will need to be paid to the adviser regardless of the 
outcome of the discussion. They may advise against the transfer. I think the individual will 
find it difficult to access advice at reasonable cost. Advisers may be reluctant to advise on 
this area once they understand the full impact of the decision. When advisers read through 
the guidance on enhanced transfer value exercises, they will realise how much care needs to 
go into advising in this area’.676  
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The FCA’s review of enhanced transfer values677 published in July 2014 found that 59% of 
members who took an ETV from a DB scheme did so as an insistent client. The FCA wants 
advisers to ensure they have recorded the client's reasons for wanting to transfer out of the 
scheme and have discussed the risks involved as well as alternative options.  
The June 2015 Policy Statement cited above also clarified the FCA’s position on how advisers 
can avoid liability when dealing with insistent clients. They need to satisfy the following 
three regulatory requirements: 
1. You must provide advice that is suitable for the individual client, and this advice 
must be clear to the client. This is the normal advice process 
2. It should be clear to the client that their actions are against your advice 
3. You should be clear with the client what the risks of the alternative course of action 
are. 
Where the advice includes a pension transfer, conversion or opt-out, there will be additional 
requirements, such as ensuring the advice is provided by or checked by a PTS in the case of 
transfers over £30,000, comparing the DB scheme with the DC scheme and starting by 
assuming the transfer is not suitable. 
This was the first time the FCA had issued rules on how advisers should deal with insistent 
clients  – even though it still did not technically recognise the term. Nevertheless, it said: 
‘There is no rule to prevent advisers from transacting business against their advice if the 
client insists. In practice, there may be occasions where the client wishes to take a different 
course of action from the one you recommend and wants you to facilitate the transaction 
against your advice’. In such circumstances, advisers should ensure they have followed the 
‘normal advice rules’, including doing a thorough fact find and suitability report and advising 
in the client's best interest.678  
In November 2015, Aileen Lynch, head of technical services at Compliance First, expanded 
on the FCA’s three steps: 679 
 Step 1 
 
Conduct the business as an advised sale, following all the processes and procedures 
carried out for all clients. For confirmation, this will include the following: 
o providing the client agreement (disclosure of costs and services) 
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o completing a fact-find 
o assessing attitude to investment risk 
o preparing research 
o delivering a recommendation based on the client(s) needs, circumstances 
and objectives 
o produce a suitability report to confirm this position. 
 
 Step 2 
 
On receipt of the recommendation, should the client(s) decline/reject the advice, a 
request should be made for the client(s) to prepare, in their own words, the reason 
for the rejection, awareness of the risks associated in this course of action and then 
confirmation of the action they wish to take. 
 
The risks associated with the action they wish to take could include: 
o penalties on encashment/transfer/switch 
o reduction of future benefits 
o loss of existing/future benefits (death benefits, guarantees, bonuses, etc) 
o depletion of retirement funds/income 
It is also recommended, for the future protection of the firm, that the spouse or 
dependants/beneficiaries countersign this declaration as they can be considered an 
interested party in the transaction.680 
 
 Step 3 
 
You should prepare a final letter to clarify that you are acting on the client’s 
insistence and confirming the product, provider, fund choices, etc., or drawdown of 
funds if in a pension scheme. 
 
This should also confirm the risks associated with the instruction and, if it relates to 
the drawdown of a pension fund, it should make specific reference to: 
o taxation 
o sustainability of income 
o impact on state benefits (welfare and social care support) 
o state benefit means-testing – deprivation of capital. 
 
You should then include a disclaimer to highlight the client’s potential loss of 
regulatory protection, with wording similar to: ‘You have chosen not to accept our 
original recommendation and you should be aware that, by proceeding on your 
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specific instructions, you may not benefit from the protection of the rules of the 
Financial Conduct Authority on assessing suitability or from the Financial 
Ombudsman Service’. 
The FCA’s technical specialist, Rory Percival, has provided examples of bad practice 
discovered by the FCA during its 2014 investigation of ETV pension transfer advice. To 
illustrate, he said the regulator had come across cases of advisers apparently conducting 
business on an 'insistent client' basis in order to bypass its suitability requirements. He said 
that dealing with insistent clients is a ‘high risk' practice that requires firms to implement 
additional controls: ‘We found, of the cases that advised on ETV transfers, 59% were on an 
insistent client basis and, within those, there were a lot of problems, [one of which was 
advisers] not really providing their own advice’. Some advisers were apparently conducting 
business based on their clients' wishes rather than determining whether those wishes were 
suitable for them. Another example was 'papering', where ‘it's manifestly not an insistent 
client case, but that's what the paperwork demonstrated it to be,… [with such cases] 
presumably undertaken to avoid some of our rules, particularly those around suitability’.  
There were also specific issues around suitability, such as when an adviser agreed to a 
transfer on an insistent client basis but then gave advice on which product to switch into: 
‘Just because one element of the insistent client process is insistent doesn't mean that the 
bit where you are giving advice, and the client is taking that advice, [doesn't need] to be 
suitable’. Some organisations, such as the Personal Finance Society, have advised members 
not to transact against their advice under any circumstances, but Mr Percival concluded: 
‘That's not our position. You can transact against the advice if you take the (above) three 
steps. But we understand the rationale for that point of view and it's up to firms to decide 
what services they provide’.681 
Despite this reassurance, some advisers still feel exposed. For example, Katherine Dandy, 
partner in Sackers, has warned that confusion over the pension reforms combined with poor 
understanding of the potential risks would result in a high level of mis-selling, which, in turn, 
would trigger mis-selling claims worth billions of pounds. Most at risk will be long-serving 
members of final-salary schemes who might be tempted to transfer to a DC scheme. She 
warned of a repeat of the mis-selling scandal in the 1980s and 1990s when members of final 
salary schemes ‘were often mistaken by the belief that they can do better themselves by 
investing the money elsewhere. This proved not to be the case, and resulted in huge 
claims’.682 
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Aileen Lynch, writing in the same article cited above, was also concerned that the issues 
surrounding insistent clients will only continue to grow over the coming months: ‘There’s an 
unsettling dichotomy between the messages of the mainstream media (“This is your money 
and you are entitled to do with it whatever you want, whenever you please”) and the more 
considered, long-term approach which is generally prevalent in financial services press and 
among advisers and providers. The difference in perspective is understandable but is almost 
certain to lead to continued misunderstandings between clients and advisers. Recent 
decisions from FOS indicate that erring on the side of caution is always the right path for 
advisers and I would urge you to continue to refuse to undertake business that you believe 
would be detrimental to the financial wellbeing of the client’.683  
Richard Nuttall, a compliance officer at support services provider SimplyBiz, believes that 
clients insisting on going against their adviser's commendations should be asked to put their 
instructions in writing to show they are aware of the risks. Merely asking a client to sign a 
typed statement offers inadequate protection as it may not prove the customer 
understands their actions: ‘Something as [important] as this really needs to be in their own 
handwriting, otherwise it's just another letter they sign [and don't properly understand]’. He 
warned that ‘there could be a raft of complaints as clients who have transacted against their 
adviser's wishes later run out of money’ and added ‘the [FCA] don't know how to build the 
rules around insistent clients. What we have had has been very light touch’.684,685 
Sheriar Bradbury believes some companies might start to offer a signing off service on 
business that other advisers turn down in the expectation of making a ‘quick income’.  If 
things go wrong, the cost will will fall on the FSCS which is paid for by advisers. Mr Bradbury 
continued: ‘Any adviser who agrees to sign off such a transfer either against their advice or 
without giving proper advice is "really stupid", even if they ask the client to sign caveats 
explaining they did not advise the transfer. A lot of IFAs got into trouble over various things 
in the past because they took risks they shouldn't have taken and they convince themselves 
it's OK and they want the money. People like me will end up paying for it through the FSCS’. 
He refuses to allow his advisers to do DB-to-DC transfers on an insistent client basis and 
argues the FCA should publish further guidance and ‘tell people “we don't like this and 
watch out”’.686 
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In April 2015, Intelligent Pensions (IP) launched a DB transfer advice service for financial 
advisers who want to assist clients planning to transfer their DB pension to a DC scheme. 
The service allows advisers who do not have the necessary pension transfer specialist 
qualification to outsource the transfers. Clients can choose a drawdown plan of their choice 
or stay within IP’s own self-invested personal pension wrapper. Advisers can then choose 
either to remain with the client in their new scheme or transfer responsibility for ongoing 
advice to IP. The company charges the client an initial advice fee and then a set-up charge to 
carry out the transfer if the client decides to go ahead. IP launched a flexi-access drawdown 
plan in March 2015 with ongoing advice at an annual charge of 0.75%. 
A survey sponsored by the APFA found that more than 50% of advisers are refusing to 
implement pension transfers out of DB schemes due to concerns that the regulator could 
later hold them to account; only 25% are prepared to undertake the transfers. Chris 
Hannant said: ‘This highlights the uncertainty for advisers and the need for the FCA and FOS 
to clarify the position on advisers' liability when they undertake a pension transfer’.687 
The Personal Finance Society has also called on the FCA to introduce additional safeguards 
for advisers dealing with insistent DB transfer clients. It wants clear rules stating that such 
clients cannot later claim redress from the FSCS. Additional independent warnings should be 
given by the scheme trustee to those insisting on transferring against the recommendation 
of their adviser. The PFS has identified a ‘problem already emerging’ of clients who are ‘not 
really looking for advice’, but just want the adviser to facilitate the transfer to satisfy the 
new rules. It is concerned that many who transfer out of their DB pensions could later regret 
the decision and ‘look for someone to blame’. Keith Richards, chief executive of the PFS, 
said: ‘If the Government expects advisers to facilitate transfers, irrespective of their advice 
to the contrary, there must be a change of process to further protect the client and 
guarantee that advisers will not be held liable if a poor outcome subsequently 
materialises’.688  
The FCA has found that 70% of providers (and 77% of the 15 largest providers) are willing to 
accept pension transfer requests from insistent clients, except where the ceding scheme has 
safeguarded benefits or where the transfer is not facilitated by a financial adviser. However, 
if a customer is able to find an adviser willing to act on their behalf, it is likely the provider 
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will accept the transfer. It therefore seems that advisers are more concerned about insistent 
clients than providers.689 
There are a range of reasons why DB scheme members might want to transfer. At one 
extreme, some people could feel pressured by other family members to use their pension 
pot to support them rather than provide for their own retirements. A study by the Centre 
for the Modern Family (which is sponsored by Scottish Widows) published in January 2015 
indicated that, of the 2,082 people surveyed, 23% expected to use their pension pot to fund 
care costs for elderly relatives, while 22% reported that they would use it to fund a deposit 
for children buying a home. Carolyn Fairbairn, chair of the centre, said: ‘Although, for many, 
the reforms announced in the 2014 Budget will represent greater autonomy over how to 
use their savings in later life, it is important to consider the knock-on effects on families. 
Many may feel pressure to access their pensions to support struggling family members and, 
while it is reassuring that family members are seeing the importance of pulling together in 
this way, it is vital people are aware of all the short- and long-term implications for 
retirement pots’.690  
At the other extreme, according to James Baxter, managing partner of Tideway Investment 
Partners LLP: ‘Members value control of the capital and flexible access to funds above 
guaranteed lifetime income. They will also be thinking: “I can’t believe how big my transfer 
offer is and I can’t afford not to take it”’. Mr Baxter believes that ‘capitalising on a DB 
benefit and getting flexible access to those funds from age 55 can be transformational for 
many members….The ability to split cash withdrawals from taxable income withdrawals, 
limit taxable withdrawals to lower income tax bands, save in a tax-exempt fund and pass on 
funds to children and create higher levels of temporary income when required are all 
options that don’t exist for DB pensioners. These come on top of an offer which is likely to 
be well beyond what most members believe their pensions are worth. Members are 
weighing these benefits versus a loss of income security in their eighties, often recognising 
that life beyond 80 is likely to be quite different, with significantly different financial 
demands, than life in their fifties, sixties and seventies’.691 
Some financial advisers believe that the new pension flexibilities could change attitudes to 
transfers out of final salary schemes. For example, Kim Bendall, director at The 
Paraplanners, says: ‘History tells us advisers would be crazy to recommend a transfer out of 
a final-salary pension but that's all in the past... I've had the opportunity recently to review 
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some final-salary pensions in order to determine whether a transfer out may be suitable.…In 
nearly all cases, the critical yield still suggests that the client would be “worse off” if they 
transfer out; however we believe this is becoming a flawed and unrealistic way of 
determining the suitability or a potential transfer….Ultimately, the critical yield has to be 
balanced with the client's non-financial objectives – such as providing options for their 
spouse when they die, or the ability to pass on some of the pension fund to their 
children’. 692  Similarly, James Baxter believes DB scheme members ‘must overcome 
perceived wisdom and historic prejudice that it’s simply never a good idea to transfer out of 
a DB benefit. We have absolutely no doubts that if schemes were to start communicating 
transfer offers to members, with balanced guidance on the pros and cons of the transfer 
option and some help as to how to get through the advice maze, then the level of transfers 
would be significantly higher’.693 
Despite the potential risks, employers and their consultants might well actively encourage 
DB members to move. The Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA) was very supportive of 
the pension freedoms when they were first announced: ‘Banning private sector DB-to-DC 
transfers... would have put UK plc at a huge commercial disadvantage with Europe as it 
would effectively have locked companies into funding for buy-out’.694 Employers certainly 
benefit when members leave the DB scheme. This is because the CETV that the member 
takes when they leave a scheme reflects the best estimate cost of providing the benefits in 
the new scheme and does not include the prudence margin that funding on an ongoing 
basis requires. This margin covers future longevity and inflation risk for example. Further, if 
the scheme is in deficit, this is reflected in a reduced transfer value. The ACA anticipated 
that many companies will initiate transfer value exercises after April 2015.   
Steve Johnson reports that: ‘Transfer value exercises can be popular with companies that 
want to de-risk by reducing the size of legacy DB pension schemes. They have often been 
criticised for encouraging people to give up valuable “gold-plated” benefits in return for 
moving to a riskier personal pension. In 2012, the Financial Services Authority, the financial 
regulator at the time, said it had found instances where advisers had recommended a 
transfer but where the FSA could find “little or no justification to do so”, potentially leaving 
people short-changed in retirement’.695 
Despite this, a number of practitioners support members transferring out of DB: 
 Simon Taylor, a partner at Barnett Waddingham, said: ‘The new pension freedoms 
may lead to an increase in members looking to transfer out of defined benefit 
schemes into defined contribution, which may ultimately help schemes de-risk’.  
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 Martyn Phillips, head of buyouts at JLT Employee Benefits, believes that paying a 
generous transfer value may be cheaper than buying a member out with an 
insurance company: ‘That’s a gain from a sponsor objective and from a trustee 
objective, and it’s obviously a more generous offer than the trustees would normally 
be offering those members’.696 
 Ian Gutteridge of Premier Pensions Management believes that ETV exercises to 
encourage DB members to switch to a DC scheme might be an attractive way for 
employers to reduce their DB liabilities in the new pensions environment. Another 
option is for the employer to offer a pension increase exchange (PIE): the member 
receives an increase in the pension but then foregoes annual pension increases on 
non-statutory pension benefits. The employer could pay for the member to have 
advice so that ‘only appropriate individuals accept a PIE or transfer value’. Mr 
Gutteridge adds: ‘It’s a dangerous strategy from the trustees’ point of view if they 
say ‘no; we don’t want to get involved in this’. Providers have been criticised [in the 
past] by regulators for failing to give policyholders the full range of options available. 
Trustees are [also] open to be criticised’.697  
 Tom Ground, head of bulk annuities and longevity insurance at Legal & General, 
argues that member option exercises have an important role to play in DB pension 
scheme de-risking exercises. He says that: ‘Transfer value exercises, pension increase 
exchanges and other member option exercises can provide valued flexibility to 
scheme members, while potentially increasing the affordability of an insurance de-
risking solution, such as a buyout or buy-in. For example, with certain member 
option exercises, insurers may take the view that there is the potential for “selection 
risk” and will charge a higher premium to cover this risk. This may have an impact, 
where a transfer value exercise has been carried out already and the insurer then 
subsequently assesses the average life expectancy of the remaining members as part 
of a buyout, buy-in or longevity insurance quote. If the insurer believes that only 
those members in poor health had taken up the offer, then the average life 
expectancy of the remaining members will be higher. So the insurance premium 
would then be higher to reflect the increased longevity of the members. This could, 
in some circumstances, put the scheme in a position where it may have been better 
for all parties, if the exercise had been conducted on a wider basis initially. By 
engaging with an insurance provider at an early stage, ahead of the point of carrying 
out member option exercises, a scheme can ensure that the initiatives contribute 
towards achieving the scheme’s long term de-risking objectives’.698 
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A survey of 322 DB schemes conducted by KPMG in May 2015 found that 75% of DB 
schemes intended to offer transfer quotes to members as part of their standard retirement 
process, while a third of schemes planned to offer partial transfers.  Around 25% of schemes 
reported that they would offer free or subsidised advice to members, while 30% planned to 
provide online modelling tools. Only 14% of schemes polled said they had no plans to 
change retirement processes in the new pension regime. Two thirds of those polled 
accepted that responsibility for dealing with the impact of the new legislation rested with 
employers (31%) or trustees (34%), rather than with individuals, providers or the 
Government.  
Stewart Hastie, pensions partner at KPMG, said: ‘It is encouraging to see that most 
employers and trustees are waking-up to the fact that they need to respond to the recent 
changes to pensions flexibility. The decisions facing pension scheme members at retirement 
are irreversible. This shows that employers and trustees have recognised that doing nothing 
is not a risk-free strategy…Both employers and trustees must stay on top of the recent 
changes and ensure they are engaging with their members. We see a need for education, 
not just the provision of information. By educating members, employers and trustees can 
help them plan for their retirement based on their individual needs. Members can also 
benefit from the full range of flexibility options open to them, in turn, increasing staff 
morale and the firm's reputation’.699 
The potential size of the DB-to-DC transfer market could be huge. Some sources estimate 
that about 500,000 members of private sector DB pension schemes will give up their index-
linked final-salary pensions and instead take a cash lump sum.700  Others put the numbers at 
2m or 50% of those over 55. Research by industry analysts for Channel 4’s Dispatches 
programme estimated that withdrawals could be as high as £6bn, which is three times more 
than HM Treasury estimates. Alan Higham, then retirement director of Fidelity Worldwide 
Investment, told the programme: ‘About 20 per cent of the calls we’ve had are from people 
who have made very quick plans to spend money on house improvements, buy a new car, 
go on holiday . . . and are looking to access their pension funds quickly for that purpose’.701 
A Close Brothers Asset Management survey in April 2015 asked 400 employers about the 
response by scheme members to the new pension regime. Around 44% of respondents with 
a DB scheme reported they had been contacted by members considering transferring out, 
while 11% said they had been approached by a ‘significant number’ of members. For those 
with DC schemes, 57% of employers were planning to offer employees help to allow them 
to make more informed decisions. Around 23% said they thought employees would turn to 
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the Government's Pension Wise service, 27% expected their staff to ask them for help, while 
28% thought employees would seek specialised advice from a financial adviser.702 
In August 2015, Selectapension released the results of a survey which showed that pension 
transfer requests from DB schemes doubled in the three months following Flexiday 
compared with the three months from April 2014. The top providers chosen to receive the 
transfers were: Royal London, Scottish Widows, Prudential, and LV=. Andy McCabe, 
managing director at Selectapension, said: ‘Pension freedoms have started to make a 
considerable impact on consumers and have acted as a catalyst for many to reassess 
whether remaining in a DB scheme is the best option. However, it is important to recognise 
that transferring from a DB scheme is not suitable for everyone and a decision as complex as 
this should not be made hastily but with comprehensive financial advice’.703 
 
TPR is concerned that a large volume of transfers could destabilise the DB scheme by 
crystallising liabilities. It has therefore provided guidance to DB pension scheme trustees on 
reducing a member’s transfer value and how to apply for more time to carry out a 
transfer.704  
 
3.12.2.3  Vulnerable consumers in the annuity market 
We distinguish between the primary and secondary annuity market. The primary market is 
the market where annuities are first sold.  The secondary market is where someone who has 
bought an annuity can subsequently sell it for cash; this market does not currently exist in 
the UK, but the Government is planning to set one up in April 2017.705 
The primary annuity market 
In August 2014, the Daily Telegraph reported that the FCA had begun an investigation into 
the sale of annuities sold since 2008 to check if they were unsuitable for customers. The 
paper said that more than 600,000 pensioners could have been sold annuities that did not 
take account of their health status. People with diabetes or high blood pressure could have 
had their pensions increased by around 20% if they had been sold an enhanced annuity 
instead of a standard one. It is estimated that as many as 60% of retirees have a medical 
                                                     
702
 Reported in Owain Thomas (2015) One in ten employers seeing 'significant number' of DB transfer 
enquiries, Professional Pensions, 21 April.  
703
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Defined benefit pension transfer requests 'double’, Professional 
Adviser, 25 August. 
704 
Reported Laura MacPhee (2015) Regulator warns trustees to prepare for an increase in DB to DC transfers, 
Engaged Investor, 2 June. 
705  
HM Treasury and DWP (2015) Creating a Secondary Annuity Market, Cm 9046 
March;https://www.gov.uk/Government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413764/Creating_a_
secondary_annuity_market__web_file_.pdf 
351 
 
condition or make lifestyle choices (e.g., smoke) which reduce their life expectancy and 
qualify them for an enhanced annuity. They may now be due compensation if they were 
sold a standard annuity. The difference between the worst standard annuity rate and best 
enhanced rate could be as great as 30%. Telephone conversations will be examined, as will 
paperwork sent to customers before they retired. Compensation orders could be issued 
where failures are identified. 
Observers believe the level of compensation could be significant. For example, John Perks, 
managing director of retirement solutions at LV=, said ‘Any element of compensation will be 
costly because it means rectifying an annuity income for the long term plus the cost of doing 
that, so there is potentially quite a scary compensation element here’.706 
The secondary annuity market 
The Government's consultation on its plans to create a secondary annuity market in 2017 
closed in June 2015. 
 
Many respondents generally welcomed the Government’s proposals, but there were also 
many critics. For example, Mark Polson, founder and principal of the lang cat, said:707 
 
I'm on record as loving the other freedoms that have been opened up, and 
encouraging the industry to trust savers with their own money. So why 
buck and kick against these freedoms being extended to current 
annuitants? 
There are two reasons. 
Firstly, on a micro level, it's going to be terrible value for those who 
participate. If we accept the mighty Ned Cazalet's recent figures that up to 
20% of the purchase price of an annuity is snaffled in charges, then 
annuitants have already borne significant pain. 
Do we really believe those that purchase second-hand annuities will be 
doing so pro bono? Of course not. We don't know how the figures might 
look, but the purchase has to be profitable for those putting up the capital, 
and that's just another way of saying that the annuitant will receive what 
we like to call a ‘secondary screwing'. 
For sure, we won't be multiplying monthly payments left to the actuarial 
cohort's expected age of death and paying that to the individual. And you 
can expect medical underwriting and postcoding to work in reverse. 
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As Cazalet's 129-page blockbuster proves, annuities are anything but 
simple, and unwinding them will be even worse – think Ginger Rogers' 
famous quote that she did everything Fred Astaire did, except backwards 
and in heels. 
Can we expect the industry to behave itself and not give annuitants looking 
to flee a worse-than-usual screwing? No, we can't. And it is for this reason 
– the supply side, not the demand side – that at an individual level this 
proposal shouldn't go ahead. 
Freedom to get re-screwed by an industry hell-bent on loading the decks 
against you is no freedom at all. 
At a macro level it gets even worse. Purchasers of second-hand annuities 
will only make it work by pooling – that is, by buying lots and lots of them 
to spread mortality risk. Once we're in that world, we'll start profiling 
those pools. 
We might have ‘A' pools, with healthy folk in good postcodes, ‘D' pools for 
people who didn't listen to their wives about the bottle of whisky and all 
that. 
Once that's happening, it's only a matter of time before we have second-
hand annuity funds in the life settlement/second-hand endowment fund 
style, and we know how well those went. And am I the only one who can 
see packages of annuities being bundled up, collateralised and sold on on 
what I suppose would be a tertiary market?  
….this omni-screwing proposal should be put down humanely before it has 
a chance to breed. 
 
Similarly, Richard Parkin, head of retirement at Fidelity International, said: ‘With these 
benefits come significant risks for consumers who are giving up guarantees in return for 
cash. In essence, this market combines the complexity of defined benefit transfers with the 
risks of pension freedom. We would therefore expect to see similar levels of consumer 
protection and requirements for advice that we have for these transactions. We cannot 
afford to skimp on protecting customers in pursuit of making transactions easy’.708 
Even amongst those who welcomed the Government’s proposals, there was widespread 
support for the idea that annuitants wanting to sell their annuities for cash should be 
required to take independent financial advice to reduce the risk that they end up getting a 
raw deal, although some warned that it could hinder competition and choice. 
For example, Aegon warned that people cashing in their contracts could be left below the 
means-tested benefits threshold without entitlement to claim a government top-up. It also 
pointed out that fraudsters would look to exploit any weaknesses in the market place and 
that beneficiaries could be hit if their partners decided to sell the policy. Similarly, the NAPF 
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proposed that there should be mandatory advice if the annuity was valued at £10,000 or 
more. It also pointed out that customers could face a significant tax bill estimated to raise 
for the Treasury an estimated £1bn in the first two years. Under the current tax regime, 
someone wanting to sell their annuity would face a 55% tax charge; however, the 
Government has said it would remove this charge, so people will be taxed only at their 
marginal rate. 
By contrast, LV= Retirement Solutions supported the idea of mandatory advice but only for 
those who ‘need’ it. John Perks, managing director, said: ‘Given the potential detrimental 
risks involved for consumers, we fully advocate that consumers are obliged to take advice 
before making a decision as to whether they proceed. However, we think the requirement 
needs to be assessed to avoid the cost of advice damaging the value of smaller annuities’. 
Similarly, JLT Employee Benefits accepted that consumers must be protected from scams, 
but did not believe that the advice should be mandatory. TISA wanted consumers to have 
access to 'tailored guidance' rather than advice which could be viewed by consumers as an 
‘unnecessary barrier and expense’. The guidance would be carried out under the existing 
guidance guarantee, Pension Wise, together with an extension of the second-line-of-
defence rules – the requirement on providers to highlight warnings about their clients' 
choices – to apply to all secondary annuity transactions. 
APFA has asked for more clarity around adviser liability when advising on annuity sales: ‘We 
would strongly recommend the provision of further guidance to financial advisers and other 
intermediaries around what constitutes a suitable reason for assigning annuity income 
rights. The continuing regulatory uncertainty on adviser liability both generally and around 
the new pension freedoms has meant many advisers are unwilling to engage in the DB-to-
DC pension transfers. We hope this will be looked at by the Government and the regulator 
elsewhere’. Further, it said that existing annuities should only be allowed to be sold to 
regulated firms, not retail investors, since ‘secondary market income streams can be 
complex and consumers must be protected as far as possible from making financial 
decisions which are to their detriment’. 
There was also concern about reliably quantifying the extent of longevity risk. Hymans 
Robertson recommended the creation of standardised health underwriting, an auction-style 
market place, and a robust audit trail to document the seller's reasons for cashing in their 
contract. 
There was also a difference of view about whether the original provider should be allowed 
to buy back a client's annuity (i.e., provider buy-back). The Government had initially said it 
did not like the idea. However, TISA’stechnical director, Jeffrey Mushens, said existing 
annuity providers should be allowed to buy back annuities ‘in order to encourage 
competition and consumer choice’. Mr Perks agreed: ‘We believe that individuals should 
have the right to sell their annuity to their existing annuity provider should the provider be 
willing to do so, and where the provider can demonstrate that a fair offer has been made. 
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We do not believe that it is in the spirit of the reforms to restrict individuals' ‘freedom and 
choice’ as to how they take their retirement income. We support the proposed approach to 
allow a wide range of corporate entities to purchase the annuity as this will lead to greater 
competition and ultimately better value pricing’.709 
In December 2015, the Government announced that the secondary annuity market would 
start on 6 April 2017. The Government said it saw ‘no reason to prevent retirees who have 
already purchased an annuity from selling their right to future income streams for an 
upfront cash sum if it is right for them’. Five million people with an annuity would be able to 
sell it for a cash lump sum and be taxed at their marginal rate. The annuity can be sold back 
to the original provider or to another institutional investor. Those taking advantage will be 
able to spend the money received as they see fit. The Treasury has also said it wants to 
make ‘appropriate financial advice’ mandatory for those considering selling their annuity 
and said that it will make an amendment to the Bank of England and Financial Services Bill 
to achieve this. It also seems that anyone will be able to sell their annuity. It had previously 
been thought that those on means-tested benefits would be excluded. Now, the 
Government intends to rely on existing deliberate deprivation rules which state that anyone 
on or likely to become eligible for means-tested benefits who gives up income or capital 
with the deliberate intention of gaining additional support or benefits can be treated as still 
possessing it.710 It is also not currently clear whether the proceeds from selling an annuity 
would remain within a pension tax wrapper.  
Harriett Baldwin said the reforms would include: 
 Setting out that pension annuities belonging to an individual and held in their own 
name will be eligible for the new freedoms 
 Requiring that all UK-based annuity purchasers and intermediaries are regulated by 
the FCA 
 Allowing annuity providers the choice to buy back an annuity, subject to robust 
safeguards 
 Introducing a comprehensive consumer protection package to ensure people make 
informed decisions about their savings, including: 
o extending the free and impartial Pension Wise service to cover the secondary 
annuity market 
o requiring individuals to seek independent financial advice for annuities worth 
above a certain threshold 
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 Asking the FCA to put in place a consumer protection framework which could include 
consulting on a range of extra consumer protections, such as risk warnings and ways 
for consumers to understand the fair value of their annuities 
 The Government has also responded to consultation feedback and will work with the 
industry and the FCA to create a simple online tool to help consumers work out an 
estimated value of their annuity. 
Ms Baldwin continued: ‘For most people, sticking with an annuity is the right thing to do. 
But there will be some who would welcome being able to draw on that money as they 
choose – the same freedom we gave people approaching retirement in April [2015]. That’s 
why I’m delighted that we’re extending our landmark pension freedoms to over five million 
people with annuities from April 2017. People who’ve worked hard and saved hard all their 
lives should be trusted to make the right decision for them and with the help of the 
regulator, we will ensure these people have the right information to do that’. 
Ros Altmann, the Pensions Minister, added: ‘The new pension freedom reforms are crucial 
in allowing people to make the most of their hard-earned savings. Keeping an annuity will 
still be the right decision for the majority of people. But some were forced to buy annuities 
in the past that may not have been suitable for them – and I am delighted that this reform 
will allow more people greater choice and the opportunity of a more flexible income stream. 
…Individuals may want to sell an annuity for instance to provide a lump sum for relatives or 
dependants; in response to a change in circumstances; or to purchase a more flexible 
pension income product instead’.711 
Tom McPhail said the Treasury's latest amendment was consistent with current rules 
around pension transfers, which require regulated advice for pots over £30,000. He believes 
that having a similar safeguard in place should help prevent investors from selling their 
guaranteed incomes for rock-bottom prices, but the size of the threshold is important: 
‘There is already some concern that the current £30,000 threshold is causing problems, with 
some investors unable to obtain the advisory services they need. Any increase to the 
threshold would have to be accompanied by other suitable protections to ensure investors 
could make an informed choice’.712  
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Others warned that the change ‘opens the door to millions making a financial mistake by 
flogging a guaranteed income in return for an immediate lump sum that will be much less 
than they would end up with by sticking with their annuity’:713 
 Steve Webb, former Pensions Minister and now director of policy at Royal London, 
said: ‘There is a real risk of poor outcomes if people on low incomes sell their annuity 
only to discover that the DWP treats them as if they were still drawing that income’. 
 Alan Higham of Pensionschamp.com said the Government was prioritising ‘political 
ideology over people’s real needs in retirement. [The change would] ‘benefit few 
consumers while exposing many to significant risks’. He has estimated that someone 
aged 75 who bought an annuity 10 years ago with £100,000 would be receiving on 
average £7,000 a year from it. If they were to sell it and were in good health, they 
would get around £56,000. They would be worse off if they lived for another nine 
years, yet official estimates indicate that an average healthy 75-year old will live for 
another 12 years. Mr Higham added: ‘Some healthy 75-year olds could easily live to 
100, given increased life expectancy, and giving up 25 years’ worth of money for 
eight years looks a very bad deal by anyone’s measure’.  
 Sarah Pennells of SavvyWoman.co.uk warned that the freedom to cash-in an annuity 
will be welcomed by ‘rogues and fraudsters [who] have already taken millions from 
people’ since the wider pensions freedoms came into force in April. 
The Government announced that advisers in the secondary annuity market could be 
required to undergo further training and take examinations: ‘Intermediaries are likely to 
have new opportunities in this market, including facilitating the purchase of annuities and 
providing a range of services for the consumer. These new opportunities are likely to 
improve the profitability of firms. However, there may be a requirement for advisers to take 
part in additional training or earn new qualifications to work with customers looking to sell 
their annuity’.714  
 
3.12.3 The FCA’s proposed new rules and guidance following the ‘freedom and choice’ 
reforms 
In October 2015, the FCA issued a consultation paper on the ‘freedom and choice’ 
reforms.715 This was a follow on from its Retirement Income Market Study, conducted prior 
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to the introduction of the pension reforms, which focused on the risks facing consumers and 
how they could make poor choices at retirement.  
The FCA has reviewed its rules and guidance and made proposals for future rule changes to 
protect the interests of retirees. The proposals include additional rules and guidance for 
firms on how they should communicate with customers, a review of the retirement risk 
warnings, which were introduced in February without consultation, and new rules for 
pension freedoms communications. The key proposals are: 
 Rules and guidance to ensure that consumers receive timely, relevant and adequate 
information to both encourage consumers to explore the full range of options for 
accessing their pension savings and enable informed decision-making 
 New rules on the methodology for providing illustrations to members wishing to 
access their pensions flexibly, including guidance to set out the type of ongoing 
information that consumers are provided, once they start accessing their pension 
savings and remain invested 
 To retain the rules on retirement risk warnings, but to remove the requirement for a 
firm to go through the question and answer process of the rules when a consumer 
has a pension pot of £10,000 or less and where there are no safeguarded benefits 
 To add guidance to make explicit the application of existing rules in the context of 
pension reforms, particularly in relation to debt collection and debt advice 
 Restrictions on the promotion and distribution of high risk investments and 
amendments to the FCA's definition of certified high net worth investor and 
restricted investor. 
Christopher Woolard said: ‘Pensions are of fundamental importance and it is vital that the 
market works well for consumers. Our proposals today are designed to ensure that 
consumers have access to products and services that are well governed and deliver value for 
money following the Government's pension reforms. We will continue to monitor the 
market as it evolves following the introduction of the Government's pension reforms to 
ensure that firms are helping consumers get the best outcome in retirement’.  
To ensure consumers are able to make informed decisions about an appropriate retirement 
solution, the FCA proposes to change the information in the pre-retirement wake-up pack. 
In addition to information about Pension Wise and regulated financial advice, the FCA 
proposes to: 
 Reduce and simplify the information provided 
 Ensure information is presented on all retirement options 
 Make it easier to obtain annuity comparisons, which would mean the need to 
provide more focus on enhanced annuities 
 Make it easier to shop around after carrying out these comparisons 
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 Ensure all information is balanced, so it does not promote one solution over another. 
This would mean where an illustration is provided, for, say, an annuity, illustrations 
would also have to be provided for all other available options 
 To reduce consumer inertia, restrict the annuity application form being enclosed 
within the pack. This has the effect of ensuring consumers make a positive election 
from the options available 
 As flexibility allows consumers to access the fund at different stages throughout 
their retirement, information should be provided at each time, i.e., pre and post 
retirement. 
In cases where the advice is to use income withdrawal, a suitability report needs to be 
prepared. The current rules apply to flexible access drawdown, but not to uncrystallised 
fund pension lump sums, and the rules will be updated to make specific reference to the 
latter. 
Non-advised annuity sales could be subject to a commission cap or an outright ban. This is 
because consumers were at risk of not getting value for money from non-advised annuity 
sales, and that, in some circumstances, commission payments were so high they exceeded 
the cost of regulated financial advice. Currently, most annuities are bought without advice –  
either direct from the annuity provider (typically the accumulation-stage pension provider) 
or via a third-party distributor. Many third-party distributors were paid a commission by the 
pension provider for arranging the sale. Commission rates were 1% - 1.5% for a standard 
annuity and 2.5% - 3% for enhanced annuities. This contrasts with taking regulated advice, 
which involves consumers themselves agreeing to the service they want to receive and the 
fee to be paid to the adviser. 
However, the FCA is aware of the potential consequences of an outright ban: ‘Other 
options, such as drawdown, would still carry commission. Therefore limiting any ban to 
annuities could distort competition between these potentially substitutable products. Firms 
might, as a consequence, be incentivised to promote drawdown over annuities with 
potential harmful impacts on consumers in the long term. This would mean that, to avoid 
distorting competition, we would need to consider banning commission on a wider range of 
investment solutions’. 
The FCA also wants to exclude pension wealth from the definition of a high net worth 
investor (HNWI) in order to prevent retirees losing their pension pot in high-risk 
investments. It proposes an amendment to its ‘certified high net worth investor' and 
‘restricted investor' (RI) certification criteria, so that lump sum pension withdrawals are 
excluded from the HNWI income criteria. It also wants money released from pensions as 
cash to be excluded from the definition of net investable assets for the purposes of HNWI 
and RI certification, in addition to the current exclusion of money held in pensions. It said: 
‘We are concerned some consumers' perception of their overall financial wealth following 
withdrawal of up to 100% cash from their pension savings may lead consumers to certify 
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themselves as HNWI. [It could also lead them to] invest more money than is appropriate 
under the RI category, and for firms to distribute potentially inappropriate investments to 
these consumers’.  
The criteria for certifying HNWIs are based on either net income (£100,000) or net 
investable assets (£250,000). As a result of the pension reforms, more retirees could find 
themselves falling within these criteria which, in turn, could leave them exposed to pension 
scammers or being targeted for high-risk investments. Anyone certified as a HNWI does not 
receive the regulatory protection of the suitability rules and it also means there are no 
restrictions on the type of promotions they receive. To reduce the potential risks, the FCA 
wants to exclude cash from a pension from the definition of net investable assets, in the 
same way that money held in a pension fund is already excluded.716 
In September 2015, Mark Neale, the chief executive of the FSCS, called for the Government 
to extend the level of financial protection to cover the total value of peoples' retirement 
savings. Currently, the FSCS protects up to £50,000 of people's retirement and investment 
savings. But this is only for those who invest in regulated products or received regulated 
financial advice and where the firm has defaulted. The FSCS already covers 100% of the 
policy value of an annuity. Mr Neale wants the protection increased to 100% of the value of 
pension pots. He highlighted examples of failures in the self-invested personal pension 
market, relating to high pressure sales tactics to invest in unsuitable alternative assets, 
which created a case for improved protection. The FSCS assesses whether a firm is liable for 
its clients' losses by applying a 'civil liability test', i.e., whether, looking at the evidence, the 
case would have been won in a civil court. 
Mr Neale said: ‘In recent years, the bulk of investor compensation we have paid out because 
of negligent advice has concerned investments in risky and exotic assets, such as overseas 
property schemes. The recent spate of claims to FSCS arising from investments in SIPPs have 
fallen into exactly this category. These are exactly the sort of investors who should have 
FSCS protection. Such investors have seen all or the bulk of modest retirement savings put 
at risk because they did the right thing and sought professional advice about how best to 
invest those funds. They received very bad advice which the great majority of responsible 
financial advisers would not have contemplated. This raises the question of whether - 
following the Government's reforms – we should take a fresh look at the scope of FSCS 
protection for retirement savings’.717 
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3.13 Media and Government reactions to regulatory and provider concerns about 
consumer vulnerability: The issues of access and exit charges 
Despite the large sums of money that were withdrawn in the first few months following 
Flexiday,  it soon became clear that many customers were actually finding it difficult to 
access their pension pots or were being made to pay significant exit charges by their 
providers.  
 
3.13.1  Access 
While the measures put in place by regulators and providers were there to protect 
vulnerable consumers, some of them at the prompting of MPs on the Work and Pensions 
Select Committee hearing in December 2014 with the FCA, the media – led by the Daily Mail 
and the Daily Telegraph – saw them as unnecessary and costly barriers to people accessing 
their money and this view was immediately taken up by Government ministers.   
Typical of media reaction is this article in the Daily Mail:718 
George Osborne’s pensions revolution was in crisis last night with 
thousands of savers unable to spend their nest eggs as they want. 
Just 65 days into the new regime, financial giants are under siege from 
furious customers. 
The Chancellor had promised savers easy access to their cash. But today a 
Money Mail investigation can reveal a string of disastrous failings: 
 Firms refusing withdrawals for fear of being sued for negligence in 
years to come; 
 Savers being forced to pay up to £1,000 for financial advice if they 
want their money; 
 Customers turned away because they have only small pensions; 
 Delays of up to 90 days in paying out cash; 
 Sky-high charges for withdrawals or for switching to rival firms; 
 Insurers knocking thousands off the value of pensions [that] 
customers want to access. 
....Since April 5 this year anyone over 55 should in practice be allowed to 
take all their savings out in cash, or dip in and out of it as they want – just 
like a bank account. 
But in reality savers are finding that they cannot get their hands on their 
money. 
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Some firms such as NEST, Friends Life and Phoenix will not allow savers to 
use their pension like a bank account. 
Others charge hefty fees of up to £240 for each withdrawal, or place 
restrictions on how much someone can take out. 
Money Mail has been bombarded with letters from pensioners who have 
been told they cannot have their savings unless they first see a financial 
adviser. This typically costs about £1,000. And even if they do consult an 
adviser they may still may not be able to get at their cash if the adviser 
does not think taking the pension is a good idea and refuses to help. 
Some savers had found that the specific type of pension they have does not 
qualify. And many have faced lengthy delays because insurers have been 
forced to dig out pension contracts that are three decades old. 
Customers of firms such as Clerical Medical, Phoenix Life and Aegon have 
experienced huge delays in getting hold of their cash. 
…Dr Yvonne Braun, of the Association of British Insurers, said: ‘Providers 
have and are continuing to work round the clock to ensure these reforms 
are implemented as smoothly as possible. 
‘In the first month alone, the industry handled over one million telephone 
enquiries – up 80 per cent on normal. ‘While the vast majority of 
customers have been able to access their funds in full, some may be 
required to take advice as a result of the Government’s rules because they 
have valuable guarantees.’ 
In June 2015, the Daily Telegraph, launched a ‘Make Pension Freedoms Work’ campaign 
with five demands:719 
1. All pension providers must offer savers ‘bank account’ type access to their money.  
Where providers won’t do this, they must allow their customers to switch to rival 
providers for free 
2. Charges for making use of the new pension freedoms – per cash withdrawal, for 
example – should be reasonable and capped 
3. The Government’s default work pension provider, NEST, should offer its own range 
of bank account features that will be suitable, and affordable, even for modest 
savers 
4. Exit penalties for all pension savers, even where these penalties have been written 
into old-style pension plans should be scrapped for every saver beyond the age of 55 
5. Savers wanting to move their pension cash from one provider to another should be 
offered a safe, standardised process where all the associated risks and costs are 
clear. 
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Even the Consumers’ Association stepped into the debate. Richard Lloyd, executive director 
of Which?, said: ‘The recent pension reforms are a golden opportunity to make the pensions 
market work in the best interest of consumers. So it is disappointing to see one of the 
biggest providers not stepping up and implementing the changes’.720 
In the same issue of the Daily Mail cited above, Ros Altmann, as Pensions Minister, and 
Harriett Baldwin, as Economic Secretary to the Treasury, wrote (under the heading ‘Insurers 
shouldn't have any excuses’): 
Earlier this year, George Osborne introduced the most significant reforms 
to the pensions system in a century. 
Gone is the effective requirement to buy an annuity. If you’re over the age 
of 55, you now have the freedom to access your defined contribution 
pension pot in the way you want — in flexible payments, by taking some 
out and leaving the rest for later, as a regular income, or as cash. 
As the Prime Minister said this week, we want to give people more control 
over the money they saved hard for over their working lives. 
It’s great that many pension providers and schemes have risen to the 
challenge and are offering their customers flexibility. 
However, it is disappointing that some firms are lagging behind, and some 
providers have chosen to focus their efforts on far too narrow a range of 
options. 
No matter which pension provider you saved with, you should be able to 
use your pension how you want to. 
The industry should be embracing this exciting opportunity and developing 
innovative and competitive products that work for you — and we will work 
closely with them to help them achieve this. 
We have to recognise that some companies have met practical difficulties 
along the way, including creaking IT systems that can’t ‘speak’ to each 
other. 
That is why we’ve allowed insurance companies flexibility over how and 
when they introduce these reforms. But we are determined that customers 
should in no way be disadvantaged by that. 
So, we have made sure that if you can’t access your pension flexibly, or feel 
you are being charged too much, you can transfer your savings to another 
provider. 
We are monitoring these issues closely and will continue to ensure that 
there is a system in place that works for you. We have also legislated to 
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allow pension schemes to override their previous narrow scheme rules, so 
they can offer the flexibilities if they want to. 
This means that there is no excuse for firms to claim that their rules mean 
you can’t access your money. 
There are some circumstances where you will be asked to seek 
independent financial advice from a regulated professional adviser — 
that’s simply because your pension has special, valuable features which 
you need to understand before you make a decision. 
Ask your pension provider to explain why they’re asking you to take 
financial advice. 
The Government will be watching this issue closely and working with the 
industry and regulators to address any problems. 
If you’re considering accessing your pension, make sure you take the time 
to find out what the options are, get help and support, and make the 
decision that is right for you and your family. 
After all, this could well be a once-in-a-lifetime decision that will affect 
what you have to live on for the rest of your life. 
To help you make that decision, the Government has set up Pension Wise, 
which offers free, impartial guidance on your options and will help you to 
understand the tax that you might pay, what charges to look out for and 
other important information. 
These have been major changes, underpinned by a very simple philosophy: 
it’s your money, you have earned it, you have saved it and we want you — 
not the Government or pensions companies — to choose what you do with 
it. 
Our focus now will be to make sure that the new system works in practice 
— and that the industry helps you get the most out of these historic 
reforms. 
 
Despite this, there were mixed messages from the Government about when it would 
intervene to oblige providers to offer full pension flexibility. Writing in the Daily Telegraph, 
Iain Duncan Smith, the Work and Pensions Secretary, said  the Government was ready to 
‘name and shame’ providers who were not giving their customers pensions freedom. He 
also said the Government was talking to regulators to ensure that people have the flexibility 
they deserve and will ‘not hesitate to take action’. In contrast,  Ros Altmann said the 
Government would not intervene immediately to ‘give the reforms a chance’ first to ‘see 
how they work’. A DWP spokesman said: ‘It is early days and no-one is proposing an 
immediate intervention, but both ministers are clear that the situation needs to be carefully 
monitored. We are prepared to “name and shame” those companies who are putting 
barriers in the way of people getting access to their money if such action becomes necessary 
to encourage the industry to make changes. If, as the market develops, it becomes apparent 
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that Government action is necessary to ensure consumers get a good deal, then action will 
be taken’.721 
The ABI immediately hit back at proposals that providers – most of which are insurance 
companies – would be ‘named and shamed’ for not offering the full range of pension 
freedoms. Huw Evans, director general, said: ‘We warned in February that not enough had 
been done to ensure a completely smooth implementation of these major reforms. The 
priority now is for the Government, regulators and providers to work through these teething 
problems together. The reforms are proving successful so far for the majority of customers 
and we have to build on that rather than get into a blame game’. In the meantime, Friends 
Life – one of the life offices criticised – has refused partial withdrawals to its customers, 
although it says it plans to offer this in ‘due course’, while NEST and Phoenix – two of the 
other providers criticised – have confirmed they will not be providing the full freedoms in-
house.722 
The ABI also went on to propose a series of measures to help resolve the ‘implementation 
challenges’ that ‘freedom and choice’ raised for insurance companies. In particular, it 
suggested that mandatory advice on pension freedom cases with guaranteed annuity rates 
worth more than £30,000 should be scrapped and replaced with a ‘customer control’ 
mechanism, giving people access to their pension pot without having to pay for advice. It 
said the mechanism should be delivered through a specific guidance session by Pension 
Wise, and enshrined in a protocol agreed with the FCA and the FOS.  
The ABI also published an action plan to facilitate pensions freedom implementation: 
 Establish a joint taskforce between the Government, the regulators, providers and 
advisers to deal decisively with the remaining issues 
 The FCA to conduct a broader review of the balance of responsibility between 
customers and providers in light of pension flexibility 
 The FCA to set out clearly those products and circumstances where advice should be 
taken 
 The Treasury to work with the FCA and DWP to clarify the definition and valuation of 
safeguarded benefits, by a change in the law 
 Providers to work with the FCA and DWP to clarify the definition and valuation of 
safeguarded benefits, by a change in the law 
 The Government to publish Pension Wise data and restart marketing to ensure 
maximum take up of this valuable service 
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 The ABI and its members to start work on developing a standardised language on 
products and charges to help customers consider their options 
 The ABI and its members to ensure clear, consistent communications to customers 
on the products and services available. 
The ABI said: ‘While the vast majority of customers so far have successfully exercised their 
choices without complaint, it is clear that implementing the law and regulatory 
requirements as they currently stand is not enough to ensure the benefits of the reforms 
can be universally felt. This action plan proposes a solution to the problem of customers 
unable or unwilling to access advice in the circumstances set out in the law….We also 
request the urgent establishment of a joint taskforce between the Government, regulators, 
providers and advisors to work through the outstanding issues and deal decisively with 
them. The ABI and its members remain completely committed to making the pension 
reforms a success so customers can make the most of the pension freedoms. But it is clear 
this cannot happen fully without a decisive and joined up approach to the implementation 
challenges that have arisen. If the proposals in this action plan are taken forward, we are 
confident customers will be able to enjoy the freedoms in a suitably regulated 
environment’.723 
3.13.2 Early exit charges  
Another issue that soon became apparent was that not only were people facing difficulties 
transferring their pension pots, those that were able to do so were being charged significant 
exit charges. A report in the Financial Times showed that exit charges could typically lie 
between 5% and 15% of the value of the pension pot, although in a few cases the charge 
could be as high as 20% or even 50%. The Chancellor, George Osborne, said that deductions 
of this size were ‘unjustifiable’.724 In June 2015, the ABI said nearly 90% of customers eligible 
for the pension freedoms will not face early exit charges.725 However, the FCA reported that 
while 84% of customers will not face an early exit charge, 670,000 consumers aged 55 or 
over faced an early exit charge (16% of the total). Of these, 358,000 faced charges between 
0-2%, 165,000 faced charges between 2-5%, 81,000 faced charges between 5-10%, and 
66,000 faced charges above 10%.726 
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Insurers impose exit charges on policies that are cashed in before their maturity date, which 
typically coincides with the retirement date of the policy holder, e.g., age 65. This mostly 
affects policies sold in the 1980s and 1990s.727 Such policies were sold by sales staff who 
received up-front commission from the insurer. The insurer recoups the commission over 
the remaining life of the policy in its annual charge and imposes an exit charge if the policy 
is cashed in early.  
Claire Trott, from Talbot and Muir, believes the exit charges are really market value 
adjustments (MVAs): ‘To me the majority of "high exit fees" are actually MVAs. People see it 
as an exit fee, because they are penalised for taking [their money] early, [but] you are 
breaking your contract and [the company] is recouping the cost [of selling the policy]’. She 
also pointed out that those breaking their contracts early could also miss out on terminal 
bonuses that would significantly enhance their pension pot: ‘The pension pot could be 
reduced by a hefty amount if you take your pension 10 years before the contract ends, for 
example, at 55 rather than 65…You need to look at the contract and take account of 
anything in it that could reduce your fund value’. 
Neil Lovatt, from Scottish Friendly, said policyholders should also be aware of ‘enhanced 
allocation rates’ which would be lost if policyholders withdraw early. The purpose of the 
enhancements was to provide an incentive to remain with the insurer. However, the 
enhanced rates were linked to the ongoing payment of commissions, so if the policy was 
cashed in early, the enhancement would be wiped out: ‘Some people have extra charges 
built in to their contracts. People who have a contract 15 years ago…would have got an 
allocation value of more than 100% and that extra has been in there from day one and 
because you are [breaking the contract early], the [extra] is taken back….Contracts were 
built until retirement age and if you leave early there will be a clawback’.728   
 
3.13.3 Official responses 
The official responses to the criticisms raised over the issues of access and exit charges were 
swift in coming – from the FCA, TPR, HM Treasury and the Work and Pensions Select 
Committee. 
 
3.13.3.1 Financial Conduct Authority  
On 1 July 2015, the FCA announced that it had written to all pension providers requesting 
data on how customers were accessing their pension pots following Flexiday. The request 
                                                     
727
 Policies sold since 2000 tend not to include exit charges, since they unfairly restrict people to stay with a 
particular insurer, irrespective of the insurer’s investment performance. 
728
 Reported in Michelle McGagh (2015) Pensions: the savers left in the lurch by exit fee clampdown, Citywire, 
30 July. 
367 
 
for data includes a questionnaire seeking information on exit charges; transfer procedures; 
treatment of insistent clients; financial advice requirements; and the options they offer 
consumers seeking access to their pots. The announcement followed a request from 
Harriett Baldwin to Martin Wheatley, then FCA chief executive, to take action on the 
implementation of ‘freedom and choice’.729 
The move was widely welcomed in the press. Typical are these views from the Daily Mail: 
The pensions industry has been given one month to clean up its act over 
the treatment of older savers. 
Following a Daily Mail campaign, regulators have written to the chief 
executive of every pension provider to demand they hand over details of 
the fees they are charging customers to withdraw their savings. 
They have also been told to come clean about any other barriers customers 
face when they try to get hold of their money under the new pension 
freedoms. 
The Financial Conduct Authority has given companies until August 7 to 
declare the exit fees charged if people over 55 try to move to a more 
flexible scheme or a rival firm. 
They will also have to present evidence of what options they have been 
offering customers. 
If they fail to disclose the information, regulators could impose sanctions, 
which might include fines in the most serious cases.  
The demand by regulators follows concerns that millions of savers are 
being blocked from using the pension reforms. 
Since April, the over-55s have been able to cash in their pension for the 
first time rather than being forced to buy an annuity, a fixed monthly 
income for life. 
But the Mail discovered that excessive fees and other restrictions meant 
many were unable to use the full freedoms. 
While most were able to withdraw all their money in one go, many could 
not use their pension ‘like a bank account’ by taking it in chunks and 
keeping the rest invested. 
Some insurers refused to offer this flexibility, and then charged huge fees 
to move to a rival firm that did. 
                                                     
729 
Reported in Professional Pensions Online (2015) FCA writes to all pension providers over 'freedoms' access, 
1 July.  
368 
 
Last month the Mail launched its Play Fair On Pensions campaign, which 
called for providers and regulators to lift rules preventing people accessing 
their hard-earned savings.730 
 
3.13.3.2 The Pensions Regulator 
On 2 July 2015, TPR announced it had launched an investigation into exit charges and the DC 
scheme transfer process to complement the FCA’s investigation announced the previous 
day. It said it will survey a sample of schemes and the results will be used in a discussion of 
the broader ‘operational readiness, governance and member communications’ of schemes 
looking to provide flexible decumulation options. It also said that a similar investigation was 
taking place to understand the impact of pension freedoms on DB schemes, any subsequent 
risks and the application of its regulatory guidance. TPR said: ‘We remain committed to 
making pension flexibilities work in the interests of retirement savers and expect to conduct 
further research on decumulation, to include costs and charges, in the autumn. We will 
consider with Government and the FCA what further action may be required to promote 
good outcomes for members’. It said it was considering creating more prescriptive guidance 
for trustees communicating the pension freedoms to members of large schemes.731 
 
3.13.3.3 HM Treasury 
On 30 July 2015, the Treasury released a consultation document called Pension Transfers 
and Early Exit Charges.  
The consultation will: 732 
 consider the issues around early exit charges, to ensure that people are not facing 
unjustifiable charges when moving scheme or accessing their pension savings flexibly 
within their scheme as part of the new freedoms 
 seek views on how the process for transferring pensions from one scheme to 
another could be made quicker and smoother, and 
 explore issues and concerns in relation to the provision and need for financial advice 
when making certain transfers.  
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In particular, the Treasury wishes to consult on whether to place a cap on exit charges that 
may represent an ‘unreasonable barrier’ to accessing the pension pot. It has set out three 
proposals: 
1. A cap on all early exit fees – a blanket cap that would allow pension schemes to 
charge a fixed percentage of the value of the funds being transferred or a capped 
fixed amount. However, there is concern that a fixed amount would deter those with 
small pots from exiting 
2. A flexible cap – this would try and address the small pot issue, so pension providers 
would only be forced to use a cap over a ‘de minimis’ amount or tailor the fees to 
take into account small pots 
3. A voluntary fee – this would allow the pension industry to set exit fees and even 
waive fees in cases where they see fit.  
The Treasury’s concern is that ‘[w]here an individual wishes to access their pension under 
the new freedoms, they should be able to do so quickly and smoothly and the Government 
is concerned that exit charges may represent an unreasonable barrier to their doing so. For 
example, an exit charge might prevent an individual from accessing freedoms where the 
level of the charge represents a significant proportion of the funds being accessed, or where 
it is so high that even those with larger pots regard the level of the charge as prohibitive. In 
these circumstances, the level of the charge might be considered disproportionate and, 
therefore, unfair and excessive’. 
The consultation paper said: ‘Although many of these individuals will face charges that 
represent fair and reasonable charges to cover costs, the Government believes there is a 
high degree of overlap between transfer fees and exit charges and, in the case of the latter, 
would like to understand, in particular, whether and why some charges may be significantly 
higher than others’, adding that as many as one in ten savers in workplace schemes could be 
affected by charges when transferring their pension. 
The Treasury said there were ‘particular issues’ concerning certain pension products sold in 
the 1980s and 1990s: ‘In some cases, policyholders are reported to have been paying high 
annual management charges, with high exit penalties for switching to another provider. 
Although the majority of these schemes are now closed to new members, a significant 
number of these plans continue to operate for existing customers’. However, the 
consultation excludes pensions that have a ‘market value adjustment’ or ‘terminal bonus’ 
written into the contract. 
Claire Trott of Talbot and Muir said: ‘A consultation on high early exit penalties should be 
welcomed. There will be many people trapped in poor performing historic pensions that 
won’t be in a position to access their income in a flexible way without incurring excessive 
fees to do so. [However], the consultation should not miss the point that many of the 
historic charging structures were low in the early years because of these built-in exit 
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penalties and some companies will be out of pocket if they are forced to reduce the 
penalties. This doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t be looked into though. The constant changing 
of pensions legislation can be very costly for pension providers with large historic books and 
bringing in the changes expected by the Government in the short timescales given has been 
a challenge for many. The consultation needs to take into account the cost of providing the 
retirement options and how these differ between different retirement products. Running 
drawdown in a self-invested personal pension with a wide range of assets, such as 
commercial property and various other assets, will be significantly more time consuming 
than drawdown run in a basic personal pension with a range of mutual funds also run by the 
same provider. The consultation should look at value rather than outright cost’. 
Nevertheless, she felt that the exclusion of MVAs meant that there was ‘little need for the 
Government to legislate’.733  
Stephen Scholefield, pensions partner at Pinsent Masons, said, while tackling exit fees 
makes the Chancellor an ‘unlikely consumer champion’, it will not be enough to ensure the 
freedoms are successful: ‘To have real success, he'll need to create a safe-harbour 
environment in which providers can process transfers efficiently, whilst savers don't live to 
regret their decisions. Otherwise, ambulance chasers will be joining car retailers in looking 
to profit from those who cash out their pension savings’.734  
Some argued that there was a case for some form of exit charge. For example, Jamie Smith-
Thompson of Portal Financial agreed that exit fees up to 20% were punitive and excessive 
and therefore a cap would help to protect consumers. However, he was concerned that this 
could turn into a ‘witch-hunt on fees in their entirety’ and argued that exit fees could 
actually help protect savers: ‘It is not a requirement for all consumers to seek financial 
advice before emptying their fund or transferring away, which means many people will be 
able to make that decision by themselves without necessarily knowing about certain 
implications, such as tax or how it may affect their benefits. A sensible charge can 
encourage people to think twice and be really sure they are doing the right thing, and 
hopefully even prompt them to seek advice so they don't have any surprises’.735 
The Daily Telegraph reported that key pension providers had already held meetings with the 
FCA to lobby against a draconian cap being imposed on charges. The providers also wanted 
a coordinated approach so all firms reduce their fees at the same time to ensure that no 
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provider faced a sudden exodus of customers to rival companies, although it was recognised 
that this might breach competition law, since it could be classed as price fixing.736  
In January 2016, the Treasury announced that it will legislate to cap excessive early exit 
charges.737 The following month, it said that the cap would come into effect in March 2017. 
implementation target. The FCA will be responsible for setting the level of the cap and will 
consult fully on this in due course.738 
3.13.3.4 The Work and Pensions Select Committee  
On 17 July 2015, the Work and Pensions Select Committee announced it would launch an 
inquiry into the new advice and guidance regime. The committee wanted to hear evidence 
on the take-up, suitability, affordability and independence of the advice, guidance and 
information available to those approaching retirement. It also wanted to hear 
recommendations for improvement. Committee chairman, Frank Field MP, said: ‘Many 
constituents were ripped off in the process of putting their earnings into pension savings. 
We have a duty to ensure they are not ripped off again if they wish to take their money out 
and spend some lump sums’.  
Richard Graham MP, a member of the committee as well as chairman of the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group (APPG) on pensions, said: ‘Taking away the requirement to buy an 
annuity and introducing much greater flexibility in how and when individuals can access 
their pension savings should be a positive change for many. However getting the right 
guidance is key, and this inquiry will look at the guidance and advice being given, and how 
effective the system is in helping people make informed choices’.739 
In September 2015, the ABI’s Huw Evans told a Work and Pensions Select Committee inquiry 
hearing that likening pensions to bank accounts is the ‘most irresponsible’ thing anyone can 
say in relation to pensions freedom: ‘If I could rub a lamp “Aladdin-style” and have a few 
wishes, certainly one of them would be to stop people referring to pensions as a “bank 
account”. It is the most irresponsible thing anyone can say. You cannot attract a tax liability 
when you withdraw money from a bank account or set up a direct debit. You can if you 
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access pension liabilities. There is a piece [of work to be done] around customer 
expectations and we have to use the right language’.740 
The Work and Pensions Select Committee reported the results of its inquiry in October 
2015.741 It found that the Pension Wise website, which provides information and guidance 
on options at retirement, but not advice, was ‘not fit for purpose’. It also found a lack of 
regulatory clarity over the difference between ‘advice’ and ‘guidance’ which is putting 
savers at risk of poor decisions, ‘particularly in the affordable middle ground between free 
general guidance and expensive independent advice’. The report said that ‘Good quality, co-
ordinated and accessible guidance and advice will be the best tools to ensure people make 
the best, informed decisions about their retirement savings, and protect them from 
scammers…We call for clarification of the distinction between guidance and advice; the 
definitions of safeguarded benefits; and protections in providing advice to insistent clients. 
We also expect to see a reduction in the use of jargon and complex pricing structures’. 
 
3.14 Pension fraud and investment scams 
 
Red flags for spotting pension fraud 
 Any unsolicited approach: phone, email, text messages or in person 
 Free pension reviews, particularly from unregulated companies marketing early access 
to cash or guaranteed investments 
 Pushy advisers that encourage members to speed up signing paperwork, as well as the 
use of couriers to collect/sign paperwork 
 Any mention of loopholes, overseas or strange/creative/unique investments –  
unregulated investments, such as hotel rooms, car parking spaces, forestry, renewable 
energy, storage pods 
 Any mention of loans or bonuses provided by Government 
 An offer to help you access your pension savings before age 55 
 A recommendation to take a large amount of money, or your whole pension pot, in a 
lump sum and invest it. 
 Warnings that the deal is limited and you must act now 
 An encouragement not to get professional financial advice or talk to Pension Wise 
 Contact by somebody who is not on the FCA register 
Source: Retirement Advantage, reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Pension scam alert, Professional Adviser, 1 July. 
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Even with safeguards in place, many pension scheme members, especially those with large 
DB pension pots, have attracted the attention of scammers and con artists.742 Tom McPhail 
believes that cold-calling scammers are ‘going to take advantage of the Government-
sanctioned freedoms to persuade people that they can do better than investing in 
“traditional” pensions. In reality, many of these schemes will be nothing but a rip off.  They 
will use seductive offers of generous guaranteed returns. The two risks from this will be 
unexpected tax charges when they take money out of the pensions and then in some cases 
the loss of the rest of their money when the unregulated investments fail to live up to 
expectations’.743 Even the Pensions Minister at the time, Steve Webb, received a text 
message from a con artist on his mobile phone: ‘if you have a frozen pension prior to 55 you 
are entitled to a free review. Please call back’.744 
In October 2015, a survey commissioned by Portus Consulting, found that one in seven 
savers over the age of 55 has been targeted by a pensions scam since Flexiday. It also 
showed that 69% of those targeted said they were offered a free pension review. Over 27% 
said the suspected scam involved an exotic investment scheme, promising attractive levels 
of return. The most common method used by potential scammers to contact over-55s is by 
email (cited by 36% of the people interviewed), followed by the telephone (33%).745  
Con artists can be pushy and charming. Each year, they steal £1.2bn from investors, 
including pension liberation, an average loss of £20,000. They are drawn to the most 
vulnerable: those in debt and desperate for cash, or who are confused about the rules 
surrounding their pension. Margaret Snowdon, head of the Pension Liberation Industry 
Group (PLIG), says fraudsters are very difficult to identify: ‘They do tend to mimic legitimate 
schemes and providers. They are fairly clever or they would be easily found out. It is 
probably the patterns of behaviour that help identify them – cold calling for example, or 
pushy and threatening to sue on delays’. They have a background in either financial services, 
including ex-IFAs, accountants, solicitors, or in wealth or debt management. They invest in 
expensive marketing material and websites. 746    
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Jack Doyle and Sam Dunn provide this warning:747 
How crooks will target you 
Promised pension freedoms herald a bright new dawn for millions of 
savers. Unfortunately, they will also act as a clarion call for crooks to 
target millions of pounds about to be unlocked by the trusting and the 
unwary. 
The danger lies in scammers' ability to contact you by phone, text or email 
– and their persistence to wear you down. 
Their first approach is usually the most enticing. A text might typically offer 
a 'free pension review', 'one-off investment opportunity' or promise of 
'upfront cash'. 
But the minute you respond to the cold-caller, they'll begin to crank up the 
pressure. Their prize is your pension pot – and they need you to agree to 
sign a funds transfer form to get their hands on it. 
So the promises will come thick and fast. They might suggest juicy returns 
of 8 per cent or more, talk authoritatively about locking away cash in 
overseas investments or dangle cashback payments. 
To soothe fears, they may also claim to be a Government adviser or say 
they've been endorsed by officials. And while there will be talk of you, at 
55, having plenty of time to lock your money away, there will be no 
mention of the imminent tax bill you'll need to pay. The fee they'll charge, 
perhaps as high as 30 per cent, will be glossed over. 
It might take a dozen or so emails and phone calls – or even ten times that 
– but once you're hooked, they'll then push you to sign a transfer form as 
soon as possible. 
This may be sent to you by email as a form to fill in online or even 
couriered over to your front door. You'll be convinced it's a simple final 
matter of filling in the details of your existing pension scheme – usually its 
name and number. 
Legally, your original pension provider – usually an insurer – can only agree 
to transfer the money on the condition it will go straight to another 
registered pension plan. However, the scammers – acting as the broker – 
do no such thing. They'll take the money and then release only a chunk of it 
to you as a loan or cash sum. 
And once your funds are released from your insurer and into a new 
account – often overseas and outside UK jurisdiction or the arm of the 
regulator – then your chances of ever seeing the cash again will vanish. 
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You may find the scammer picks up the phone the first time you call to 
check up on your investment – but they won't be there the next time. 
As well as the hefty fee, HMRC will then slap you with a tax charge of up to 
55% because you've taken out an 'unauthorised payment' from your 
pension. 
Always check the credentials of the company and any advisers, who should 
be registered with the Financial Conduct Authority at fca.org.uk.  
If you think a company is trying to get you to liberate your pension, report 
the company to Action Fraud or call it on 0300 123 2040. It can prosecute 
companies found breaking the law. 
 
In April 2015, Citizens Advice warned that sophisticated fraudsters were targeting 'cash rich' 
retirees. It released a report Consumer Experience of Pension and Pensioner Scams before 
April 2015 which analysed 150 case reports from consumers made in the run up to the new 
pensions regime.748  It has identified five key types of pension scam: 
 Moving savings to a new pension 
 Fake investment opportunities 
 Offering free ‘advice’ or services 
 Charging for ‘dodgy’ services 
 Getting personal information from people. 
The report also identified cold calling as the most common means of initial contact (covering 
two-thirds of cases), although text messages, post, visiting in person and internet contact 
were also methods used by scammers. In some cases, multiple approaches were used: for 
example, phoning and then sending someone to their house, texting then phoning, or calling 
and then following up with letters. 
It said scammers used either a ‘carrot and stick’ approach or employed high-pressure 
tactics: ‘We’ve heard from many consumers who have been offered the chance to take 
advantage of a “tax loophole” or a “special investment rate”, while others have been told 
they’ve won lotteries despite never entering one. Pressure is often applied by saying that 
special offers are time limited, or by bombarding people with correspondence to catch them 
at a weak moment. To appear authentic, some scammers claim to be acting on behalf of a 
client’s pension provider. In other cases they use official sounding names like ‘the Pensions 
Office’ or say they are a Citizens Advice “pensions officer”’. 
In terms of human cost, the report said one person had lost £200,000 as a direct result of 
pension scams and added: ‘The money lost in a scam can mean the difference between a 
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comfortable retirement and a life on the breadline…. One consumer spoke for many when 
they said: “I feel really stupid to have given away my pension money to a crook on the 
phone”…. As well as direct losses, people can also lose through unexpected tax or benefit 
consequences’. 
In a follow-up report, Citizens Advice said that there is increasing evidence that fraudsters 
are using investment scams to target people’s pension pots. Scams include: 
 Unspecified financial products which see fraudsters offering to invest pension money 
in other products without explaining what those products are 
 Free pension ‘reviews’. People are texted or cold-called with offers of free pension 
reviews. Citizens Advice has had reports of fake-IFAs – who could not describe 
investments –  visiting homes 
 Investment schemes where victims are persuaded to invest money in property, or in 
fine wine. 
Gillian Guy, chief executive of Citizens Advice, said: ‘Pension scams threaten people's 
financial security. People are being targeted again and again with bogus investment offers 
or fraudulent pension opportunities. Opportunistic fraudsters are finding new ways to go 
after people's pension pots including offering free pension reviews and promising to invest 
in funds that don't necessarily exist. Pension and investment scams are particularly 
dangerous, as they can destroy people's entire pension pot, leaving them with little or no 
savings for retirement. We will be monitoring pension scams closely in order to track how 
they are evolving, and warn consumers what to look out for. If you've had an offer or signed 
up to a scheme you're unsure about, contact Citizens Advice for support’.749 
In March 2015, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) reported that it was 
investigating claims made by the Daily Mail that its reporters, posing as a cold-calling 
company, had bought a database containing information on the pensions, salaries and 
investments of 15,000 people for 5p a record. The ICO said it was making enquiries to 
establish whether there have been any breaches of the Data Protection Act or Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Regulations. It was also in contact with the police. The 
information was sold without consent, leaving these people vulnerable to fraudsters. The 
ICO also reported that it had received more than 1,000 complaints about pension-related 
spam texts, automated calls and cold-calling relating to pensions in the second half of 2014. 
According to the Pensions Regulator, pension scheme members have so far lost £500m via 
‘pension liberation’ scams, where companies illegally encourage people before the age of 55 
to transfer money from their pension fund into investments offering implausibly high 
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returns. These people end up not only losing their investment, they also have to repay the 
tax relief they receive.750   
In July 2014, TPR relaunched its ‘Scorpion’ campaign which warns consumers not to be 
‘stung’ by cold calls, text message spam or website offers claiming to be able to help them 
cash in their pension. The regulator is urging pension trustees and providers to include its 
leaflet in the next annual statement sent to members, and anyone who requests a transfer 
in the meantime. The campaign highlights cases where victims have lost thousands of 
pounds by being scammed into moving their retirement savings into unregulated high-risk 
or bogus investments. One woman, whose 40-year-old son took his own life after never 
receiving a promised £17,000 lump sum following the transfer of his £42,000 work pension, 
said: ‘I don’t want other mothers to suffer what I’ve been through, and what my family has 
been through. No matter how desperate things get, don’t be tempted to cash in your 
pension. Don’t do it –  the people behind these scams are rogues who exploit people’s 
vulnerabilities’. Another 49-year-old scam victim, who is potentially facing an £18,000 tax 
bill and risks losing her home after falling victim to a ‘pension loan’ scam said: ‘These scams 
target vulnerable people. I feel very angry that I have been misled. Ignore the sales patter, 
ignore the glossy websites, ignore the cold calls and text messages. Go to an independent 
financial adviser – speak to an expert’.751,752 
In October 2014, the FCA launched ScamSmart, a campaign to alert people to the dangers of 
‘scammers offering opportunities that are too good to be true’. The Treasury has made it a 
criminal offence for anyone to pretend to offer Pension Wise guaranteed guidance. In July 
2015, the FCA provided updated figures on ScamSmart. Around 100,000 people had visited 
the ScamSmart website since October last year. Around 20% had checked an investment 
through the warning list.753 
In March 2015, the Pension Liberation Industry Group introduced a code of good practice 
for combating pension scams:754 ‘The Code of Good Practice is voluntary and sets an 
industry standard for dealing with requests by members for transfers from a UK registered 
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pension scheme to another registered pension scheme or Qualifying Recognised Overseas 
Pension Scheme. 
The Code is aimed at trustees, administrators and providers and sets out industry standard 
due diligence to follow when considering a transfer request. The legislation relating to 
transfers is not prescriptive as to due diligence that trustees/providers should carry out on 
transfer applications’. 
The Code operates according to the following three principles: 
1. Trustees, providers and administrators should raise awareness of pension scams for 
members and beneficiaries of their scheme. 
2. Trustees, providers and administrators should have robust, but proportionate, 
processes for assessing whether a receiving scheme may be operating as part of a 
pension scam, and for responding to that risk. 
3. Trustees, providers and administrators should generally be aware of the known 
current strategies of the perpetrators of pension scams in order to inform the due 
diligence they need to undertake and refer to the warning flags as indicated in the 
Regulator’s Guidance, FCA alerts and Action Fraud. 
In May 2015, the FCA issued a warning announcing that fraudsters were using the details of 
the firms it authorises, such as their 'firm reference number' (FRN), in an attempt to 
convince customers that they work for a genuine, authorised firm. This followed a similar 
announcement in April about a scam firm which used the details of investment manager 
BlackRock to defraud investors. The regulator pointed out that investors who give money to 
unauthorised firms have no recourse to the FSCS or the FOS if they lose their money.755 
There is even a case of a fraudster, who goes by the name William Howarth, pretending to 
be calling from the FCA.756 There are fraudsters pretending to be from National Savings & 
Investments who are cold calling pensioners and trying to sell them ‘pensioner bonds'.757  
In July 2015, the BBC reported that fraudsters had built a database of around 200,000 
people –  with an average age of 74  – on so-called ‘suckers lists’. Almost 11,000 of them had 
already lost an average of £1,184 each.758 Also in July 2015, provider Retirement Advantage 
reported the results of a YouGov survey that it commissioned which showed that 17% of 
over 50s and 20% of over 55s had been approached by a company offering to ‘help' them 
access their pension savings early, typically via a legal loopholes or a one-off investment 
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opportunity. Andrew Tully, pensions technical director at Retirement Advantage, said: ‘It is 
clear that there are already scammers preying on people who might like the idea of using 
the new pension freedoms to take large amounts of cash from their pension schemes. The 
scammers may be offering get-rich-quick schemes or even early access before age 55 to 
trick people out of their hard-earned savings. Retirees need to be on their guard: if an 
opportunity sounds too good to be true, it almost certainly is. It is vital that the Government 
and financial industry work together to ensure all practical measures possible are in place to 
protect people from these scams. We need to make people aware that there are fraudsters 
hoping to trick them out of their money. Hopefully Pension Wise will help educate people 
around the risks, but professional financial advice will be crucial to ensure people 
understand the options available to them and make the right decision for their personal 
circumstances. The Government also needs to make life difficult for the scammers, and 
punish those found guilty of preying on innocent victims’.  The ABI’s campaign Your 
Retirement, Your Choice also aims to prevent people avoid pension scams by helping them 
understand their options better.759 
There is also evidence of an increased number of frauds using prominent financial addresses 
in the heart of the City of London. The City of London police force said it was struggling to 
cope with the increased number of cases being reported and it now concerned about the 
City’s own reputation. It said that it has already investigated dozens of individuals, and has 
identified at least 14 different criminal groups.760 
Even if the investment opportunities being offered are not scams, they can be unregulated 
which can be equally risky. An example of this is the case of Capital Alternatives and the 
schemes it promoted – Capital Carbon Credits (later renamed Reforestation Projects) and 
African Land – which the FCA claimed were deliberately structured to avoid regulation. Most 
investment funds are collective investment schemes (CIS), where investors pool their assets 
and have these managed by an independent fund manager, and most are regulated. The 
promotion and operation of a CIS is a regulated activity and cannot be lawfully carried out 
by anyone who is not authorised by the FCA. Capital Alternatives is not authorised by the 
FCA. In June 2013, the FCA banned the promotion and sale of unregulated collective 
investment schemes (UCIS) to most retail investors in the UK, the exceptions being certified 
high net worth individuals, certified sophisticated investors, and self-certified sophisticated 
investors. Capital Alternatives denied that its schemes were CIS or UCIS and took the FCA to 
court. In March 2015, the Court of Appeal agreed with the FCA that the Capital Alternatives 
schemes met the definition of CIS, namely that investors' monies was pooled and the 
investments were managed centrally. Capital Alternatives appealed to the Supreme Court 
which in August 2015 confirmed that Capital Alternatives’ schemes were in fact UCIS and 
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hence cannot be sold to unsophisticated UK investors. Tobias Haynes of Regulatory Legal 
said: ‘The decision of the Supreme Court is a welcome one, and one which is a true 
consumer victory. The decision opens up the doorway to many vulnerable investors who 
otherwise would have no recourse. This is particularly the case where SIPP providers have 
allowed retail investors to invest directly into UCIS without having first been satisfied that 
the consumer was properly certified as a high-net-worth or sophisticated investor’.761  
The Personal Finance Society has warned about the dangers of consumers becoming 
confused about the difference between regulated and non-regulated financial advice as a 
result of the ‘inevitable wave of non-regulated scammers’ capitalising on ‘freedom and 
choice’. It called for greater oversight of non-regulated advice. Keith Richards, chief 
executive, said: ‘The public generally do not understand the difference between regulated 
and unregulated activities and, in fairness, should not be expected to. They are, therefore, 
more exposed to scammers, fraudsters and opportunists who often look like regulated firms 
or processes….The increasing danger of consumers finding their way into unregulated 
activity is worrying. It is now time for all activity to come under the same umbrella, to 
provide consistency of standards and consumer protection’.762  
In August 2015, Portal Financial published the results of a survey which appear to show that 
consumer education campaigns around spotting financial scams and finding financial advice 
were not working. The results of the survey of 1,000 people over the age of 55 in four 
regions across the UK are shown in Table 3.7. Jamie Smith Thompson said: ‘The result raises 
questions over the effectiveness of the MAS and Pension Wise awareness campaigns, but it 
also highlights the problem that, at the moment, you can't simply use the message “go to a 
regulated company and you will be protected” for every financial product. MAS and Pension 
Wise's job would be easier if that were the case. Until legislation is changed to bring all 
financial product sales under the regulatory umbrella it is going to be hard for the man in 
the street to tell a sophisticated scam from a genuine service. The current system of 
identifying and shutting down scam companies can take a very long time, which in turn 
means more people can be affected’.763 
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Table 3.7: Portal Financial survey concerning financial scams and financial advice 
Question  Midlands 
and Wales  
North & 
Scotland  
Northern 
Ireland  
South  
Have you ever been contacted 
by a company that you felt 
could be running a financial 
scam? 
Yes: 50% 
No: 50% 
Yes: 51% 
No: 49% 
Yes: 69% 
No: 31% 
Yes: 55% 
No: 45% 
Are you confident that you 
could tell the difference 
between a scam and a genuine 
offer from a regulated 
company? 
Yes: 59% 
No: 41% 
Yes: 58% 
No: 42% 
Yes: 46% 
No: 54% 
Yes: 63% 
No: 37% 
Have you noticed an increase in 
the volume of pension-related 
sales calls in the last month or 
so? 
Yes: 40% 
No: 60% 
Yes: 43% 
No: 57% 
Yes: 77% 
No: 23% 
Yes: 33% 
No: 67% 
If you wanted accurate financial 
advice on the pension reforms, 
would you know where to go? 
Yes: 73% 
No: 27% 
Yes: 80% 
No: 20% 
Yes: 54% 
No: 46% 
Yes: 77% 
No: 23% 
Source: Portal Financial 
 
As a consequence of investment scams, compensation payouts from the FSCS jumped 156% 
in 2015 compared with the previous year to £183.1m. The average payout rose from £5,136 
to £8,855. Mark Neale, chief executive at FSCS, said: ‘Many savers had been poorly advised 
to move pension savings from safe workplace schemes to risky investments’.764  
The Pensions Ombudsman (PO) deals with member objections to transfer requests that 
have been blocked by providers who suspect members could become a victim of fraud. The 
PO’s rulings have been consistent in stating that scheme administrators cannot block a 
member's request where there is a statutory right to transfer and that right will only exist 
where it has been established that the receiving scheme is a properly established and 
registered arrangement. Geoff Egerton, associate at Linklaters, said: ‘You do your due 
diligence. And you do your work to make sure that you've flagged the warnings from The 
Pensions Regulator's guidance, which says you should satisfy yourselves that this isn't a 
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pensions liberation vehicle. But once you've done all that, if the right exists, there has to be 
a transfer’.765 
There are also concerns about pensioners cashing in their annuities, and the introduction of 
the secondary annuity market was pushed back from 2016 to 2017 as a consequence of 
these concerns. Providers have warned about the ‘terrible consequences for elderly 
policyholders if the changes are pushed through before the right safeguards are in 
place….[M]any people would be offered a very low value for their annuity and could face 
rip-off charges to cash it in’. The ABI recognised the plan for a secondary annuity market 
'poses a risk'. Dr Yvonne Braun, of the ABI, said: 'Naturally there are considerable challenges 
in establishing a functioning market, [with] many unresolved complex legal, regulatory and 
prudential questions. We urge the Government not to rush these proposals through for 
2016’. The ABI said more clarity was needed around how a partner would be protected if 
someone sold a joint life annuity. Also those selling their annuities would include vulnerable 
older people with 'reduced mental capacity'. In addition, the ABI was concerned about how 
the Government would 'protect people from scams and fraud'.766 
 
3.15 Customer engagement, customer communications and customer responsibility 
3.15.1 Customer engagement 
One key problem with auto-enrolment is that it does not require any customer engagement. 
However, the new pension regime will not work well without engagement. This could be a 
serious problem, since as Nigel Aston, head of DC at State Street Global Adviser, says: 
‘”Freedom and choice” legislation hasn’t suddenly created a population of self-empowered, 
interested, financially savvy people….[However], all the research points to the fact that they 
can make really good decisions…but they can only do it when they’ve been given some sort 
of guidance and better products’.  
A survey of trustees and pension managers at nine trust- and contract-based DC schemes 
was carried out by Spence Johnson on behalf of the Defined Contribution Investment Forum 
(DCIF) in March 2015. This confirmed that their biggest challenge is improving engagement 
with members to ensure people understood what they wanted. The schemes agreed that 
engagement was much more difficult than choosing an investment solution which one 
respondent said was ‘quite simple’. The schemes had developed straightforward 
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communications on the impact of the pension freedoms, but are looking for tools that can 
help them improve longer term engagement.767   
We know that in other areas of economic activity, particularly those involving immediate 
gratification, people can become engaged and put the necessary effort in. An example put 
to us was holiday planning. The more effort put in, the better the holiday. We need to find a 
comparable way of engaging people in retirement planning, so that more effort gets better 
outcomes. 
There is also an important question about the best time to begin the engagement process. 
According to a survey by Mercer, 52% of employers and trustees believed the guidance 
guarantee should be offered 5-7 years before retirement, 32% when the member chooses, 
15% when they take their first pension and only 1% at retirement. The following are typical 
of the majority view: ‘It’s too late at retirement. It needs to be considerably earlier to 
ensure adequate money is going in, and the correct investment strategy is being applied to 
the potential decumulation option to be used’ (John Chilman, First Group) and ‘We believe 
that pension guidance should start a lot earlier than a year or two prior to retirement and 
needs to be part of an integrated approach to improve financial awareness and 
understanding in the workforce’ (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development).768 
For the plan to be effective, there needs to be a set of key decision dates both before and 
after the plan begins: 
 10 years prior to the nominated implementation date to confirm whether a de-
risking glidepath is required and, if so, when it needs to begin 
 1 year prior to the nominated implementation date to re-confirm commencement 
date 
 Age 74 to review death benefits 
 Ages 80 and 85 to confirm implementation of longevity insurance (i.e., switch to 
annuitisation if drawdown was used at the implementation date). 
 
3.15.2 Customer communications 
The FCA believes that customer engagement can be increased by better communications 
with customers. In June 2015, it issued a discussion paper called Smarter Consumer 
Communications.769 The DP begins by arguing that information, while important, is not 
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enough: there needs to be better communications with customers. In the introduction to 
the DP, Christopher Woolard said: 
Like many other regulators, we have relied heavily on information to help 
ensure greater consumer protection and make competition work. In some 
cases, we specify the type of information firms should disclose to 
customers and the format it should take. We will continue to do this where 
we feel it is necessary to improve outcomes for consumers. 
We recognise, however, that information itself does not necessarily 
empower the consumer. Our work on behavioural economics has clearly 
shown it can overwhelm, confuse, distract or even deter people from 
making effective choices if presented in a way people struggle to engage 
with. We can begin to understand why consumers often fail to make good 
decisions about financial products and services, when we take into account 
that: 
 behavioural biases, low levels of financial literacy and the 
complexity of some financial services and products can limit 
people’s ability to take appropriate action 
 firms tend to use financial and legal jargon, which can make the 
materials they produce lengthy and impenetrable for the consumer 
 in some firms, marketing material is much more consumer focused 
than other consumer communications. 
Communications play a fundamental role in helping consumers to make 
informed decisions. Effective, engaging information can be a key tool in 
promoting effective competition to supply products and services that 
consumers want. Greater transparency in firms’ communications with 
consumers can also lead to greater efficiency for the industry, with less 
time spent handling complaints. 
Effective, engaging information is also already integral to our regulatory 
approach: we require firms to have due regard to the information needs of 
their customers, and to communicate information in a way that is clear, 
fair and not misleading. While some firms may feel they already do this, 
from what we have seen in our research, thematic reviews and market 
studies, it is evident most firms need to do more to communicate with 
consumers in a way that truly empowers them to make effective decisions. 
We expect all firms to embed an organisation-wide culture where the 
importance of communicating effectively with consumers is recognised and 
prioritised. The information needs of potential customers need to be fully 
considered when developing a product or service and throughout the 
lifecycle of that product or service. 
We are committed to driving improvements in the effectiveness of the 
information consumers receive about the financial products and services 
they have or want to buy. This DP is intended to kick start a debate around 
how the FCA, industry, consumer groups and other stakeholders can work 
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together to deliver information to consumers in smarter and more effective 
ways, including adopting innovative techniques as we move away from the 
paper-based mindset. 
 
In the DP, the FCA reiterates its expectation that firms: 
 understand and recognise the importance of communicating effectively with 
consumers 
 create product and service information for consumers with at least as much 
behaviourally informed creativity as is applied to business development, marketing 
and financial promotions 
 create communications as an integral part of the product or service design process. 
It acknowledges that many firms are doing this and it signals its support and encouragement 
for firms that are: 
 writing for the consumer first and then ensuring communications are compliant, 
rather than the other way round 
 moving away from a box-ticking approach to communication design, or the 
perception that communications driven by regulation are the responsibility of 
compliance and legal staff 
 building a wider understanding of their customers’ information needs and 
objectively considering not only what consumers actively demand to know, but also: 
o what the consumer needs to know 
o how much they need to know 
o when they need to know it 
 prioritising efforts to ensure that information is effective for the intended audience 
and testing communications among real consumers 
 adopting innovative techniques to improve how key information about products is 
conveyed and delivered to consumers.  
The FCA said it was pleased with the good practices and innovative approaches to 
communicating effectively with consumers that it saw emerging in some firms. This included 
firms that: 
 designed communications to meet the needs of the product or service’s target 
market 
 ensured their communications effectively delivered the key information to 
consumers by, for example, using plain language, a clear and short format, bullet 
points and clear graphics 
 provided information at a time consumers need it and in an engaging format 
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 developed interactive communications, harnessing technology such as mobile 
devices, tablets, apps, social media, YouTube and online tools to ensure key 
information was more accessible to consumers. 
One problem area that the FCA identified was communication about charges to consumers. 
It noted that the compounding impact which charges have on investment returns over the 
long term ‘can be a difficult concept for some consumers to understand’.  It identified 
Nutmeg as an example for other firms to follow in terms of ‘presenting this [impact] 
graphically, with a clear explanation’.  
 
Figure 3.4: FCA-proposed label for the services offered by firms derived from the US 
Environmental Protection Agency’s ‘fuel economy' label’ 
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Figure 3.5: FCA-proposed label for  firms’ charges schedule derived from the US 
Environmental Protection Agency’s ‘fuel economy' label’ 
 
 
 
The FCA said it also liked the idea of  disclosure ‘labels’ to outline firms’ charges and the 
type of advice they offer to consumers. It pointed to the 'fuel economy label' designed by 
the US Environmental Protection Agency which has been on display on all new cars in the US 
since 2008 and which it adapted in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. 
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3.15.3 How responsible is the consumer? 
The regulatory tension between the econ and human view of the customer was clearly 
demonstrated by Martin Wheatley, then chief executive of the FCA, speaking at the NAPF 
investment conference in Edinburgh on 11 March 2015.770  
He said consumers will be liable for their decisions in retirement as long as the industry 
complies with conduct rules and standards which involve informing customers about the 
Pension Wise guidance service and about regulated advisers, and giving personalised risk 
warnings to people wishing to access their pension pots. He added: 
Certainly, under the system as it will be, there will be no ability to prevent 
all of the people, all of the time from making “sub-optimal” decisions. 
Some savers, come 55, will invariably head to Las Vegas, buy fast cars or 
otherwise calculate how to run down their pension pots in days and 
months, rather than years. Optimists will be inclined to believe that these 
numbers will be fractional. Pessimists that they may be more significant. 
But the reality is that this is all simply part of the process that flows from 
the benefit of freedom. Some responsibility, by definition, has to bump 
across from industry to customers otherwise you simply return to difficult 
conversations around why policy makers should, in effect, decide how 
savers draw their money. 
Come April 6, what you will have is a structure under which customers will, 
on seeking access to their pensions, immediately be recommended to seek 
guidance – via Pension Wise or financial advice. After which, when a 
decision has been made, the system will effectively have a further check, if 
necessary triggering a personalised risk warning. Allowing a final 
opportunity for people to assess the wisdom of their choice. [With all this 
in place, customers] will be in a position to make what are, clearly, life-
influencing decisions on future income, with some confidence that the 
structure behind their choice is sound. 
Yet Mr Wheatley left open some doubt about where responsibility ultimately lies:  
It is perfectly reasonable for firms to question where accountability 
eventually lies if you end up in a situation where X percentage of 
consumers refuse to listen to any guidance or risk warnings given. Who, 
ultimately, is to blame if – 10 to 15 years on from now – those people 
regret whatever choice they’ve made, or complain they weren’t properly 
guided? And actually at that point, it becomes difficult to sensibly argue 
that individual consumers shouldn’t accept responsibility. Nor, I think, 
would wider society expect otherwise. [Under the new system, there will be 
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a] division of responsibility [between consumers, firms and policy makers 
that is] a long way from today’s annuity-based system. 
 
3.16  Monitoring outcomes 
Monitoring outcomes under the ‘freedom and choice’ pension reforms will be a crucial part 
of assessing the success of the reforms.  
Yet, as pointed out in a briefing note released by Just Retirement in June 2015, the 
Government has put no monitoring mechanism in place.771 The briefing note states: ‘Our 
primary concern is the lack of a co-ordinated and comprehensive forward plan for 
monitoring the impact of the reforms on consumer outcomes, both in the early stages and 
over the longer term. This is important because of known problems with consumers’ 
engagement with pensions and retirement planning decisions which have led to negative 
outcomes for consumers…The Government accepts it cannot predict the outcome of the 
reforms and has made clear that individuals are responsible for their decisions. Nonetheless, 
it will be important to monitor the available data in order to understand developing norms, 
and to help prevent consumer detriment likely to result from poor financial capability, 
disengagement and the impact of financial scams’. 
The briefing note identifies the following information sources that will be crucial inputs into 
any evaluation of the success of the reforms: 
 Take-up rates for Pension Wise; the characteristics of the consumers using the 
service; details of what people do next after exiting the service; and the outcomes 
for those who do not choose to use Pension Wise 
 Data collected by the ABI and FCA will be crucial indicators of early trends. The ABI 
collects sales data from its members, though this does not cover the full range of 
providers across the wider financial services industry and so is limited. By contrast 
the FCA (and before that the Financial Services Authority) has been receiving product 
sales data from all regulated firms since 2005, providing a basic but complete data 
set from which to analyse product purchase outcomes. 
However, the data collected by the FCA does not currently capture certain information, such 
as the rate of cash withdrawals from DC pension savings, type of annuity (e.g., joint or single 
life, enhanced or standard, level or escalating/inflation-linked), or details of the risk profile 
or funds invested through income drawdown contracts at the time of purchase. The briefing 
note states that: ‘These data points are important in the context of the pension reforms due 
to known shortcomings in financial engagement and capability, especially in relation to 
                                                     
771 
Just Retirement (2015) Briefing note on the need for adequate monitoring of pension reform outcomes, 
June. 
390 
 
retirement choices. Consumer analysis, including the FCA’s own thematic work on the 
retirement market, has shown that consumers are often ill informed or make decisions 
without being aware of better options, with the outcome often irreversible. Common 
examples include individuals failing to consider their dependant’s needs and opting for a 
single life annuity instead of a joint-life policy, or buying a standard annuity without realising 
the significantly higher income provided by enhanced annuities. The potential risk of mis-
selling and mis-buying has increased with the new options available since April 6 [2015], and 
new risks, such as the potential for individuals to unknowingly trigger a large tax charge on 
lump sum withdrawals’. 
The briefing note identifies the monitoring gaps that need to be closed in order to fully 
assess the success of the pension reforms: 
The concerns outlined above emphasise the need for substantive data on a 
range of key measures without which regulators and the Government will 
be unable to monitor outcomes in the new pensions environment. 
Compared to the depth of information required for non-retirement 
products such as mortgages, the FCA’s present retirement product data 
collection is minimal and will not be sufficient to monitor consumer 
outcomes in the new environment. 
Similarly, the Treasury has yet to set out any plans for the collection and 
publication of data on the feedback from Pension Wise users. This will be 
an important measure, providing basic user feedback on the service itself, 
its quality and whether it is succeeding in helping individuals navigate the 
new pension freedoms. 
 In addition to collecting this feedback on Pension Wise, data on the wider 
outcomes for all retirees must be captured to understand the longer-term 
impact of the reforms. This must also include proper assessment of the 
impact of at-retirement processes for consumers including product 
provider behaviour and the adequacy of regulatory protections including 
the second line of defence or ‘retirement risk warnings’.  
 
The briefing note ends by arguing: ‘The need to collect and then aggregate a range of inputs 
including Pension Wise user data, FCA sales data and intelligence from regulators’ thematic 
and supervisory work, points to the wider need to coordinate these various activities. 
Addressing these intelligence gaps will allow policymakers to identify and address potential 
consumer detriment at an early stage, enabling the Treasury, FCA and TPR to refine the 
regulatory and policy framework, and by so doing ensure the reforms benefit consumers’. 
The Aon DC Survey, published in November 2015, indicated that achieving better member 
outcomes was a top priority for DC schemes (suggested by 57% of respondents). This was 
followed by communications (46%) and increased member engagement (45%). 
Nevertheless, Sophia Singleton, head of DC Consulting at Aon Hewitt, said that schemes 
needed to put practical steps in place if they are to meet these objectives: ‘Now is the time 
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to re-set the DC agenda. If schemes are serious about the ambition to achieve better 
member outcomes, then they need to start setting clear targets and putting plans in place 
to achieve them. They must also set and measure themselves against clear key performance 
indicators to ensure their intentions become reality’.772  
In October 2015, the Work and Pensions Select Committee also reported773 that it was 
concerned about the lack of Government data on ‘freedom and choice’. It said that the 
available statistics were ‘unacceptable’ and asked the Government to do more to shed light 
on the impact of the reforms. Specifically, the committee wants regulators to collect 
information on: customer characteristics of those using freedoms from pot size to sources 
of retirement income; take-up of each channel of guidance; reasons for not taking up 
guidance and advice; and subsequent decisions made and reasons for those decisions.  
Apparently, the Government is relying on incomplete HMRC data to assess the reforms.  
Tom McPhail said there is ‘considerable disquiet’ about Government vigilance over the 
policy and a lack of early warning systems about unintended consequences: ‘HMRC has 
published some very superficial data, which was underwhelming. Either they are not getting 
much data or they are not sharing it. Either way, it doesn’t look good. The Treasury appears 
to have been surprisingly blasé about the consequences of reform, which are approached 
from an ideological standpoint….There are longstanding divisions in the system [such as, the 
division of pension policy between DWP and the Treasury] which exacerbate the data 
problem. Why has no one sought to mitigate the divisions and bring all data sources into 
one helicopter view for what is going in UK retirement savings?’.774  
Frank Field MP, chair of the Select Committee, said: ‘Reluctance to provide information 
about how a reform or service is working is rarely a good sign. It is very difficult for the 
Government to support its claims that all is well, or for us to make any assessment of 
progress, when no data are forthcoming despite repeated requests. The scarcity of 
information regarding Pension Wise, in particular, is not conducive to effective scrutiny. The 
committee repeats its call for Government to address these omissions urgently, and 
particularly to introduce a research programme tracking consumer outcomes…. We have 
seen all too clearly, too many times, what happens when financial information is not 
properly provided and regulated’. The committee also said the Pension Wise website was 
‘not fit for purpose’ and that the lack of regulatory clarity over what is ‘advice’ and 
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‘guidance’ is putting savers at risk of poor decisions. Nick Thomas-Symonds, shadow 
Pensions Minister, said the report showed the Government was failing to protect and 
inform consumers: ‘Since pension freedoms have been introduced, money lost through 
scam activity has increased. Labour is urging the Government to look very closely at this 
report and act now in order to avert the next great mis-selling scandal’.775  
However, Martin Tilley, director of technical services at Dentons Pensions Management, has 
described the claims by the Select Committee that pensions freedom could be the next ‘mis-
selling scandal' in financial services as a misplaced attack on providers and advisers. He said: 
‘The industry wasn't consulted about the changes before they were announced, didn't ask 
for them and has been criticised at every turn for not adopting the changes more quickly 
and charging too much to implement them: the latter sometimes in campaigns by national 
journals who are happy to print popular opinion without understanding the facts. By using 
the phrase ‘mis-selling', I'd suggest this is a similarly ill-addressed attack’. Mr Tilley added 
that customers are now able to do things that might not be in their best interest ‘not 
because the industry is selling it, simply because legislation now allows it’.776 
 
3.17 The self-employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment 
There are two groups not eligible for auto-enrolment: the self-employed and non-eligible 
job holders for the purpose of auto-enrolment. 
There are around 4.5m (i.e., 17% of the 26.3m employed population, up from 8% in 1980) 
who are self-employed777 and around 6.2m (24%) non-eligible job holders.778 This means 
that around 11m people working in the UK will not be auto-enrolled onto any pension 
scheme. There are, however, a number of problems with interpreting these figures which 
should be noted. For example, the definitions used by ONS for employment categories are 
different from those applied by TPR for auto-enrolment, which include ‘eligible jobholders’, 
‘non-eligible jobholders’ and ‘entitled workers’. In addition, permanent employment, 
contract employment in the workplace and self-employment are not mutually exclusive 
categories. On average, people change jobs 10 or 11 times during their working lives. This 
can include periods of permanent employment (where the individual is eligible for auto-
                                                     
775 
Reported in Josephine Cumbo (2015) MPs warn of pension changes ‘endangering savers’, Financial Times, 
19 October. 
776
 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) MPs' pensions freedom mis-selling warning is ‘ill-addressed' attack, 
Professional Adviser, 19 October. 
777
 Source: ONS, https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/gor/2092957698/report.aspx,  
778 
The Pensions Regulator (2015) Automatic Enrolment: Declaration of Compliance Report, April;  
http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/automatic-enrolment-declaration-of-compliance-monthly-
report.pdf 
393 
 
enrolment), periods of non-eligible employment (where the employment contract renders 
them ineligible for auto-enrolment), and periods of self-employment.  
The Royal Society of Arts (RSA) recently published two reports on the self-employed.779 
Between the 2008 recession and 2014, more than 500,000 people have become self-
employed, accounting for more than half of all jobs created during this period.780 Five key 
trends are discernible in this boom in self-employment: 
 The rise of one-person businesses – 95% of new micro-businesses (which employ 
between 0 and 9 employees) started since 2000 have no employees; one-person 
businesses now account for 75% of all businesses in the UK 
 The growth of part-time self-employment – the number of self-employed people 
working less than 30 hours a week has increased by 60% since 2000, compared with 
a 20% increase in full-time self-employment over the same period 
 The increasing importance of self-employment outside of London – for instance, 92% 
of all new jobs in the North West since 2000 have been in self-employment 
 The changing demographic of the self-employed – the biggest growth areas in self-
employment have been among women, the under 25s and older people. The 
number of self-employed people over 65 has increased by 140% since 2000. 
 The uniqueness of the boom to the UK – the UK is an outlier amongst developed 
countries: self-employment has fallen in Germany, Canada and the US since 2008. 
In terms of the self-employed’s pension arrangements, there is some information contained 
in these RSA studies, as well as two other reports from the Resolution Foundation781 and 
from Scottish Widows.782  
The RSA studies found that the self-employed are half as likely as employees to contribute 
to a private pension. They also typically have a pension pot that is half the size at the point 
of retirement: according to the Wealth and Assets Survey, 55–64 year-olds in self-
employment have a median private pension pot of £50,000, compared with £98,700 for 
those in a typical job. One key reason for this difference is the self-employed people do not 
benefit from employer contributions: according to Prudential, those who choose to work for 
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themselves forego an average of £91,500 in employer contributions over their lifetime. The 
self-employed also tend to start saving at a relatively late age, with less than 15% of self-
employed 25–34 year-olds contributing to a private pension.  
The latter two reports found that pension membership for the self-employed has fallen 
significantly behind that of employees, but only since 1998. Scottish Widows, for example, 
found that 39% of self-employed people (as well as 30% of employees working in a small 
business) were saving nothing for retirement in 2015, up from 23% the previous year. The 
Resolution Foundation report found that the self-employed who run businesses with 
employees (17% of the total) are much better prepared for retirement than those who work 
for themselves without additional support. The former can either sell their business or keep 
it and draw an income. In many cases, the self-employed were previously employees and 
can therefore expect some occupational or personal pension income when they retire.  
The RSA studies also found that many self-employed people have made an active decision 
not to contribute to a personal pension. Instead, they will use ISAs to provide for their 
retirement. Data from the Wealth and Assets Survey shows that 55% of households with a 
self-employed worker have savings in an ISA (averaging £17,000, compared with £8,000 for 
employee-only households). These studies point out that, although ISAs give people more 
flexibility, large ISA savings may adversely affect their benefit entitlements under Universal 
Credit. 
In September 2015, the PPI published a briefing note on those who were ineligible for auto-
enrolment.783 There are three main reasons why 6.2m people are ineligible for auto-
enrolment: 
 3.5m (57% of the total) earn below the £10,000 Earnings Threshold because they 
work part-time.784 
 1.8m (29%) are below age 22. 
 843,000 (14%) are above state pension age. 
Most (2.7m) of the 3.5m people earning below £10,000 are women. Some of the 3.5m will 
have a number of part-time jobs and may have a combined annual income above £10,000. 
However, the qualification for auto-enrolment is assessed on a ‘per job’ basis. Two other 
groups that that fail the eligibility criteria are the disabled and carers. Around 30% of 
disabled workers (649,000 people) earn less than £10,000. Similarly, around 81% of 
employed carers are ineligible, including 35,000 who earn below £10,000. 
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Both the self-employed and non-eligible job holders will benefit in due course from the 
single-tier state pension. Similarly, members of both groups could join NEST which has a 
public service obligation to take on anyone who applies, but only around 800 self-employed 
people have done so to date. However, it is more likely that, if they do make any pension 
arrangements, this will be through the retail market. But we could find no accurate data on 
the combined number of the self-employed or non-eligible job holders with individual DC 
policies.  Similarly, when it comes to decumulation, it is likely that these groups will fail to 
benefit from institutional value-for-money solutions and instead will have to rely on the 
high-cost retail market. 
The Resolution Foundation report argues: ‘Taken together, the evidence suggests there is a 
case for greater intervention to ensure the self-employed are adequately prepared for their 
later years’. A similar case could be made for non-eligible job holders. The PPI briefing note 
finds that ‘if the income from both first and second jobs was taken into account when 
assessing eligibility for automatic enrolment, then a further 80,000 people (60,000 women 
and 20,000 men) would earn enough to meet the qualifying criteria’. 
The RSA reports do not, however, believe that auto-enrolment into NEST or another of the 
larger master trust schemes is a sensible solution due to the administrative challenges of 
dealing with the irregular and volatile incomes the self-employed tend to have, but also 
because of the clear preference amongst many of them to have flexible access to their 
savings. Instead, the RSA proposes the following two options: 
 Present a ‘compulsory question’ for enrolment onto a pension or ISA scheme 
o The Government should present the self-employed with a compulsory 
question asking them whether they wish to join a workplace pension scheme 
and/or a Government-backed ISA, for example, one provided by National 
Savings & Investments (NS&I). To increase the likelihood of take-up, this 
should be done at a moment of financial reflection, such as when people 
complete their tax return or Universal Credit application. 
 Establish automated saving schemes for the self-employed on low incomes 
o The Government should provide an option within the Universal Credit system 
that allows claimants to automatically channel a percentage of their benefits 
into a savings account. Banks should consider following suit by creating a 
‘Save When Paid’ initiative for their self-employed clients, which would take a 
small amount off the value of every invoice and immediately transfer this into 
savings. 
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3.18 Experience from abroad 
In April 2015, the Pensions Policy Institute released a report that compared the new UK 
pension system with those developing in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the US.785  It 
noted that the UK was moving in the opposite direction to these countries in terms of risk 
pooling. Whereas the new UK pensions regime completely individualises risk bearing, 
countries, such as Australia, have seen the benefits of greater pooling of risks, and, in 
particular, longevity risk. Chris Curry, said: ‘The findings from the research are encouraging 
in that the UK pensions industry as a whole has an understanding of various types of risk 
and a sophisticated market has developed here for, in particular, underwritten annuities. 
The challenge for the industry will be around the identification of effective default glide-
paths where it can no longer be assumed that individuals purchase an annuity. So far, the 
focus of regulation in the UK has been the introduction of a standards regime to ensure the 
quality and consistency of guidance. This contrasts with countries, such as Australia, which 
are now considering the introduction of rules to ensure defaults that manage longevity risk. 
It is possible that further steps will be considered in the UK that ‘nudge’ individuals towards 
decisions that ensure they have a regular income stream over the course of their 
retirement’. 
We will examine the experience in Australia, Switzerland, Chile and the US. 
 
3.18.1 Australia 
Australia has been put forward as a success story for a ‘freedom and choice’ regime might 
look life. Many of those familiar with the Australian experience take a different view.  
Many people in Australia – a country with no requirement to annuitise the pension pot – 
actually pre-spend their pension fund: they spend more than their disposable income in the 
lead up to retirement, knowing that they will use their pension fund to pay off their 
debts.786 Paul Leandro, partner at Barnett Waddingham, said: ‘We went out there looking 
for the silver bullet and we just did not find it…The Australian model is still relatively 
immature and it will be some 40 years before we see people retiring after having 
contributed 9.5% to their pension and there has also been little focus on what happens at 
decumulation. What is also important is that people don't view this money in terms of a 
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retirement income. Around 27% spend the money on a holiday, while only about 4% 
purchase an annuity’.787  
The Australian Financial System Inquiry discussed earlier discovered that a lack of risk 
sharing and over-reliance on drawdown products had left Australians with inadequate 
incomes in old age. The FSI had estimated that moving to a system that managed longevity 
risk reduced the level of assets needed for adequate retirement incomes by around 15%. It 
was for this reason that the FSI recommended that Australian pension schemes introduce a 
default comprehensive income product for retirement, the CIPR. 
Kevin Davis788 in an article for Reform789 entitled Retirement Incomes Policy Reform in 
Australia,790 wrote: 
A number of shortcomings [in the Australian retirement income system] 
were highlighted by the recent Financial System Inquiry. The main focus of 
the FSI in the areas of superannuation and retirement income was on 
improving efficiency in the accumulation phase and increasing risk-pooling 
in the retirement phase. These have the potential to increase retirement 
incomes substantially, and reduce age pension related Government 
budgetary pressures. The recommendations of the FSI, together with other 
recent reforms, should enhance sustainability and adequacy. 
One fundamental problem, identified by the FSI, is a lack of member-driven 
competitive pressure to induce lower fees and costs and improve efficiency 
in institutional funds, particularly for default funds….Absent significant 
improvements, consideration should be given to introducing a formal 
competitive process (such as a tender or auction) for allocating new 
employees into default funds. (Those recent reforms sought to introduce a 
cost effective, simple default fund product, improve transparency and 
governance and streamline administrative arrangements.) 
Another major concern is that superannuation assets are not being 
efficiently converted into retirement incomes due to a lack of longevity risk 
pooling and overreliance on account-based pensions. Evidence suggests 
that the major worry among retirees and pre-retirees is exhausting their 
assets in retirement. An individual with an account-based pension can 
reduce the risk of outliving their wealth by living more frugally in 
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retirement and drawing down benefits at the minimum allowable rates 
(which a majority of retirees do). 
The Inquiry also noted that many retirees find it challenging to navigate 
the transition to the retirement phase of superannuation. The task of 
managing multiple financial objectives and risks in retirement is complex 
and the quality of financial advice can vary significantly.  
Accordingly, the Inquiry recommended that institutional super funds be 
required to offer their members a ‘pre-selected’ comprehensive retirement 
income product which, where appropriate, includes a regular and stable 
income stream, longevity risk management and some flexibility. A product 
involving some mix of an account-based pension and deferred annuity is 
one such example, and the longevity risk pooling provides an opportunity 
for higher consumption streams for participating retirees. There is, of 
course, no free lunch, as beneficiaries receive lower inheritances from 
residual super balances. This is consistent with another of the Inquiry’s 
recommendations to shift the focus of the system from tax-preferred 
wealth accumulation and estate planning to provision of retirement 
income by setting clear objectives for the system. 
Offering a ‘pre-selected’ product was preferred to a system where 
individuals are ‘defaulted’ or mandated into a specified product. This 
maintains consumer sovereignty, while positively influencing retiree choice 
towards taking up products that include some longevity insurance. A 
default solution also faces practical complications given retiree diversity. 
 
The concerns about Australia were reinforced by a study published by the Social Market 
Foundation published in November 2015.791 The study identifies two types of Australian 
consumer: 
 ‘Cautious Australians’ who preserve their capital by reducing it by less than 1 per 
cent a year. They face a very low risk of running out of savings, even if they live 
longer than average. But this comes at the cost of reduced incomes and lower living 
standards throughout retirement. 
 ‘Quick-spending Australians’ who consume pension funds quickly with four-in-10 
running out by age 75 – long before they reached average life expectancy. Their 
incomes risk sinking towards poverty levels. 
The study argues that lessons should be drawn by the UK Government. In particular, it 
should create a two-tier ‘Early Warning System’ to understand what retirees are doing with 
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their pension savings and to identify emerging long-term risks both to consumers and the 
taxpayer. It recommends: 
 A ‘Retirement Risk Dashboard’ – to help the Government monitor retirement 
decisions and provide a view on long-term outcomes for consumers and the state. 
This would be based on a range of statistics such as pension balances, pension cash 
withdrawal, insurance take-up, levels of investment risks and take-up of guidance 
and advice. 
 ‘Personal Pension Alerts’ – to help policymakers intervene where appropriate with 
the sub-groups it has identified as at particularly high risk. Potential interventions 
could include: targeted support and advice; initiatives to make retirees think twice 
before taking one-off decisions such as withdrawing all their pension savings; and, a 
‘Mid-Retirement Financial Health Check’ to encourage older people to reconsider 
their financial position for their later years. 
Nicholas Morris is writing a book with the working title When Markets Don’t Work: Lessons 
from Australia’s Superannuation Fiasco which focuses on investment issues. He summarised 
the situation as follows: 
Today, Australia has a complex and expensive [investment fund] industry 
which manages these very large [superannuation] funds. Most funds are 
predominately actively managed, with substantial associated costs. On 
average, administrative and investment management costs exceed 3% of 
managed funds, or over $50 billion, per annum. As risk-free investments 
struggle to earn much more than this in today’s markets, the result is that 
returns after expenses are very modest. Compared to funds in Canada, the 
US and Europe, Australia’s funds perform badly…. 
Why did this outcome emerge and what can other countries learn from it? 
The answer is that principal-agent and conflict of interest problems 
combined with lack of effective competition and light-handed regulation 
allowed rent extraction by private sector managers on a massive scale. The 
prevailing regulatory ethos in Australia followed that adopted in many 
other countries in believing that disclosure and competitive pressures 
would prevent excessive rent extraction from occurring. Inattentive 
trustees, and contractual eclipse of trust law arrangements, led to weak 
representation of members…. 
[I]nefficiency [in the fund management industry] results from the 
development of a complex, multi-layered, industry, with extensive 
delegation of both functions and responsibilities, and from extensive use of 
active funds management with excessive focus on short-term results. 
Additionally, although in principle there should have been economies of 
scale as the funds administered grew, most of this has not been passed on 
to scheme members.  Rent extraction has been facilitated and permitted 
by a laissez-faire and unfocused regulatory system, including a disclosure 
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regime which permits the majority of costs to remain hidden, and limited 
effective competition.  
The evidence from Australia illustrates how a large degree of separation 
between fund managers and members, created by extensive outsourcing 
and delegation of responsibility, creates a poor outcome for scheme 
members. The result is a sorry tale of costly complexity, poor 
representation of member’s interests, limited disclosure and extensive 
unresolved conflicts of interest.792  
 
3.18.2 Switzerland, Chile and the US 
Chris Curry in an article for Reform entitled The UK Retirement Market: Lessons from 
Abroad,793 wrote: 
[C]ountries, such as Switzerland and Chile, have high levels of 
annuitisation. Despite Swiss savers being permitted unlimited access to 
their private pension savings (though some schemes restrict access), 
around 80 per cent of DC assets are put into lifetime annuities. This is 
attributed to cultural attitudes; Swiss workers are described as being 
‘financially conservative’ and ‘preferring guaranteed incomes for life’ over 
taking lump sums. 
However, Swiss annuities are funded by hosting pension schemes and their 
rates (which are regulated by the Government) are considered to be very 
generous, given the current low interest rates in the Swiss market and low 
mortality rates amongst annuitants. 
Chileans who wish to access their DC pension savings must opt either for a 
lifetime (deferred or immediate), index-linked annuity or for phased 
withdrawals from a pension fund. The number of DC savers purchasing an 
annuity in Chile has risen from 3 per cent of pensioners in 1985 to just 
under 70 per cent of DC savers for whom annuities were an option in 2007. 
This equates to around 70 per cent of DC assets. 
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and financial reporting standards, and that fees were too high. A recent Grattan Institute Report also points 
out the high charges in Australian pension schemes: see Jim Minifie (2014), Super Sting: How to Stop 
Australians Paying Too Much for Superannuation, Grattan Institute Report No. 2014-6, April 2014. The recent 
Financial System Inquiry (2014) has also concluded that ‘there is little evidence of strong fee-based 
competition in the superannuation sector, and operating costs and fees appear high by international 
standards’. 
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The high demand for lifetime annuities in Chile is attributed to the 
restrictions on accessing savings and on the lack of a sufficient universal 
state pension to fall back on. In addition, fund providers must guarantee a 
minimum rate of return, which is backed by the Government. 
Both Switzerland and Chile offer higher annuity rates than would have 
been expected given market conditions. 
Annuities are perceived as a ‘good deal’ for annuitants in these countries. 
….The purchase of lifetime annuities is minimal in the USA, estimated to 
account for less than 2 per cent of pensioner income in 2009. Savers in the 
USA are permitted to access their DC savings from retirement age without 
restriction and the lack of interest from consumers in annuitisation is 
attributed to the lack of bequest options, large fund sizes, ‘adverse 
selection’ and consumer concerns about developing health problems in 
later life. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the UK is not the only country concerned about pension 
advice. In the US, President Barack Obama has introduced a fiduciary standard for financial 
advisers who recommend retirement-account investments which requires them to act solely 
in their clients’ interests. Currently, advisers’ recommendations must be ‘suitable’ for a 
client, but they do not have to be in the client’s best interest, which would be a fiduciary 
standard. The absence of a fiduciary standard has allowed advisers to recommend products 
which earn the advisers higher commissions of around 1%. This is particularly the case when 
401(k) accounts (the US equivalent of the accumulation phase of personal pension schemes) 
are rolled over into independent retrement accounts (IRAs) (the US equivalent of a retail 
drawdown product) when someone retires. In 2013, about $353 billion was rolled from 
401(k) accounts into IRAs. However, advisers claim that anyone with less than $50,000 
would no longer be able to find an adviser willing to deal with them.794 
 
3.19 Feedback from our interviews and responses to the consultation paper 
3.19.1 Feedback from our interviews795 
3.19.1.1 Consultants 
What will members with DC schemes do? 
There was considerable uncertainty about what scheme members would actually do, 
although the most common view is that many will follow ‘the path of least resistance’ and 
just accept their existing provider’s decumulation product.   
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Andrew Ackerman and Karen Damato (2015) Obama Backs New Rules for Brokers on Retirement Accounts, 
Wall Street Journal, 23 February. 
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 The interviews took place in late 2014 and early 2015. 
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Nobody yet has a clue as to how many people will want to take all their cash immediately or 
over a very short period (to mitigate a high tax bill in a single year). They will need to 
consider a range of complex decisions depending on what they’ve got in DB, DC, state 
pension, and other sources of capital. 
They need advice, but regulated advice will not make financial sense for most people. There 
was widespread criticism of the FCA’s role when it comes to the issue of advice: 
 ‘The FCA doesn’t consider the profit motives of advisers. In effect it has stopped 
employers and trustees from helping members, because they have to tread on 
eggshells around the advice/guidance mess. It’s a case of “whatever you do, under 
no circumstances must you give members useful information”’. 
 ‘The FCA is in denial – if the right people to advise members are not permitted to do 
so, we will have another scandal of similar proportions to the personal pension mis-
selling scandal [in the 1980s and 1990s]’. 
3.19.1.2 Providers and investment managers 
What are your views on defaults?  
In one sense, there is always a default in decumulation which is ‘doing nothing’. So, the 
default might be to stay in the final stage of accumulation default fund, unless an active 
decision is made. What subsequently happens depends on the scheme rules: 
 In a contract-based scheme, it is not possible to force annuitisation (due to unfair 
contract terms legislation), although it might be possible, depending on the contract, 
to require the member to take a surrender value at some age (e.g., 75)  
 In a trust-based scheme, trustees have the power to say to a member ‘if you don’t 
tell us otherwise, after one year we will buy you an annuity’ (i.e., they can force 
annuitisation as a default). Trustees do want a process for moving people from 
accumulation to decumulation, but are concerned about having a specific default, 
since retrospectively, a member could claim they would have been better off with a 
different solution. So trustees still need to give choices (which conflicts with the idea 
of a single default). 
It was also recognised that many people will take ‘the path of least resistance’, whereby the 
individual accepts the decumulation product of the pension provider. This used to be the 
provider’s annuity (rather than the open market option). Now, this will be cash or some 
form of drawdown product. 
Some insurance company participants questioned whether there was even a need for a 
separate default decumulation fund. It could simply be a continuation of the accumulation 
fund, but used to deliver a certain percentage of the fund as income each year until, say, 
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age 75. Others pointed out that this could lead to a similar consumer detriment as 
previously existed with rollover/internal annuities. 
There was support for the idea of default pathways using decision trees, with a small 
number of branches in the decision tree, dealing with health, dependants, other assets and 
liabilities, tax, etc. However, others thought that narrowing down to a single universally 
suitably default will be difficult if not impossible, even though they recognised that defaults 
may be useful.  
It was agreed that an appropriate default should recognise and give appropriate weighting 
to the need for a secure retirement income as the basis upon which to build other access 
options, accepting that there is both a demand for a secure income (guaranteed income for 
life) and a demand for flexibility. However, the first aim should be to secure basic lifelong 
income to meet the needs of ‘heating and eating’. You can then add a platform for 
drawdown. 
Two defaults were proposed (both meet the needs of a good scheme): 
 Drawdown plus a deferred annuity 
 Layering – first secure essential life-long expenditure (‘heating and eating’), then 
allow for luxuries (e.g., a SPEEDOMETER plan). 
However, there are challenges with the first of these proposals. Individuals do not really 
want to manage investment risk. In the US, for the small number those who choose to take 
out longevity insurance, around 10-15% of the fund at retirement is used to buy a deferred 
life annuity.  In the UK, a key problem with a deferred annuity is cost and this will be made 
worse by the introduction of Solvency II in 2016. People might decide to wait until, say, age 
85 and buy an immediate annuity, but these might not appear to be good value due to 
selection factors.  
We were told that there is potentially a problem with having a default that arises from 
MiFID.796 MiFID says you cannot put people into a commercial contract without their 
consent. However, we were informed that it is possible to get around this by getting a Letter 
of Comfort from the EU. This was the mechanism used to get around a similar problem in 
the case of auto-enrolment in the UK.  
What are your views on guidance and advice? 
We first asked about the distinction between guidance and advice in relation to a decision 
tree for a default decumulation strategy. We were told by Huw Evans, CEO of the ABI, that 
there is an important difference between ‘advisory’ and ‘advice’ in English law. A decision 
tree would be advisory, but is not really advice. However, there is no distinction between 
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‘advisory’ and ‘advice’ in the current regulatory framework. If a decision tree is classified as 
advice, then it means that it is regulated. This is not at all useful and would need to change 
for a decision tree to work in the manner intended.  
We were also told that schemes using a decision tree would need to make sure customers 
have used the Government’s new guidance service, Pension Wise, even though this just 
takes stock of people’s assets and liabilities and explains the options available.  
If these two hurdles can be crossed, then we were told that it might be possible to follow up 
Pension Wise with a standardised decision tree (possibly with statutory approval) which 
would be suitable for those above the new trivial commutation level (£30,000) and below 
those classified as high net worth, i.e., middle income households with assets below 
£100,000. 
It would be better if the decision tree had a standardised set of questions across all 
providers. These might be aligned with the questions asked under advanced protection (or 
the second line of defence) which gives the FCA comfort that a provider is not selling a 
standard product to someone with a health problem, is not selling a single life product to a 
married man, is not selling a fixed-income product to someone who makes clear that he 
wants an inflation-protected income, etc. However, we were told that this would cause a 
problem if the provider does not offer a product covered by a particular question. 
Turning to the question of advice more generally, the nature of ‘advice’ will vary in terms of 
how it is regarded under FCA regulations. It could be fully regulated fee-based advice 
(where the firm makes a clear recommendation and therefore is responsible/liable) or some 
other form of ‘non-advice’ (where the firm provides decision trees, explains options etc, but 
the individual makes the final choice – in which case the individual is responsible and the 
firm has little or no liability).  
All participants were agreed that the FCA’s various definitions of advice is a major problem 
and out of step with what the DC decumulation market needs. This has to change. One 
participant told us that the FCA’s attitude is that only the best will do, which implies that we 
have a zero-failure regime. But the ‘best is enemy of the good’ – it results in advice costs of 
at least £1,500 which no one wants to pay. However, it was believed that the FCA will say its 
hands are tied by EU law.  
The concept of advice has to change to make it more useful to customers. Advice should 
help people understand the difference between ‘want’ and ‘need’ and help people clarify 
the decisions they need to make. At present, people are presented with a whole range of 
complex questions and choices and then told ‘you’re on your own’. Even guidance or a steer 
towards a single solution or even two solutions constitutes ‘advice’ under current rules. The 
implication is that most customers are overwhelmed by choice, but have nowhere to turn 
without paying £1,500 for advice.  
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What is the solution to this problem?  We were told that the simplest solution involves only 
three routes: 
 Execution-only – the customer makes all the decisions 
 ‘Filtered choice’ – the customer is steered towards tailored options (e.g., low-risk 
funds); but this is still currently classified as advice 
 Personal recommendation (i.e., full regulated advice) 
It would then be necessary to find a way to nudge the mass population towards a soft 
default or a set of default pathways. Three types of nudging were suggested to us: 
 Guidance 
 What do ‘people like me’ do?797 
 Advice (needs to be simplified, targeted) 
However, participants told us that the industry is still a long way from this ideal. For 
example, one provider told us they had built a simplified advice website but acknowledged 
that it does not really serve customers’ needs. The FCA has reviewed existing simplified 
advice models, but says that they are not clear enough. No life office has yet brought a 
simplified advice model to the market, which is regarded as very telling. 
All agreed that guidance/advice is where there is a need for real innovation – far more than 
in product design. The use of web-enabled technology is already producing good results. 
Consumer education is another key factor and the industry needs to rise to the challenge.  
It was also agreed that guidance and advice could not be a single event, but had to be a 
process. There needed to be periodic financial health checks, with at a minimum of one 
leading up to retirement, and another before age 75. 
There was common agreement amongst interviewees that the FCA’s advice and guidance 
regime is little short of catastrophic and does virtually nothing to prevent customers ‘self 
harming’. There was also common agreement that the two regulators, the FCA and TPR, 
should merge. 
 
3.19.1.3 Trade unions 
What are your views on advice to members? 
A participant opened with the comment: ‘What you can have is a default to financial advice. 
The scheme or employer can say we will pay for you to have a session with a regulated 
financial adviser who will take responsibility for that advice (and the individual therefore has 
recourse if wrong advice is given). Guidance is great because it takes you through your 
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options. But if the best thing for you is drawdown or an annuity, that is buying a regulated 
financial product. But the way the industry is at the moment, it is difficult to get financial 
advice for pots less than £30,000’.  
We pointed out that 75% of people currently have pots less than £30,000 and regulated 
advice can cost £1,000 or more, which prompted the discussion: 
 ‘If schemes are paying for this, may be they are able to bring costs down’ 
 ‘If it is the case of an employer having to pay, I cannot see them leaping at that’ 
 ‘To my mind, the only way you would get employers to take on the real responsibility 
and cost is if the state said “we are going to subsidise advice through tax relief or 
some other mechanism”’  
 ‘There is no incentive for an employer to do it’ 
 ‘Low and middle-income savers lack the trust and experience of dealing with 
financial advisers. This is why attention should be focused on default options not 
advice’ 
 ‘Some unions (e.g., Unison with Lighthouse, Unite) and have directories of financial 
advisers’ 
 ‘Advisers have an interest in (maintaining) complexity. With good defaults you can 
take a lot of the complexity out of it. People do not really want regulated advice. 
They want to be directed’ 
 ‘Advisers just try to sell you stuff’. 
 
3.19.2 Responses to the consultation paper 
We summarise the responses to Questions 22-31 in the consultation paper here. 
22. It is now recognised that many people face a number of behavioural barriers which 
prevent them behaving optimally. When it comes to decumulation, what are the key 
barriers? 
A wide range of behavioural barriers were mentioned by the different respondents. The 
barrier to optimal behaviour that was most commonly mentioned was the lack of financial 
literacy. Other behavioural barriers included poor understanding of longevity risk, lack of 
engagement, short termism, framing effects, procrastination and over/under confidence. 
23. We need to recognise that retirees: have different expenditure needs during different 
phases of their retirement; need to pace their spending throughout retirement in order to 
optimise the use of their lifetime assets and income and their ability to make intended 
bequests; and need a choice architecture that reflects the market segment to which they 
belong. (a) What is your understanding of the regulatory consumer market segmentation 
and is this appropriate in relation to the needs of DC retirees? (b) What nudges and choice 
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architecture do people need to deal with these issues and overcome the behavioural barriers 
they face? 
There was general agreement on the characterisation of market segmentation into mass 
market, mass-affluent market and high net worth. A substantial minority of responses were 
enthusiastic about nudges, but more thought that it was more important to provide better 
information. 
24. (a) What lessons from auto-enrolment in the accumulation phase can be brought to 
the decumulation phase?  
Responses to this were very mixed. Respondents agreed that inertia had provided benefits 
in the accumulation phase of pension saving, but not all thought that this could be used in 
the decumulation phase: one reason for this was the greater diversity of needs in the 
decumulation phase, which makes it much harder to provide appropriate defaults. There 
were also differing views on whether defaults were needed to address the issue of inertia or 
whether they discouraged engagement with the process and made matters worse. Several 
responses suggested having a menu with a limited number of default choices. 
24. (b) Given the importance of income security for the elderly and the existence of 
longevity risk, is there a case for  defaulting people into buying longevity insurance via auto-
enrolment (i.e., drawdown with longevity insurance becomes the default retirement 
strategy)? Consider the advantages and disadvantages of such a strategy.  
Responses were equally divided on whether or not there should be defaults into longevity 
insurance. Opponents said that such a policy was inconsistent with ‘freedom and choice’ 
and that it would be hard to select an appropriate range of options for heterogeneous 
pensioners with different needs. The most enthusiastic supporters said that people could 
always opt out. 
24. (c) What would be the likely annualised cost of such products for individuals? 
Responses suggested that the cost of default longevity products depends on too many 
factors to provide a simple answer. 
24. (d) How could the default principle, upon which the success of auto-enrolment is 
predicated, be best reconciled with the individual freedoms for DC decumulation introduced 
in the 2014 Budget? 
Responses were very divided on whether or how defaults into longevity products could be 
reconciled with choice and there was no agreed position. Supporters of defaults thought 
there was no real problem of reconciliation: defaults were useful in eliminating confusion 
and helped those who wanted to be told what to do, while everyone was free to opt out.  
Opponents said individuals needed advice to take full advantage of the individual freedoms. 
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25. What are the implications of the Chancellor’s announcement in September 2014 
effectively ending the 55% tax rate on inherited pension pots? 
A third of respondents thought that ending the 55 per cent tax rate on inherited pension 
pots would encourage more pension savings. Others thought people might feel obliged to 
use their pension pot for inheritance, rather than spend it during their own retirement. 
Most recognised that the issue was irrelevant for people with small pension pots. 
26. What are your views on the guidance guarantee and how effective it will be? 
Many responses thought that it was too soon to tell whether the guidance guarantee would 
be effective and many had concerns that it would be insufficient, especially for those who 
wanted to be told what to do. 
27. (a) Will other forms of guidance and advice be needed?  
There was a very strong view that more support would be needed than the guidance 
guarantee alone. A quarter of responses thought that there needed to be a level of support 
between guidance and advice. 
27. (b) For DC savers who prefer to make their own decisions, what is the best way to 
build on the guidance guarantee to help individuals avoid buying retail products that are 
inappropriate (e.g., in relation to risk) and/or poor value (e.g., in relation to price)? 
Most responses thought that better information needed to be provided to build on the 
guidance guarantee, possibly via online resources. Only a minority referred to advice or 
nudges. 
28. (a) What specific risks should regulatory safeguards aim to address in relation to 
financial decisions made at retirement? 
Respondents identified three main risks of decision-making at retirement that need to be 
addressed by regulation: the risk that individuals purchased inappropriate products (e.g., a 
married person buying a single life annuity); the investment risks faced by individuals; and 
the risk of scams and mis-selling. 
28. (b) At what point does individual choice cease to be a regulatory 
concern/responsibility? 
Responses disagreed on when individual choice ceases to be a regulatory concern. On 
balance, responses suggested that it was when (or if) an individual secured an income for 
life. A significant minority (42 per cent) said that the point of the recent reforms was to 
provide choice and that this would inevitably mean that at some point consumers should be 
free to make mistakes and hence not the concern of the regulator. 
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29. Some DC customers might draw down all their pots in the early years of retirement, a 
decision they might subsequently regret. What is the most effective way of assisting DC 
customers to act in their best long-term interests? 
Respondents were divided on how to assist DC customers to act in their best long-term 
interests and not make decisions that they subsequently regret. Some responses noted that 
the point of ‘freedom and choice’ is to allow choice and that the possibility of bad choices 
must be accepted as part of that. The responses to this question on how to avoid bad 
choices were varied and included defaults, better education and incentives to secure an 
income (at varying points in retirement). 
30. (a) What is the best way of ensuring that any DB-to-DC transferees only undertake 
such a transfer when it is in their best interests? 
The large majority of respondents thought that transfers from DB to DC should only be 
allowed after taking advice (with an exception for small pots). Many accepted that the 
advice could be ignored, although one suggested that transfers should be banned if the 
advice was negative. One response suggested that if individuals wanted to transfer out they 
should take advice at their own expense. 
30. (b) What are your estimates of the number of DB-to-DC transferees (deferred and 
also active) and size of assets involved? 
Very few responses provided estimates of the number of DB-to-DC transferees. Those that 
did thought that about ten per cent would transfer. 
30. (c)  Is the requirement for regulated independent advice for such transferees 
adequate? 
The few responses to this question believed that the requirement for regulated 
independent advice for DB-to-DC transferees was adequate. 
30. (d) Can/will the guidance guarantee process cope with DB active/deferred members 
who seek help in considering their options? 
Respondents thought that the guidance guarantee for DB members was inadequate. 
31. Are there other ways of supporting pension savers to make the right choice at 
retirement for them and their family? 
Respondents suggested that a combination of approaches (including advice, nudges, 
incentives and information) would be needed to support pensioners to make the right 
choice at retirement. Some believed that better education and improved financial literacy 
were required in the longer term. 
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3.20 Analysis and recommendations 
3.20.1 Analysis 
This Chapter is called ‘Supporting savers to make the right choice at retirement for them 
and their family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment’. In order to meet this 
aim, we need to examine, in turn, each of the players involved in or commenting on pension 
provision: savers, the national media, advisers, the wider financial services industry, and the 
FCA. We also consider pension fraudsters and investment scammers, and the self-employed 
and non-eligible job holders. We begin with savers (i.e., the pension scheme members). 
3.20.1.1 Savers  
The model of economic behaviour underlying the pension flexibilities introduced in the 2014 
Budget is the exact opposite of the model underlying auto-enrolment.   
The model used by the Chancellor George Osborne on 19 March 2014 was that of an ‘econ’, 
a rational lifetime financial planner: 
People who have worked hard and saved hard all their lives, and done the 
right thing, should be trusted with their own finances. 
And that’s precisely what we will now do. Trust the people.… 
I am announcing today that we will legislate to remove all remaining tax 
restrictions on how pensioners have access to their pension pots. 
Pensioners will have complete freedom to draw down as much or as little 
of their pension pot as they want, anytime they want. 
No caps. No drawdown limits. 
Let me be clear. No one will have to buy an annuity. 
 
However, the model used in auto-enrolment (AE) to get people to save more for their 
retirement is that of a ‘human’ in which inertia and other behavioural biases drive 
behaviour. With AE, individuals make no active choice to join a pension scheme, are 
enrolled at a default contribution rate, and do not need to choose the fund into which their 
contributions are invested.  
So the Government has relied on the model of ‘humans’ to get people to do something 
relatively simple – namely get them to save a bit more – and is now relying on the model of 
‘econs’ to get people to negotiate the highly complex process of decumulation.   
As Sara Benwell points out: ‘Auto-enrolment largely exists because we believe that people 
are either incapable or unwilling to save for their future. At the same time, “freedom and 
choice” makes the assumption that people are capable of making good decisions about 
retirement. It doesn’t take a behavioural economist to tell you something’s not right here, 
but what behavioural science can tell you is the two policies aren’t just contradictory; they 
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are underpinned by diametrically opposed assumptions about the way people work’.798 As 
the FCA itself recognised in its June 2015 discussion paper Smarter Consumer 
Communications: ‘We can begin to understand why consumers often fail to make good 
decisions about financial products and services, when we take into account that behavioural 
biases, low levels of financial literacy and the complexity of some financial services and 
products can limit people’s ability to take appropriate action’. Either that or the 
Government believes that ‘humans’ have somehow transformed into ‘econs’ over the 
course of their working lives.   
Greg Davies, head of the Barclays behavioural finance team, compared AE with ‘freedom 
and choice’:799  
It’s not necessarily enough to ensure that everyone is in the right situation 
for them. 
Essentially, nudging people to make pensions contributions creates better 
outcomes, but to ensure optimum outcomes, we also need to educate 
people to ensure they save more and in the right way. 
That engagement has long-term benefits as well because it’s only by 
having engagement over time that we do actually build up the confidence 
and the knowledge for people to start approaching the decisions when 
they’re decumulating with any degree of confidence. 
[With the new pensions freedoms], we now have a raft of behavioural 
issues that are going to be there that weren’t there before. 
This is largely because the assumptions behind auto-enrolment are right. If 
we can learn anything from the past it is that when left to their own 
devices, people make sub-optimal decisions. 
By shifting to an opposing behaviour assumption at the finish line of the 
pensions process, we are assuming people will act in a different way. When 
we look at the poor choices people made when choosing an annuity, it’s 
clear that this isn’t the case. 
When left to their own devices, people make sub-optimal decisions. 
The assumption seems to be that in the intervening decades between 
when we nudged people into savings when they wouldn’t do it themselves, 
we now seem to believe that they have magically become able to 
assimilate large quantities of information in a short period of time and 
make optimal decisions for their future. 
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 Quoted in Sara Benwell (2015) 'Freedom and choice' could be the undoing of the pensions industry, 
Pensions Insight, 30 January. 
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Giving people choice on its own doesn’t seem to be that well grounded in 
our behavioural knowledge, because we know that if you give people 
complex choices, in an area that they’re not experts in, particularly one 
which involves trade-offs over time between actions now and outcomes in 
the future, these are all features that make people deeply uncomfortable. 
 
Complexity is indeed a key problem. Many of the risks in Table 1.2 are very hard to 
understand – even for pension professionals. Pensions must be made simpler to appeal to 
ordinary savers, according to Lesley Williams, the first chair of the Pensions and Lifetime 
Savings Association (PLSA),800 as well as group pensions director at Whitbread. In her first 
speech as chair, she said that ‘we're kidding ourselves if we think education will fix’ the 
problem of people not understanding pensions or being engaged in them and that it will 
only treat the symptoms. Savers should not be regarded as the problem – rather the 
industry and policy-makers are collectively to blame for creating complexity in pensions. Ms 
Williams said that, while she is a ‘real believer’ in default pathways, she believed that the 
industry could make pensions simpler and less technical for the end customer.801 Speaking 
at the same event as Ms Williams, Andy Harrison, chief executive of Whitbread, said: 
‘Pensions have always been hard for people to understand, but the trust in pensions is 
probably the lowest it has been in my lifetime. Government really has not helped, but we 
need to do the best with what we have… The lesson from AE's success was simplicity and 
solid communication worked and this could be applied to other problems in pension’.802 
Of course, if the ‘econ’ model is right, we do not need to worry about any of this – econs are 
not troubled by complexity. If, instead, the ‘human’ model better describes most people’s 
behaviour – which appears to be the case – then we should be looking for a framework for 
nudging people to behave in what is in their best long-term interests. Running out of money 
before they die and living in poverty in very old age is clearly in no one’s long-term interests.  
It was to avoid this possibility that pension schemes providing lifetime incomes – rather 
than lump sums – first started in this country. 
Given the complexities of decumulation and the risks in Table 1.2, the challenge is to design 
a simple and effective default decumulation strategy that deals with the key risks in the 
Table, yet allows for the flexibilities made possible by the 2014 Budget. At the very 
minimum, we believe that an effective quasi-default decumulation strategy – initiated by 
the scheme members, but which they can always opt out of – can be designed which allows 
for:  
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 access 
 investment performance to beat inflation during retirement and  
 longevity insurance. 
This could be determined using a standardised decision tree (possibly with statutory 
approval) which will be suitable for those above the new trivial commutation level (£30,000) 
and below those classified as high net worth, i.e., middle income households. 
Those opposing a default employ a ‘one size does not fit all’ argument. While this is a 
reasonable point to make – although much less so if the member can opt out of the default 
– we do not believe that most people’s circumstances are so complex that they cannot use a 
decision tree with a small number of pathways that lead them to a set of suitable retirement 
income products that will meet their life-long expenditure needs – especially if the 
alternative is 350,000-400,000 different bespoke solutions per year, one for each retiree 
whatever the size of their pension pot. We should always bear in mind the statement ‘the 
best is the enemy of the good’. If the default is ‘good’, then that should be ‘good enough’ 
for most members with relatively small pension pots – especially if the alternative is a huge 
set of expensive, highly engineered, over-complex solutions designed by providers and 
advisers. 
An important aspect of the success of such a quasi-default will be consumer engagement. 
The value of any product or service depends on the time and effort that goes into planning 
it. Consumers understand this with products and services which give immediate 
gratification, such as holidays. Can we get them to understand that the same applies to 
products and services involving deferred gratification, such as retirement income solutions?  
Related to this is the number of product and solution choices. While competition can be 
good and lead to product innovation, it also leads to a proliferation of essentially identical 
products which are marketed as being different. This leads to customer confusion. 
Consumer engagement will improve if there are only a small number of well-designed 
products and solutions being offered to customers. 
We expect – and certainly hope – that, whether nudged, guided or advised, the majority of 
decumulation strategies after April 2015 will take the form of either (a) layering (e.g., 
SPEEDOMETER plans), or (b) cash and income drawdown, with longevity insurance in the 
form of annuity purchase deferred until later life. Retirees in poor health without 
dependants might well choose to access their funds in full at the date of retirement. 
Nevertheless, we would find it very hard to understand if savers in good health at 
retirement were not advised to purchase longevity insurance as part of their retirement 
expenditure plan. Careful tax planning will also be a feature of such strategies in order to 
avoid people paying too much tax in the early years of the plan. However, this can be quite 
straightforward for most people, if they have access to a simple table that allows them to 
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calculate how much they can withdraw from their fund in one year in relation to their 
current income before they move into a higher tax bracket. 
Another important aspect will be realism. Clearly, consumers value flexibility, but it can be 
expensive to provide. The new flexibilities have placed product providers in a similar 
position to an airline pilot who believes her passengers want to fly from London to Sydney, 
but, as she is about to land, is told that the passengers have changed their mind and want to 
fly to Shanghai instead.  It can, of course, be done, but only at a price. Consumers also value  
guarantees, but they are also expensive. For example, guaranteed drawdown which gives 
complete flexibility of withdrawal can result in the income that can be withdrawn being up 
to 30% less than an equivalent annuity. 
Related to this is consumer vulnerability. Humans can be particularly vulnerable when it 
comes to financial services and the FCA has estimated that up to 50% of UK consumers are 
potentially vulnerable. Humans are also prone to overconfidence, bordering on arrogance. 
There is nothing potentially more toxic in financial services than consumers who are not 
aware of their own vulnerability and are dismissive when this is pointed out to them. This is 
particularly true when it comes to investment and longevity risks, the two key risks in 
retirement. Both risks are likely to be dismissed as unimportant by many humans.  
3.20.1.2 The national media 
The situation has not been helped by national media reports that emphasise the immediate 
problems that people have accessing their pension pots, but which do not mention longer-
term risks, such as investment and longevity risks, or the importance of the additional 
protection/second line of defence that was designed to protect consumers.  
Typical are these extracts from Daily Mail articles:803 
More than 100,000 savers have already discovered they face a fee if they 
take advantage of the new pension freedoms. 
Radical reforms introduced two months ago promised that the over-55s 
could cash in their pots rather than being forced to use the money to buy 
an annuity, or income for life. 
But a Money Mail investigation found some savers are being charged huge 
fees if they withdraw their funds or seek financial advice, while others are 
being allowed no access at all to their cash. 
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Now, industry analysts have revealed one in ten over-55s eligible to take 
advantage of the pension freedoms will have to pay if they want to get 
their hands on their hard-earned savings.…. 
Many pensioners have been told they cannot withdraw their money until 
they have seen a financial adviser. 
But if the adviser believes it would be a bad idea to cash in their pot, some 
pension firms have then refused to let people do so. Advisers and pension 
firms are worried they will face fines for mis-selling if customers later blow 
their cash and end up penniless in retirement. 
But critics said savers must be allowed to spend their money as they wish, 
even if it contradicts professional advice. Paul Green, of over-50s specialist 
firm Saga, said: ‘People should be trusted with their own money.’…. 
We have identified six major failures of the reforms: 
1: Firms refusing to hand over savings 
Before the reforms, most pension providers promised they would take part. 
They admitted there were challenges, but that things would be ready on 
time. In practice, many savers are finding this is not the case. 
Research from actuary firm Barnett Waddingham found that none of the 
major pension firms offer full access to all the freedoms. 
Some have publicly admitted they won’t allow savers to use their pension 
as a bank account. 
2: £1,000 for advice you don't want 
Some big insurers are so scared of being accused of mis-selling that they 
refuse to help customers unless they have had formal financial advice.  
There are specific circumstances where savers have to take guidance for 
their own protection. These include anyone who wants to take all their 
cash at once from a pension of more than £30,000, and those with 
guaranteed payout rates written into their contracts. 
But many firms are telling customers they have to see an adviser 
regardless of circumstances. A session with a financial adviser will typically 
cost £500 to £1,000. 
3: Savers stuck in limbo with no help 
Money Mail has been bombarded with letters from savers stuck in limbo 
after their insurer and financial adviser refused to help them. 
Some have been turned away by dozens of firms who just don’t want their 
business. In many cases, savers have visited advisers for help withdrawing 
all their cash from a pension. 
The adviser has recommended that they don’t do this, but when the 
customer insists they still want to press ahead, the adviser refuses to 
assist. 
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4: Delays of up to 90 days 
Time and time again, Money Mail has come across savers being forced to 
jump through hoops before they can access their own savings. 
It’s leaving many facing substantial delays in getting their cash. 
Often, savers are being made to move their money to a different type of 
pension and, though the official industry figures show this should be 
completed within ten days, readers and independent experts say it can 
take as many as 90. 
5: Sky-high fees and crippling red tape 
Even when they are allowed to get their hands on their pension savings, 
many retirees are being confronted with sky-high charges. 
There is also a dazzling array of terms and conditions that stop them using 
their pot as they would wish. Savers can be hit with a set-up fee of £184 
and then charges to manage their pension fund on top of that. They can 
also be asked to pay from £20 to £90 – and in some cases up to £240 – 
every time they make a withdrawal. 
Some firms only allow wealthy savers access to the freedoms. According to 
Barnett Waddingham, you can only have flexible drawdown at Legal & 
General if you have £30,000 saved, £20,000 at Royal London, or £50,000 at 
Zurich. 
At the Government’s approved low-cost pension provider NEST, you can 
only have access to the freedoms if you are prepared to take all your 
savings in one go –  potentially exposing yourself to a massive tax bill. 
6: Insurers who cut value of your pot 
Money Mail has also heard from savers who have been told they cannot 
enjoy the freedoms unless they move to a new type of pension – at a steep 
cost. 
When they switch the money to the newer scheme they are hit with a 
charge. 
A typical problem occurs when someone wants to take their pension over 
the age of 55, but then discovers their contract prevents them from doing 
so without penalty before the age of 60 or 65. 
 
Articles such as these give the impression that the pension fund is held in cash and people 
are being charged high fees for accessing it. If the pension fund were held in cash, the return 
on the pension fund would be very low. Instead the pension fund is invested in growth 
assets that aim to generate higher average long-term returns, but which are hard to 
liquidate at short notice. If the pension fund had to hold more assets in cash-like 
instruments, just in case someone wants to withdraw money without notice, this will bring 
down the return on the overall pension fund – which would lead to a different complaint 
from the national media. Even more important is that there is no mention of longevity risk. 
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Pension assets have to last a lifetime – complaining that it takes 90 days to access a pension 
pot really is the wrong issue to be discussing at the start of someone’s retirement. 
3.20.1.3 Advisers 
The evidence we have gathered in the earlier Sections of this Chapter suggests that advisers 
need to address five key issues. 
First, advisers do not appear to be sufficiently focused on the consumer’s real needs. Most 
consumers (as many as 90% according to one study) have very simple needs. They also have 
very modest resources in retirement. Such consumers need something very straightforward, 
namely financial help.   
There is insufficient clarity amongst advisers about the appropriate way to segment the 
market and about the level of assets below which financial help in the form of a purely 
advisory default pathway will be adequate. We believe the market should be segmented by 
behavioural type, by spending type, and by resources and needs – and suitable integrated 
solutions offered to each segment. This would assist in determining the appropriate level of 
guidance, help and advice more effectively. The evidence we have gathered suggests that, 
as a rough rule of thumb, those below £30,000 need only guidance (provided it deals 
effectively with the impact on entitlement to welfare benefits or unless they actively choose 
something different), those with £30,000-£100,000 need help via a default pathway (unless 
they to actively choose something different), and those with more than £100,000 would 
benefit from full advice (unless they also choose something different).  
Anyone who strongly believes that full advice is needed as a default by those with smaller 
amounts should bear in mind that the new single-tier state pension has a capital value of 
around £200,000 and no one is setting up a business to advise people how to spend their 
state pension. Also when drawdown was first introduced, it was deemed to be a suitable 
product for people with a pension fund above £250,000. 
There has to be a middle way between guidance and regulated advice. Many people’s pots 
are just not big enough and their financial circumstances are just not complicated enough to 
warrant full regulated advice. If we do not end up with a simple set of default pathways 
which the middle market can use with confidence, then there are two dangers. The first is 
that many people will not take advice at all, in which case, we need to answer the question 
raised by Ian Price, divisional director of pensions at St James’s Place: ‘Liberating pensions 
will be the new windfall and the new boost to consumption, but what happens when that 
money is all spent and people still have 10 to 15 left in retirement?’804 The second is that 
many of the 350,000-400,000 people who retire each year will be persuaded by advisers and 
providers that they need a personally designed bespoke retirement income solution that 
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has been exclusively prepared for them. It would, of course, be nice if we could all afford 
our own interior designer when we redecorated our homes, but most people do not need 
one. Peter Bernstein coined the phrase ‘interior decorator fallacy’ for the argument that 
most people’s investment portfolios should reflect investor characteristics such as attitude 
to risk in the same way that interior decorators attempt to reflect the personal taste of their 
clients.805 There is a hint of the interior decorator fallacy about the argument that every 
retiree needs full regulated advice. 
There is, of course, an important role for advice for those prepared to pay for it, but it 
should be highly focused at its cost should reflect this. As John Porteous, head of client 
proposition at Towry, says: ‘As a general observation, there seem to be three primary 
challenges that the industry faces in delivering both effective and valued client outcomes for 
a rapidly growing market: 
 Advice policy around the relative merits of the options available 
 Investment strategy to support a sustainable standard of living  
 Ongoing communication and client engagement over time’.806 
Second, advisers appear to be too focused on their own revenue generation, rather than 
providing the right type of advice for the right type of client. We were told that the advisers 
were ‘pushing for decumulation to be a retail market for obvious reasons: it’s payback time, 
as they have lost out when auto-enrolment was introduced – with no need for advice’.  
It is also somewhat surprising that advisers had not sorted out whether they should have a 
fee-based or percent-of-assets charging structure by the time that the pension freedoms 
began. Steve Lewis, head of distribution – retirement solutions at LV=, believes a fixed fee 
can work for smaller pots: ‘The challenge is doing that in an efficient way which clearly 
explains the risk and balances to the client without creating an excessive burden of fee….A 
lot of people below £100,000 will come into the drawdown space. I suspect we will see 
adviser firms doing it on a fixed-fee basis; so perhaps fixed initial fees, and pre-determined 
fees for “advice events”’.807 
It is significant to note that very few professional services firms – lawyers, accountants, etc – 
now charge on an ad valorem basis. Instead they charge on the basis of the amount of work 
done, typically expressed as an hourly rate. One of the reasons for this change was the loss 
of professional indemnity cover in cases where clients successfully sued a professional 
services firm and the firm could not justify the size of the fee charged against the amount of 
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work done, typically expressed in terms of hours worked.808  Many in the financial services 
industry, in particular advisers and investment managers, along with estate agents, still 
charge on an ad valorem basis and we wonder why that is the case.   
The new pensions regime is an opportunity for financial advisers – and other financial 
services firms such as investment managers – to put themselves on the same footing as 
most of the rest of the professional services industry. We accept advisers need to be 
adequately rewarded, but there also needs to be much clearer evidence that the charging 
method used provides customer value for money. If advisers want to be compared with 
estate agents, then estate agents have smart high street offices, embrace the latest 
technology and have enthusiastic sales staff selling your property.  
Third, and equally remarkable, is the lack of clear charge disclosure on advisers’ websites. 
The argument that exact fees can only be established after a conversation to gauge the 
work involved does not prevent fees for typical scenarios being published. With estate 
agents, lawyers, and accountants, for example, it is also easy to find out the sales 
commission or fees that will be charged without feeling committed to using a particular 
agent. We recognise that people want to sell their house, for example, whereas most 
people do not ‘want’ investment advice, but we should also ask why that is the case, given 
that many people have pension pots and houses of similar value. 
Fourth, the advice industry also has to redesign its business model to deal with new 
technologies such as online advice and the competitive challenges this will bring for both 
the revenue and cost side of the model. Similarly, simplified advice will be suitable for many 
people and that has to be delivered at low cost, another challenge for the advisers’ business 
model.  There is a very clear role for low-cost, fixed-fee robo-advice for people with pension 
pots between £30,000 and £100,000 – with fees of around £100 p.a. per client. 
Finally, there is the issue of the professional standards of advisers. Advisers have certainly 
become more professional in recent years. For example, the Financial Adviser School was 
launched in 2011 and offers vocational and academic training for financial advisers. It was 
established by the Sesame Bankhall Group and sold to Intrinsic in October 2015.809 Similarly, 
the Society of Later Life Advisers (SOLLA) has created an industry standard for retirement 
advisers called the SOLLA Retirement Advice Standard (RAS).810 To satisfy the standard, 
SOLLA accredited advisers need to hold a QCF level 4 financial planning qualification, a 
statement of professional standing (SPS), and the minimum qualifications in equity release 
                                                     
808
 Of course, the hourly rate provides an incentive to ‘over-service’ the client in order to build up the fee. 
809
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Intrinsic and OMW to launch national advice business, Professional 
Adviser, 2 October. 
810 
http://retirementstandard.co.uk/for-advisers/ 
420 
 
and long-term care.811  In November 2015, the Chartered Insurance Institute (CII) announced 
that it would launch a new Life and Pensions Foundations examination unit (LF1) to support 
professional standards in the life and pensions sector. It is targeted at new entrants as well 
as those already working in customer-facing jobs. People who pass will get a CII Level 2 
Award in Life and Pensions Foundations. The exam is designed to enhance public confidence 
in life and pensions.812  
Despite this, advisers are not a recognised profession, unlike accountants, and this is 
affecting recruitment into the industry. The average age of advisers is rising and could be as 
high as 50, according to recent surveys, implying that not enough younger people are 
looking at financial advice as a career choice. A debate on LinkedIn suggested reasons why 
this was happening and put it down to the absence of a recognised career path in financial 
advice. According to Lawrence Gosling: ‘The cost of training is too high, not enough people 
are taking up some of the excellent financial services degrees which are available at 
universities, and the generally negative image of the profession outside the industry. One 
participant perceptively made the comparison with accountancy, pointing out trainee 
accountants have a clear career path – pass the two Chartered accountancy exams and you 
can practice. Then, after a couple of years, you can become a fellow of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants. There is no such clear equivalent in the advice sector, which could 
read “take the exams, then a few more, be subject to a couple of FCA audits, realise the cost 
of professional indemnity insurance is high, network like crazy, and you might get a few 
clients”. But even after all of this, you do not have a career, unless you can find a firm to 
take you on, or get lucky and find a couple of good clients and set up on your own’.813  
 
3.20.1.4 The wider financial services industry 
There is always going to be a tension between competition and cooperation, but the 
evidence we have gathered in this and the previous Chapter suggests that there is currently 
too much tension between (a) advisers and providers (who are fighting a turf war over 
access to clients), and between (b) investment managers and insurance companies (who are 
fighting a turf war over control of client pension assets) to the detriment of consumers.  
On the one hand, we have customers, many of whom do not understand the risks they face 
in retirement, are not interested in finding out more about these risks, and even when told 
about them, do not care. Yet, they still need to use their pension pot to provide them with a 
‘good’ life-long retirement income journey. 
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On the other hand, we have suppliers – advisers, providers, investment managers and 
insurance companies – which should be offering integrated effective value-for-money 
solutions to these customers, but which appear to be more concerned about protecting 
their own patch and their own revenues. This means that instead of an integrated approach 
in which each supplier contributes an appropriately designed component that fits well in an 
overall ‘good’ solution, we are seeing a fragmented approach in which each supplier offers 
what they consider to be the ‘best’ solution, without taking into account the full retirement 
journey that the member needs to make. So, for example, we are seeing investment 
managers recommending equity income funds as the ‘best’ solution for providing 
retirement income, without any acknowledgement of the importance of dealing with 
longevity risk. Or we have advisers who see full regulated advice as the ‘best’ solution for 
everyone, irrespective of the size of their pension pot. Just as bad, we have advisers more 
concerned with inheritance tax planning than with managing longevity risk. All this is 
actually worse than the customer getting a ‘flat pack furniture unit’. At least with a ‘flat pack 
furniture unit’, you know what you are going to get, once you have put the pieces together 
correctly. What the customer is being offered now is a range of incomplete ‘flat pack 
furniture units’, with no clear way of putting them together and no obvious piece of 
furniture that is recognisable at the end of the exercise. 
There are other examples of bad practice. For example, we see providers and insurance 
companies relying on customer inertia to retain accumulation-stage customers, once they 
enter the decumulation stage. As Janette Weir, founder of Ignition House, said: ‘We are in 
danger in the drawdown market [that] we will make the same mistakes as in the annuity 
market. In the annuity market, inertia was key and people just went with their providers. It 
caused all sorts of problems. The FCA got involved and drawdown is compounding that, 
because, if the providers don't offer drawdown solutions and have appropriate funds to go 
with that, then people will find it impossible to shop around. It is really difficult for them’.814  
Another example is client poaching. Advisers have recently accused providers of 
inappropriate contact with clients that the advisers have ‘introduced’ to them, e.g., Aegon 
was accused of poaching dozens of an adviser’s clients for its direct-to-consumer (D2C) 
platform, although the FCA said the provider had broken no rules. A Professional Adviser 
survey of 76 advisers found that half had experienced at least one incidence of a provider 
contacting their clients in a way they felt was inappropriate. Some respondents thought that 
some providers were deliberately trying to undermine the relationship between the adviser 
and the client: ‘One provider wrote to a client without copying to me, stating: “As your 
adviser has not made any changes to your investment in the last three years, we have 
removed them as the adviser for this plan”. But we had been reviewing the plan annually. 
So this led to hours of work, needless contact and annoyance for the client’. Others said the 
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problem could be resolved if the adviser was always notified of any contact: ‘The 
relationship between client, adviser and provider should be seen as a partnership in its 
loosest form. As such, I am quite comfortable with providers contacting clients direct but 
with the proviso that a copy is sent to the adviser’. Nevertheless, most respondents wanted 
the FCA to intervene and limit the amount of freedom providers have to contact their 
clients.815  
Providers would certainly like to be able to give advice to their clients, as Paul Bucksey, head 
of DC at BlackRock, points out: ‘My sense is that there is a reluctance among members of 
pension schemes to pay for advice. [Providers can, and should, step in to fill the gap.] From 
an advisory point of view, anything we can do as a provider which is more than listing out a 
range of funds is good. From our perspective, we certainly welcome a bit more clarity 
around firstly acknowledging that people need some help, most people want to be told 
what to do…. Providers, like BlackRock, can do more without getting into personal 
recommendations. This concept of simplified advice, rules of thumb, being able to tell 
people they should be aiming to contribute about 15%, for example, is not ‘advice'. It is 
giving people some guidance, some rules of the road. If you go into drawdown, if you take 
an income of no more than 5%, that would be quite sustainable, but at the moment, people 
get there and ask: “how much should I take?”; “how much is too much?”’. Mr Bucksey’s 
colleague Tony Stenning, head of UK retail at BlackRock, added: ‘We should able to say this 
stuff without thinking it is advice. Or that it would not be construed as advice if it came from 
TPAS or MAS, but it would be if it came from BlackRock’.816 Clearly a number of providers 
feel that they should be able to offer this sort of financial help to their clients without having 
to bother about advisers. 
We believe that there should be a much more focused narrative based on an appropriate 
segmentation of the market and providing good integrated solutions for each market 
segment. There needs to be a much greater spirit of co-operation amongst the four main 
players involved in pension decumulation – at least in the early stages of the development 
of the new market. Even so, there will be winners and losers. The winners are likely to be 
providers benefiting from the inertia of their clients and investment managers offering 
decumulation products with flexibility and guarantees. The losers will be insurance 
companies selling annuities and advisers trying to get people with less than £100,000 to pay 
very much for advice.  Advisers offering simplified or robo-advice might have better luck in 
this market segment, but still might find it hard to get customers to pay much more than 
£100 per year for it. Advisers offering full regulated advice might find their client pool 
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restricted to those will assets above £100,000 – although it is also clear that many will be 
comfortable with only this type of cleint. 
3.20.1.5 The Financial Conduct Authority 
The current regulatory process is not working well either for customers or their advisers. 
The main reason for this is that the key regulator, the FCA, appears to be confused about 
whether the ‘human’ model of the customer is more appropriate than the ‘econ’ model. On 
the one hand, it talks of vulnerable consumers. On the other hand, its chief executive 
speaking at the NAPF investment conference in Edinburgh on 11 March 2015 says the 
consumers must take responsibility. Something that is really rather straightforward  –  the 
delivery of a pension, something we have been doing for hundreds of years – has become 
fiendishly complicated, not least because of endless regulatory interventions. 
Taking first the customer. In terms of products, there are no safe harbour products that the 
FCA is currently prepared to recognise. In terms of advice, the regulator distinguishes 
between half a dozen definitions of advice, while the average customer is unable to 
differentiate between advice and guidance. There are just too many different types of 
advice.   
Turning to advisers, they have become fearful of offering common sense solutions to clients.  
We are currently in the extraordinary position of having, on the one hand, people being 
given a whole new set of flexibilities, yet, on the other hand, it is apparently not possible for 
the industry to design a sensible default that helps manage the risks in Table 1.2 without 
coming up against the barrier of regulated advice. As Tony Stenning from BlackRock has 
said: ‘It is a minefield. People do need help and we have our hands tied behind our back. 
Clearly, one of the unintended consequences of RDR was the advice gap. Individuals now 
have much more flexibility and choice which is great, but that also increases their anxiety. 
When you ask people, they really want guidance and to be helped. [But] there is a very thin 
line between advising them and guiding them’.817  
There needs to be greater clarity on suitability and appropriateness. As Rachel Vahey has 
said: ‘Obviously, [the FCA] will need to develop new guidance on suitability. At the moment, 
it is clear drawdown is only suitable for those with large funds and who understand the risks 
and take them on comfortably’. 
Does a decision tree constitute advice? If so, is it regulated? If so, this needs to change. As 
mentioned previously, there is an important difference between ‘advisory’ and ‘advice’ in 
English law. The decision tree is advisory but not advice. However, there is no distinction 
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between ‘advisory’ and ‘advice’ in the current legislative framework. This too needs to 
change. 
One way out of the impasse is for the FCA to recognise safe harbour retirement income 
plans. These involve the use of key safe harbour products and a decision tree. Any adviser or 
provider who uses the decision tree and assesses the suitability of the safe harbour products 
for their customers would not subsequently face problems with the FOS. It is important that 
the FCA approves both the decision tree and the default options at the end of the decision 
tree, even if these can only be classified as options that are ‘good enough’, rather than the 
‘best’ possible options for member’s circumstances. 
In Chapter 2, we provided a list of potential safe harbour products:  
 In the annuities class:  
o Lifetime annuities (with/without capital protection) – fixed and inflation-
linked 
o Investment-linked annuities (with a minimum income underpin and 
with/without capital protection) 
o Enhanced annuities 
 In the drawdown class: 
o Capped drawdown (with a minimum income underpin) 
 In the hybrid class: 
o Variable annuities (with a minimum income underpin) 
o Guaranteed drawdown (with a minimum income underpin).  
It is important that there is full transparency over the product design and over charges for 
each of the above products – and that the charges are demonstrably not excessive. 
Retirement income solutions which do not offer longevity insurance that (together with the 
state and any defined benefit pensions) covers at least essential expenditure should not be 
given a safe harbour status. Products not granted safe harbour status should not be sold 
without regulated advice. Anyone selling them should be open to future claims for mis-
selling. 
As Derek Bradley, CEO of Panacea Adviser, also argues, simplified advice cannot work 
without simplified regulation: ‘Simplicity of financial advice delivery, it seems, is difficult to 
define. There is considerable uncertainty and fear of regulatory retro-retribution for getting 
it wrong, a lesson well and truly learned by advisers. Now here's a simple thought. What if 
the regulator were to define and approve what products could be safely placed in this 
simplified space, along with a simple set of tick-box questions and processes to confirm 
client understanding of product, purpose and suitability in any application. We know that 
would require responsibility from the FCA,….[but] even if FCA clarity was possible, the FOS 
does not do ‘clarity' to the extent it can be relied upon. It is the simplified advice killer. To 
425 
 
prove this a number of major firms have concluded that simplified advice is not “currently 
commercially viable”’.818  
Finally, the FCA needs to sort out the question of customer safeguards. As Huw Evans told a 
Work and Pensions Committee hearing in September 2015: ‘We must resolve the tension 
that came to light when the reforms were implemented around safeguards that have been 
put in place. Some customers deeply resent those safeguards and want to find a way round 
them. A decisions has to taken by policymakers to find a way forward. A resolution to that 
has to be sorted. As a part of that, we absolutely need to clarify what the advice 
requirements are. Some providers were still unclear when they had to ensure customers 
take regulated financial advice’.819  
3.20.1.6 Pension fraudsters and investment scammers  
When it introduced pension freedoms, the Government completely underestimated the 
extent to which pension fraudsters and investment scammers would also seek to enjoy 
these pension freedoms. A great deal of belated effort has gone in to trying to rectify this 
problem, but with limited success to date. It is a potentially bigger risk to pension scheme 
investors than, say, investment risk. 
3.20.1.7 The self-employed and non-eligible job holders 
There are around 4.5m who are self employed  and around 6.2m non-eligible job holders. 
This means that around 10.7m people working in the UK will not be auto-enrolled onto any 
pension scheme. Very little is known about their pension arrangements, although it is 
almost certainly the case that their pension arrangements need improving. 
The RSA did not believe that auto-enrolment of these groups into NEST or another of the 
larger master trust schemes was appropriate due to the administrative challenges, and also 
because of the clear preference amongst many of them to have flexible access to their 
savings.  Instead, the RSA proposed a Government-backed ISA to encourage these groups to 
save more, together with a nudge in the form of a ‘Save When Paid’ option to pay into the 
ISA when an invoice is received or a tax form has to be filled. 
3.20.2 Recommendations 
Our analysis in this Chapter leads us to make the following 12 recommendations. 
 
                                                     
818
 Derek Bradley (2014) Simplified advice can't work without simplified regulation, Professional Adviser, 30 
July. 
819
 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Comparing pensions to bank accounts ‘irresponsible’, ABI chief warns, 
Professional Adviser, 8 September.  
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Recommendation 3.1: Safe harbour retirement income plans 
We recommend that a quasi-default retirement income plan is designed and used by 
providers and advisers. This will involve a simple decision tree and a limited set of default 
pathways. The plan would be self-started following a guidance or advice surgery, and the 
plan member has the right to opt out until the point at which the longevity insurance kicks 
in.   
The guidance or advice surgery needs to collect information on: 
 pension pot size 
 other sources of lifelong income (especially any state and defined benefit 
pensions) 
 other sources of wealth (such as housing equity) 
 liabilities (e.g., mortgage, credit card debts) 
 health status 
 family circumstances, including bequest intentions  
 given other income sources, health status and family circumstances, decide the 
levels of expenditure that are considered essential, adequate and desired 
 tax position 
 risk attitude 
 risk capacity. 
The plan could be operated by a provider or an adviser. Two forms of the plan would be 
acceptable: 
 drawdown plus a deferred annuity, or 
 layering – first secure essential life-long expenditure (‘heating and eating’), then 
allow for luxuries.  
The plan must allow for:  
 access – the flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis 
 inflation protection (either directly or via investment performance), and  
 longevity insurance. 
The customer will choose from a set of safe harbour products approved by the regulator. 
The purpose of the decision tree is to identify the products that are most suitable for 
meeting the customer’s needs. To be feasible, any default pathway using a decision tree 
would need to be aligned with the guidance guarantee process in a way that it is not 
classified as regulated advice or a personal recommendation. This is because a decision 
tree is advisory – not advice – and so would be granted safe harbour status. Any adviser or 
provider making use of such a retirement income plan would be protected against future 
mis-selling claims.  
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A whole range of problems that emerged during the early months of ‘freedom and choice’ 
can be overcome by using such a default, e.g., lack of financial engagement and capability by 
members, ineffective communications, and scammers. 
 
Recommendation 3.2: Simplifying the definitions of information, guidance and advice 
We recommend that the Financial Conduct Authority: 
 reviews its multiple definitions of information, guidance and advice with a view to 
replacing them with just two categories: ‘personal recommendation’ and ‘financial 
help’, with the latter replacing everything that is not full regulated fee-based 
advice where the adviser takes responsibility for the personal recommendation 
 recognises that a quasi-default decumulation strategy is ‘advisory’ rather than 
‘advice’ and that advisers and providers should be able to explain the quasi-default 
decumulation strategy and assess suitability without this being classified as 
regulated advice. 
The simplest solution involves only three routes: 
 execution-only – the customer makes all the decisions (‘I want to do it myself’) 
 ‘financial help’ – the customer is helped or steered towards tailored options using a 
decision tree; but this is currently classified as advice (‘Help me do it’) 
 personal recommendation or full regulated advice (‘Do it for me’820) 
It is also important to recognise that guidance and advice cannot be a single event, but has 
to be a process. There needs to be periodic financial health checks or just simple reminders: 
 10 years prior to the nominated retirement date to confirm whether a de-risking 
glidepath is required and, if so, when it needs to begin 
 1 year prior to the nominated retirement date to re-confirm commencement date 
 at age 74 to review death benefits 
 at ages 80 and 85 to confirm implementation of longevity insurance (i.e., the switch 
to annuitisation if drawdown was used at the beginning of retirement). 
 
Recommendation 3.3: Appropriate segmentation of the advice market 
We recommend that: 
 an attempt is made to segment the advice market in a way that would be helpful 
to consumers. There are a number of ways of doing this, e.g.: 
                                                     
820
 Terms used by the Universities Superannuation Scheme. 
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o by level of assets – Is there a level of a ssets below which ‘financial help’ 
alone will be adequate (for most people) and above which full regulated 
advice is recommended?   
o by spending type – Are there spending types for whom ‘financial help’ 
alone will be adequate and are there spending types for whom full 
regulated advice is recommended? 
o by behavioural type, e.g., ‘econ’ or ‘human’. Econs only need information in 
order to make informed decisions. Humans face behavioural barriers and 
biases which need to be identified early on (e.g., low levels of financial 
literacy, overconfidence, and self-control and hyperbolic discounting 
problems). Are there simple nudges that would improve effective decision 
making by humans, such as:  
 help  
 What do ‘people like me’ do? 
 advice (simple and targeted)? 
 an attempt is made to agree on: 
o the appropriate level of help or advice for each market segment 
o the appropriate role of technology (e.g., robo-advice) for each market 
segment. 
The service in economy class is broadly similar across different commercial airlines and the 
same is true for business class and first class. Millions of people are content with this simple 
classification. Why can’t the financial advice market be segmented in a similar way? 
 
Recommendation 3.4: Turning financial advisers into a recognised profession 
We recommend that financial advisers undertake a review of their industry with a view to 
transforming themselves into a recognised profession. The following issues would be 
covered in the review: 
 formalising and improving the professional (including training) standards of 
advisers 
 introducing a fiduciary standard for financial advisers who provide full regulated 
advice 
 the appropriate charging model for the service offered (fixed fee or percentage of 
assets), with the charges demonstrably delivering value for money to the customer 
and with full transparency over charges. 
Financial advisers are not a recognised profession, yet they wish to provide advice on 
billions of pounds of UK retirement savings. Further, research by the FCA shows that 
customers are put off seeking financial advice because they are unable to trust the advice 
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they receive or judge its quality. The obvious solution is to transform themselves into a 
recognised profession. They should continue to improve their professional standards, 
accepting that the advice market might be smaller, although more profitable as a result. In 
particular, the professional training of advisers should be improved, with a much greater 
emphasis on understanding the risks involved in delivering retirement income solutions and 
how those risks can be measured, monitored and managed.821   
Advisers should also consider introducing a fiduciary standard for those who provide full 
regulated advice, as in starting in the US. This requires advisers to act solely in their clients’ 
best interests.822  
The current disparate views expressed by the industry on both the nature of the service 
offered (ranging from ‘everyone needs bespoke advice’ to ‘advice is only necessary for the 
very well off’) and the charging model (fixed hourly rate vs percent-of-assets) is not helpful 
to consumers or in the long-term interests of advisers. We need a common national 
narrative on both these issues, bearing in mind that surveys show that most consumers are 
not currently prepared to pay very much for advice, because they do not place much value 
on it.  
In terms of adviser fees, there needs to be much greater justification of ad valorem fees 
where the fee is unrelated to the amount of work done. Such fees are now very uncommon 
in most other types of professional services organisations. Charges also need to be 
transparent and easy to understand. It is not acceptable in this day and age that a potential 
client needs to have a long face-to-face meeting with an adviser before they are told what 
the charge will be, and then feel under some moral pressure to accept this charge. 
 
Recommendation 3.5: Review of the unresolved implementation challenges of the 
pension reforms  
We recommend that the Financial Conduct Authority: 
                                                     
821
 The actuarial profession was required to do this following the Equitable Life debacle and the resulting 
Morris Review of the Actuarial Profession in 2005. Further, there are only around 5,000 actuaries in the UK, 
less than 25% of the number of financial advisers;  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/morris_final.pdf 
822
 Following the Morris Review, the actuarial profession adopted five core ethical principles which should 
underpin the conduct of all members when related to their professional lives (see The Actuary Magazine, 
August 2009): 
 Integrity 
 Competence and care 
 Impartiality 
 Compliance 
 Openness. 
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 reviews the circumstances where mandatory advice is necessary 
 clarifies the legal consequences for customers, advisers and providers when 
‘insistent clients’ act against advice. 
We support proposals, made by the ABI and others, to deal with the remaining 
implementation challenges of the pension reforms.  
 
Recommendation 3.6: Review of the powers of independent governance committees  
We recommend that the Government reviews the powers of independent governance 
committees (IGCs) in contract-based schemes with a view to making them equivalent to 
the powers of trustees in trust-based schemes.  
This essentially means giving IGCs a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of scheme 
members. For example, IGCs should be given the power to fire an underperforming fund 
manager without requiring the members’ express consent. 
 
Recommendation 3.7: Dealing with pension fraud and investment scams 
We recommend the following measures are taken to deal with the problems of pension 
fraud and investment scams: 
 all financial product sales (covering both regulated and unregulated products) 
should be brought under a common regulatory umbrella 
 telemarketing (cold-calling) should be made illegal 
 penalties for pension fraud and investment scams should be greatly increased.  
There can be no hiding place for pension fraudsters and investment scammers. 
 
Recommendation 3.8: Customer responsibility  
We recommend that the Government initiates a national debate amongst relevant 
stakeholders on the appropriate degree of customer responsibility and what industry and 
regulators need to do before consumers can reasonably become liable for their decisions 
in retirement. 
Associated with this should be attempts to improve customer engagement via better 
customer communications. 
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Recommendation 3.9: Introduction of an ‘early warning system’ to help retirees 
We recommend that the Government introduces the following measures to support 
consumers as soon as possible: 
 a ‘pensions dashboard’ 
 ‘personal pension alerts’ to help policymakers intervene where appropriate with 
the sub-groups it has identified as at particularly high risk.  
We support the various proposals that have been made to develop a ‘pensions dashboard’ 
that would enable consumers to view all their lifetime pension savings (including their state 
pension) in one place. In the past, this idea has been dismissed as too much of a 
technological challenge, given the multiple data bases that this information is held on, but 
we understand that the technology is now available to do this.823  
We also support the proposal for introducing ‘personal pension alerts’, developed by the 
Social Market Foundation, which would enable potential interventions, such as ‘targeted 
support and advice; initiatives to make retirees think twice before taking one-off decisions 
such as withdrawing all their pension savings; and, a “mid-retirement financial health check” 
to encourage older people to reconsider their financial position for their later years’. 
 
Recommendation 3.10: Monitoring outcomes 
We recommend that the Government puts in place a monitoring mechanism to assess the 
success of the ‘freedom and choice’ pension reforms. This should be benchmarked against 
the criteria for a good pension scheme listed in Recommendation 1.1 and Table 1.1. 
Data should be collected from sources such as Pension Wise, the ABI, the FCA and HMRC.  
Focus groups should be established to discuss their experience. We support the Work and 
Pensions Select Committee’s request for better information on: ‘customer characteristics of 
those using freedoms from pot size to sources of retirement income; take-up of each 
channel of guidance; reasons for not taking up guidance and advice; subsequent decisions 
made and reasons for those decisions’. 
 
 
                                                     
823 In January 2016, it was reported that the FCA and TPR were working on designing a ‘pensions dashboard’. 
Michael Roe, development manager at Origo, said that the technical architecture was available to support this 
initiative (reported in Sara Benwell (2016) FCA and TPR working together on pensions dashboard, Pensions 
Insight, 22 January). 
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Recommendation 3.11: The annuities market 
We recommend: 
 The  sale of immediate annuities should be via an auction 
 The Government should facilitate and encourage the development of a market in 
deferred annuities.  
The first point deals with the problem identified by the FCA in 2014, namely ‘consumers’ 
tendency to buy from their existing pension provider [which] weakens competitive 
discipline. Not only do incumbent providers feel less pressure to offer competitive vesting 
rates, but challengers find it difficult to attract a critical mass of consumers. As a result, 
there has been limited new entry into the decumulation market in recent years’. It is also 
likely that these annuities will be medically underwritten, i.e., applicants have to fill in a 
medical questionnaire which asks health and lifestyle questions. 
The second point attempts to address the problem that an open market in deferred 
annuities does not exist in the UK, yet is essential to provide the longevity insurance needed 
for the decumulation default to work (see Recommendation 3.1). The various reasons why 
a deferred annuity market does not exist (e.g., onerous regulatory capital requirements 
under Solvency II) need to be addressed. 
 
Recommendation 3.12: The self-employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-
enrolment  
We recommend that the Government: 
 considers revising the qualification for auto-enrolment from a ‘per job’ basis to an 
‘combined jobs’ basis 
 begins to collect more reliable information on the pension arrangements of the 
self-employed and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment 
 investigates the possibility of establishing a Government-backed arrangement (like 
an ISA) to help these groups save for their retirement 
 considers how to help these groups draw a retirement income in a cost-effective 
manner. 
The combined size of these two groups is significant: 4.5m self-employed people (17% of the 
employed population) and 6.2m non-eligible job holders (24% of the employed population), 
implying that around 11m people working in the UK will not be auto-enrolled onto any 
pension scheme.  
The qualification for auto-enrolment is assessed on a ‘per job’ basis, which implies that 
individuals with a number of low-paid jobs will be excluded from auto-enrolment onto a 
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pension scheme. The PPI estimates that ‘if the income from both first and second jobs was 
taken into account when assessing eligibility for automatic enrolment, then a further 80,000 
people (60,000 women and 20,000 men) would earn enough to meet the qualifying criteria’. 
We fully recognise the practical difficulties of implementing this recommendation. Further, 
the recommendation might not actually be desirable if it results in workers falling into a 
benefit trap. Indeed, it might be the case that the only feasible way of dealing with this 
group of workers is through the state pension system. 
We could find no accurate data on the combined number of the self-employed or non-
eligible job holders with individual DC policies. Similarly, when it comes to decumulation, it 
is likely that these groups will fail to benefit from institutional value for money solutions and 
instead will have to rely on the high-cost retail market, unless NEST establishes a 
decumulation scheme which they could join. 
We support the call of the Resolution Foundation ‘for greater intervention to ensure the 
self-employed [and and non-eligible job holders for auto-enrolment] are adequately 
prepared for their later years’. These groups should be encouraged to save more for their 
retirement, but in a way that allows them flexible access to their savings and has low 
charges. We therefore support the recommendation of the RSA for the introduction of a 
Government-backed ISA (e.g., provided by National Savings & Investments) to facilitate this. 
In addition, the groups could be encouraged to join NEST. We also support the RSA’s ‘Save 
When Paid’ proposal which automatically diverts a percentage of every pay cheque to a 
savings account. 
When it comes to drawing an income in retirement, both groups should be allowed access 
to a national decumulation scheme like NEST (once its decumulation blueprint has been 
implemented).  
Appendix: Information services for customers and advisers 
Services for customers 
In September 2015, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA) launched a Financial Services Register of firms and individual and collective 
investment schemes. The register will include the names of unauthorised firms as well as 
firms knowingly running a scam.824 
The Money Advice Service's (MAS) retirement adviser directory was launched in April 2015. 
It contains a list of 5,000 financial advisers – both independent and restricted – specialising 
in retirement planning for those wanting to access regulated paid-for advice following the 
introduction of the new pensions regime. The directory asks people a number of filtering 
                                                     
824
 Reported in Laura Miller (2015) FCA to include scam firms in relaunch of official register, Professional 
Adviser, 4 September.  
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questions, such as why they want advice and what size of pot they have, to ensure they are 
guided to the most suitable advisers. The MAS is also working on a charges display to its 
directory so people can compare costs before they seek advice. A total of 6,000 people 
accessed the directory in its first month of operation, although MAS is not currently able to 
say how many people went on to receive advice.825 
In April 2015, the Personal Finance Society launched a consumer financial education website 
called Yourmoney to help consumers make better informed decisions about their personal 
finances.826 It contains a fully-searchable directory of more than 22,000 accredited financial 
advisers, all of whom are members of the PFS and must abide by the society's code of 
professional ethics. The directory contains information on the costs of professional advice. It 
also contains links to financial planning tools from the Money Advice Service, Which? and 
Moneyfacts. It can be accessed at: www.thepfs.org/yourmoney.827 
In March 2015, the Association of British Insurers launched Your Retirement, Your Choice, a 
campaign to help customers understand their choices in retirement in the new pensions 
environment. Its aim is to prevent people from rushing into decisions, while pointing them 
to the Government's guidance guarantee. It will also make people aware of pension scams 
and how to avoid becoming a victim.828 
In October 2015, the Money Advice Service launched a 10-year strategy to enhance financial 
capability in the UK.829 The aim is to improve people's ability to manage money well day to 
day, prepare for and manage life events, and deal with financial difficulties. It will also 
educate people about the difference between financial guidance and advice, help them 
understand when they need advice and how to get it. The work will cover consumers of all 
ages – from education in schools to at-retirement. Progress will be monitored through a 
'financial capability survey' and formal reviews will be published in 2020 and 2025, alongside 
updates on the strategy's website. Advisers will be able to contribute to the strategy by 
joining a number of steering groups, which will each have their set of specific targets and 
success measurements. 
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Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Thousands flock to MAS adviser directory in first month, Professional 
Adviser, 6 May.  
826
 The Personal Finance Society is one of a number of associations in the UK to which financial advisers are 
affiliated. Two others are the Institute of Financial Planning (IFP) and the Chartered Institute of Securities and 
Investment (CISI). In August 2015, it was announced that the IFP would merge with the CISI in November 2015. 
827
 Reported in Laura Miller (2015) PFS launches consumer education website with 22,000 strong adviser 
database, Professional Adviser, 24 April. 
828
 Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) ABI launches pension freedom awareness campaign, Professional 
Adviser, 17 March. 
829 
Reported in Carmen Reichman (2015) Consumer education strategy looking at guidance and advice 
launched, Professional Adviser, 28 October. 
435 
 
The strategy will be governed by MAS's Financial Capability Board, whose members at the 
time of launch were: 
 Andy Briscoe, chair, the Money Advice Service (chair of the Board) 
 Jasper Berens, head of UK Funds, JP Morgan 
 Sherard Cowper-Coles, senior advisor, HSBC and chair of the Financial Inclusion 
Commission 
 Benny Higgins, chief executive, Tesco Bank 
 Elaine Kempson, emeritus professor, University of Bristol 
 Lily Lapenna, founder & co-chief executive, MyBnk 
 Phil Loney, group chief executive, Royal London  
 Eleanor Marks, deputy director communities division, Welsh Government 
 Louise Macdonald, chief executive, Young Scot 
 Gwyneth Nurse, director of financial services, HM Treasury 
 Steve Pateman, executive director, head of UK banking, Santander 
 Caroline Rookes, chief executive, the Money Advice Service 
 Roger Sanders, managing director, Lighthouse Group 
 Hector Sants, chair Archbishop of Canterbury's Task Group and StepChange Debt 
Charity 
 Otto Thoresen, chair, National Employment Savings Trust 
 Sian Williams, head of national services, Toynbee Hall 
 Chris Woolard, director of strategy and competition, Financial Conduct Authority 
 Tom Wright, group chief executive, Age UK  
Services for financial advisers 
Defaqto has launched a pension ratings service for financial advisers in May 2015 which 
measures the quality of the service from pension providers. Pension Service Ratings uses 
advisers' satisfaction scores on 41 aspects of service to set the provider ratings. The data 
was collected using a survey of 500 financial advisers who advise on personal pension 
products. Defaqto then allocates providers to the following classes: gold, silver or bronze, or 
not rated.830 
F&TRC launched a similar service in July 2015.831  Pension providers are awarded a gold, 
silver or bronze rating depending on their proposition in eight sub-categories:  
 Product offering and administration 
 Investment and fund options 
 Record keeping and governance 
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Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Defaqto launches pension ratings service, 1 May. 
831
 Reported in Retirement Planner (2015) F&TRC launches ratings service for workplace pensions, 14 July. 
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 Scheme setup 
 Joiners and leavers process 
 Education 
 At-retirement options 
 Auto-enrolment process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
